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Traditionally, intervention has been investigated within 
a legalistic framework, or as a minor offshoot of power 
theories, or with a normative, moral, or policy-oriented 
thrust. To note the predominance of moral, legal, and 
strategic emphases in the literature concerning intervention 
is not to imply that these investigations have been misguided, 
for any individual needs only a modicum of humanity to be 
aware of the moral issues and legal questions involved when 
one international actor intervenes in the affairs of another.
This study, however, will investigate the systemic sources 
of interventionary and penetrative behavior. This study 
begins with the basic assumptions that potent sources of 
intervention are to be found within the systemic structure 
of the international system and within the systemic structure 
of the "intervened" national actor. Furthermore, it seems 
that only an approach using systems analysis, specifically 
across-systems theory, with its flexibility in analyzing all 
levels of interactions and relationships, offers a simple 
method of organizing and understanding the underlying factors 
which encourage intervention and penetration.
Several national and international scholars use a 
systems framework to generate explanations, and even though 
system theorists employ a variety of versions and applications, 
the basic idea of a systems framework is to design "a simpli­
fied model of a complex entity that may be defined by its 
systemic characteristics."^ This chapter should not be con­
strued as an overview of systems theory literature. By re­
viewing the models of a few systems theorists, this chapter 
will simply illustrate the scope and the variety of definitional 
emphasis, versions, and applications of systems framework.
The political systems approach is most fully articulated 
in the influential works of David Easton, which draw heavily 
on the communication science of cybernetics and on general 
systems theory. In his book. The Political System, published 
in 1953, Easton surveyed the condition of political science 
as a discipline and contended that the prime reason for the 
poor state of the discipline was the absence of a theoretical 
orientation which would provide meaning, coherence, and di­
rection to on-going research. He professed that a conceptual 
framework was needed in order to give relevancy and orien­
tation to political research and argued for the use of the 
systems concept, which is "an analytical tool designed to
identify those integrally related aspects of concrete social
2reality that can be called political."
Easton seeks to define the kinds of functions character­
istic of any political system and to examine "the basic pro-
cesses through which a political system, regardless of its 
genetic or specific type, is able to persist as a system of
3behavior in a world either of stability or change.” Easton 
holds that "there are certain basic activities and processes 
characteristic of all political systems even though the struc­
tural forms through which they manifest themselves may and do 
vary considerably in each place and each age." The requisite 
function of any political system, and the criteria by which a
political system is distinguished from other kinds of systems
5is the "authoritative allocation of values for a society."
According to Easton, systems theory is based on the
notion of political life as a boundary-maintaining set 
of interactions imbedded in and surrounded by other 
social systems to the influence of which it is constantly 
exposed. As such, it is helpful to interpret political 
phenomena as constituting an open system, one that must 
cope with the problems generated by its exposure to 
influences from these environmental systems. If a 
system of this kind is to persist through time, it must 
be able to take measures that regulate its future 
behavior. Regulation may call for simple adaptation 
to a changing setting in the light of fixed goals.
But it may also include efforts to modify old goals 
or transform them entirely. Simple adaptation may not 
be enough. To persist it may be necessary for a system 
to have the capacity to transform its own internal 
structure and processes."
A political system, which is an aspect of the whole social
system, is the aggregation of interrelated human activities
having to do with the formulation and effectuation of community
policies for "the authoritative allocation of values for a
society." Those interactions which are not predominantly
oriented toward "the authoritative allocation of values for
a society" constitute the environment, to which the political
system is open and responsive.
Easton, whose paradigm is identified with what is termed
7"input-output analysis," directs his attention to the capa­
city of political systems to respond to their environment 
since systems are open to varying degrees of influences from 
the environment as well as from within the system itself. 
Influences from the environment are conceptualized as inputs, 
summary variables of demands and supports. Demands, which 
are mainly concerned with matters relating to the allocation 
of resources, materials, or positions, are able to penetrate 
the boundaries of the system despite the "gatekeeping" func­
tions of such filtering institutions as parties and interest 
groups. These gatekeeping institutions, which aggregate and 
articulate the diffuse and undifferentiated demands, regulate 
the volume and variety of demands in order to keep the flow 
of demands manageable for the decision-making institutions 
of the political system. The whole process of demand regu­
lation reflects an elitist orientation since the system will
g
respond to the politically relevant members: "all members
will not have equal access and the decision-makers will respond 
to those members with political capital— money, prestige,
9organization, status."
Supports may be either for the society (the set of 
political institutions comprising the current regime) or for 
the output of the political system. (The outputs of the system 
consist of the decisions which authoritatively allocate the
values of the society.) The first type of support is much 
more stable than the last type. Although every system depends 
on specific support which is generated by "the satisfaction 
a member feels when he perceives his demands as having been 
met, a system may seek to instill in its members a high level 
of diffuse support in order that regardless of what happens 
the members will continue to be bound by its strong ties of 
loyalty and affection.
Outputs which represent the system’s response to demands, 
are the policies or decisions allocating system benefits. Out­
puts generate the process of feedback, information concerning 
the state of the system and its environment, which is communi­
cated back to the authorities. "The capacity of a system to 
persist in the face of stress is a function of the presence 
and nature of the information and other influences that return 
to its actors and decision-makers."^^ However, "even if the 
authorities do obtain accurate information, lack of will to 
use it, lack of resources to put it to use, inadequate wisdom 
and skills in doing so may all contribute as much to an in­
ability to meet a decline in support as the absence of such 
information feedback itself.
Easton's predominant concern is with the maintenance of 
the system or with the question of how the system maintains 
the existing pattern of interaction in the face of stress or 
external/environmental disturbances. His basic proposition 
is that three variables— demands, supports, and outputs—
tend to maintain a balance or an equilibrium despite changing
magnitudes of each of the variables. This primary concern with
system maintenance underlies an implicit static, conservative,
or status quo bias in Eastonian analysis. Easton attempts to
overcome this status quo bias by not equating system maintenance
with the total absence of change and by introducing the concept
of system persistence which is different from rigid maintenance
13of the status quo.
System persistence means that a system may change up to a 
point and still persist; a system will react to varying degrees 
of stress by changing or adapting its capacities to handle 
such stress. "System analysis directs our attention toward 
the processes that all types of political systems share and 
that make it possible for them to cope, however successfully, 
with stresses that threaten to destroy the capacity of a 
society to sustain any political system at all."^^ However, 
Easton does not explain whether such system change creates 
a radical alteration within a persisting system or if it 
creates an entirely new political system. Easton does not 
discuss quantitative volume or qualitative intensity of stress, 
nor does he specify a range of permissible change within 
which a system adapts and persists beyond which a system 
breaks down or "non-persists." This issue which is essentially 
the problem of system transformation is crucial in the appli­
cation of the system concept to any real system. In a system 
there are variables and relations between the variables and
when the variables change, the relationships change. It would 
be absurd to say that a system continued as long as the vari­
ables remained the same, since the important characteristic 
of a system is the pattern of relationships not the actual 
individual variables. Change in actual variables might not 
be viewed as a critical factor in determining whether the 
system has been transformed, however, major changes in the
number of variables might alter the pattern of relationships 
15considerably. Although Easton never adequately deals with
systemic change and systemic persistence, system theory does
direct its attention to system transformation and this concern
has special relevance for many international students who must
take into account the powerful transformational influences
operating at the international level.
Easton posits that his model is suitable for the global
system, he states :
...an international system is Just another system at a 
different level of organization... it is amenable to 
investigation through the same conceptual apparatus that 
is being developed in this volume with respect to what 
we normally call domestic political systems....This 
interpretation of the international political system 
as Just another kind of political system cognate with 
any national system creates no theoretical hardships, 
at least with the systems conceptualization developed 
here...we can identify in the international system all 
of the basic variables that we have already discussed 
for political systems in general.17
The systems approach at the international level is of con­
siderable value, however, one must question the suitability
18of Easton's particular model. As noted earlier, Easton 
defines the essential variables of a political system as "the
(authoritative) allocation of values for a society and the
19relative frequency of compliance with them." In the global 
system do "authorities" exist, and if so who are the "authori­
ties?" According to Easton, authorities in this case are 
much "less centralized than in most modern systems, less con­
tinuous in their operation and more contingent on events, as 
in the case of primitive systems. Nevertheless, historically 
the great powers and, more recently, various kinds of inter­
national organizations, such as the League of Nations and 
the United Nations, have been successful, intermittently, in
resolving differences that were not privately negotiated and
20in having them accepted as authoritative." However, the
problem is the excessive instability of the "authorities" or
the uncertainty of who can or will act as the authority in
21relation to a particular demand. According to Easton’s
conceptualization the authorities do not always have to be
the same and precisely identifiable, but if the source of
authoritative allocation cannot be identified or is very
unstable, the information concerning demands and supports
cannot flow in a sufficiently constant and persistent pattern,
22and the systemic processes break down. Moreover, the 
systemic processes cannot be sustained by the actions of 
the politically powerful: "Whatever the politically powerful
members in fact decided to do, their decisions and actions 
would not have the compelling quality of authoritative allo­
cations; if their own demands are not processed through the
authorities, they 'would not be converted into recognized 
systemic outputs.'" Actions on the part of the politically 
powerful could be considered a systemic process of some kind, 
but not of the type conceptualized by Easton. The point 
being made is not that there has always/or never been an 
authoritative allocation in the global system, "merely that 
on the continuum between these two extremes the global system 
is very much closer to the latter than perhaps Easton im­
plies.
Another critical systemic element is the input of support
which gives a system legitimacy, this is minimal or lacking
25at the global level. Although Easton's major concern is 
to determine how political systems persist in the face of 
stress, he contends that the absence of a sense of legitimacy 
at the global level "need not constitute a danger or threat
26of stress for the system." There seems to be little logic
in the contention that there is no danger to the system, since
a system may exist with no sense of legitimacy. The global
system's ability to persist in the face of stress is reduced
27tremendously by the lack of a sense of legitimacy.
The difficulty in identifying the "authorities," the 
threat to the processing of demands, and the question of support 
and legitimacy, lead one to question the usefulness of Easton's 
model as an aid to understanding the global system, which is 
essentially anarchical— one in which values are not authori-
28tatively allocated through the processes identified by Easton.
10
Another problem In applying Easton's framework to the 
international system is that Easton gives more attention to 
the processes of the system than to those of its environment. 
Even though Easton attempts to delineate the nature of political 
systems and the boundaries between them and their environments 
and notes that political processes of a society are responsive 
to developments which unfold in the environment beyond its 
boundary, he does not offer any systematic ways in which these 
developments abroad could be interdependent and thereby gene­
rate environmental processes which could in turn condition 
societal processes. Easton’s approach which distinguishes 
between intra- and extra-societal environments of a political 
system, the latter consisting of such entities as other 
political systems, social systems, and international organi­
zations, such as NATO, the United Nations, international
social structure, international economic system, merely
pocategorizes the two environments. Nowhere are the phenomena 
embraced by his categories posited as interdependent or con­
ceived as self-sustaining processes which could lead to 
predictable forms of behavior. To know that the external 
environment consists of other political, economic, and social 
systems, to assert that the external environment is a source 
of inputs into a system is not to explain how that society 
may respond to them nor to suggest the existence of interde­
pendencies.^^ In short, as Rosenau notes, "categorization...
is not conceptualization, and thus Easton offers no help to
31the researcher interested in horizontal forms of analysis"
11
of international politics.
Easton's interest in the functions of the political systems
•52is shared by Herbert Spiro, whose formulations constitute 
another version of input-output analysis. Spiro's paradigm 
revolves around the processing of issues, which involves a 
four-phase policy-flow process: the formulation of issues
(identification or recognition of the problem), the deliberation 
of issues (the consideration of alternatives), the resolution 
of issues (selection of one of various alternatives which 
had been considered), and solution of the problem which 
created the issue (application of the decision). Other ele­
ments in his paradigm include a two-dimension classification 
scheme of all political issues. The first of these dimensions 
refers to time— an issue may be viewed as either "fundamental" 
or "circumstantial." A fundamental ' ue is considered basic 
to the system, whereas a circumstantial issue is concerned 
only with present circumstances or a particular situation.
The second dimension of political issues relates to their 
content— issues are perceived as being either procedural 
(concerned with the method by which issues are processed), or 
substantive (concerned with the content of the decisions).
Spiro also classifies issues according to problems— consti­
tutional problems, economic problems, power problems, and
33cultural problems— which arise out of the system's goals.
All political systems are more or less deliberately 
directed toward four basic goals: stability, flexibility,
efficiency, and effectiveness. This fourfold classification
12
of system goals corresponds to a fourfold categorization of 
political style— legalism, pragmatism, ideologism, violence.
In different political systems or in any one political system 
at different times, more or less emphasis is given to one or 
more of the basic goals, to one or more phases of the policy 
process, and/or to one or more types of issues and problems. 
These emphasis differences can be described or explained in
•3l|terms of political style. For example, a political system 
which is preoccupied exclusively with the basic goal of 
stability and emphasizes the formulation and deliberation 
of constitutional issues to the neglect of the other goals, 
issue-processing phases, and problems (economic, power, 
cultural) is said to be legalistic. A political system whose 
style is violent emphasizes the goal of efficiency (or the 
desire to solve problems immediately) and often resorts to 
armed conflict to resolve issues. Where political style is 
violent, power problems are likely to occupy the center stage. 
Pragmatism results from excessive concern with the basic goal 
of flexibility (or the desire to keep the future permanently 
open, to be permanently in a position to avail oneself of 
novelty). Where political style is pragmatic, economic prob­
lems are likely to predominate. A political system whose 
political style is ideological is excessively concerned with 
the goal of effectiveness. In this system, the main preoccu­
pation is to create values and to enforce "if necessary, the 
population's permanent commitment to values that can offer
13
answers to all questions and solutions to all problems, in a
35manner both comprehensive and consistent." Where political 
style is ideological, cultural problems are likely to pre­
dominate .
Spiro recognizes that actual political systems do not 
exhibit "undiluted" or "pure" political styles, they contain 
a combination or variety of styles: for example, both prag­
matism and violence in Stalinist Russia and both pragmatism 
and legalism in the United States. However, differences between 
political systems with respect to stability and successful 
processing of issues can be explained by the fact that actual 
political systems do emphasize certain political styles and
deemphasize others, occasionally to the detriment of the flow 
37of policy. He holds that a successful system must process 
its real issues and this depends on the achievement of a 
dynamic equilibrium among the four system goals. If one goal 
is stressed to the preclusion of others a pathological political
O O
style will develop and interfere with the processing of issues.
Spiro’s paradigm which fails to specify precise empirical 
indicators for its key concepts is fraught with methodological 
difficulties. He does not indicate how he would operationalize 
his concepts of political style, he does not offer criteria 
to measure the degree of legalism, pragmatism, violence, or 
ideologism in a given system, and he does not specify a thres­
hold level beyond which a political system would fail due to 
its pathological political style. Moreover, Spiro’s basic
14
proposition is that a system must process its real issues or 
fail, yet he does not define "real" issues, he does not assign 
weights to various issues (all issues are not,of equal impor­
tance), and he does not indicate what percentage of issues must
•30be processed. Spiro’s explanations are imprecise and incom­
plete, nevertheless he does attempt to explain systematically
the difference between actual political systems and why some
40are more likely to succeed (or fail) than others.
Like Easton's framework, Spiro's paradigm is applicable
to many levels of analysis. For example, at the international
level Spiro compares the style of world politics in the
period before World War I to the era of the Cold War— in the
former the goal of flexibility was stressed, whereas in the
latter the goal of stability (motivated by the fear of nuclear
violence). During the Cold War era international politics
frequently oscillated from the legalism of a John Poster Dulles
in the 1956 Suez Crisis to the pragmatism of a Lyndon Johnson
4lin the 1965 Dominican Republic Crisis.
Spiro defines a political system as a community that is
processing its issues. He holds that a "political system can
exist whenever people are concerned about common problems and
are engaged in cooperation and conflict in efforts to solve
42these problems." In the light of the previous statement
Spiro asserts that "today for the first time in history a
global community exists or at any rate is coming into exis-
4?tence in the consciousness of human beings..." "No quali­
15
tative or 'essential' difference in political process can be
found between lower political systems and the all encompassing
global system to warrant the study of two different levels
of politics..." Spiro's definition of a global or political
community rejects the focus on power, or "the legitimate
physical compulsion" (Almond), or on the state. Like Easton,
Spiro applies his framework to the international level, however,
by the definitional nature of the political system, Spiro
sidesteps Easton's problem— mainly that at the global level
no person or institution has a monopoly of the instruments of
coercion, therefore, there is no global authority which can
make allocations of values which are generally accepted as
being binding. Spiro believes that the political system is
dominant; he rejects the "prevailing narrow view of the political
system as a subsystem of the society." The political system
is, according to Spiro, "more important, more comprehensive,
45and 'greater' than the social system."
By focusing upon the state as the political system, Spiro
believes the analysis of international politics is distorted
because it leads to the qualitative distinction between national
46and international politics. He gives limited praise to
Morton Kaplan who avoids this type of distortion by rejecting
the focus on power and by denying that the political system "is
4?the coercive subsystem in the social system." Kaplan, who
"focuses upon a political system whose geographic scope is
48defined by the purpose of a particular analysis," sees the
16
main difference between national political systems and the 
international system as in the fact that the former are "system 
dominant" and the latter is "subsystem dominant." Politics, 
according to Kaplan, "is the contest to fill decision-making 
roles, to choose alternate political objects, or to change the
49essential rules of the political system." Even though Kaplan’s
view of politics is more acceptable than Morganthau’s , Easton’s,
or Almond’s, Spiro still considers it unsatisfactory "partly
because of its definitional nature, partly because it does
not entirely overcome the danger of compartmentalization: 'a
political system exists when its constitution and laws are
50communicated successfully within a social system.’" Thus,
rejecting the more "conventional" view of the political system
and proceeding upon the assumption that the political system
should not be considered an operating component of the social
system, Spiro builds his "global system" which is based on the
thesis of "the universality of basic political processes, no
51matter when or where they are taking place."
Whether or not a political system exists depends not 
upon acceptance as legitimate or authoritative of the 
same goals by all, or by some proportion of, the 
participants ; nor upon the capacity of any of the 
participants to compel others; nor upon the stability 
over a prolonged period of time of the essential rules 
governing the process. It depends, rather upon the 
participants’ awareness of their participation in the 
political process. The point here is that the participants 
through their consciousness impose upon their interaction 
the characteristics of a system. This means that a set 
of interactions of only brief duration not only can be 
analyzed as a political system, but may actually 
be a political system.52
17
Easton and Spiro are primarily concerned with the func­
tions of the political system, whereas international analysts 
Morton Kaplan, Charles McClelland, and Richard Rosecrance, 
view nation-states or national actors as the predominant or 
significant units and seek to explain interactions between 
national actors by phenomena such as their previous inter­
action and the structure of the system.
Morton Kaplan defines a system as "a set of variables 
so related in contradistinction to its environment, that 
describable behavioral regularities characterize the internal 
relationships of the set of individual variables to combinations 
of external v a r i a b l e s . H e  contends that the international 
system is subsystem dominant, for a system can only be con­
sidered dominant over its subsystems when "the essential rules 
of the...system act as parametric 'givens’ for any single sub­
system. A subsystem becomes dominant to the extent that the
essential rules of the system cannot be treated as parametric 
[5/1’givens.’" Charles McClelland, who views system theory as 
furnishing a framework for understanding, identifying, mea­
suring, and examining interaction within a system and its 
subsystems, states:
The strategy, first of all, of conceiving of many 
kinds of phenomena in terms of working relations among 
their parts, and then labeling them systems according 
to a definition of what part of the problem is most 
relevant, is the key to the approach. Then, the 
procedures of bypassing many complexities in order 
to investigate relationships between input and 
output, or systematically moving to different 
levels of analysis by recognizing the link of sub­
systems to systems, of being alert to "boundary phe­
nomena" and the ranges of normal operations of sub­
18
systems and systems, and of taking into account both 
"parameters" and "perturbations" in the environments 
of systems are other major parts of the general systems 
apparatus.55
He conceives of the international system as an expanded version 
of the notion of two actors-in-interaction. The international 
system, which is complex, one that has much variety in the 
process of changing from one state to another, and multi­
dimensional, encompasses all interactions in full scope— "all
of the exchanges, transactions, contacts, flows of information,
56and actions of every kind." McClelland who contends that
the international system cannot be viewed "from the lofty
57vantage point where the whole system is envisaged," believes 
in focusing attention upon one level of analysis at a time. 
McClelland concentrates on interaction between the national 
actors, specifically prior transactions between national units 
and any significant variation in the flow of action within the 
system.
58McClelland’s essay "The Acute International Crisis" ex­
plicates the event/interaction model which describes the state 
of the international system in terms of its pattern, structure, 
and performance. Using interaction analysis, McClelland 
examines cases of crisis, whose sequences of action-reaction 
can be traced (since the time span and focus of inquiry are 
narrowed), and posits that present international interactions
can be explained by previous international/event sequences and
59systemic configurations. A basic assumption underlying his 
framework is that events in crises form a chain of interaction
19
sequences and that these International processes occur regu­
larly with specific international situations such as crises.
Thus, his objective is to identify, compare, describe, and 
possibly predict patterns of interactions which accompany 
various crisis situations. "Interaction analysis focuses on 
the outputs of national systems. The national systems them­
selves are black b o x e d . M c C l e l l a n d  believes that this 
approach avoids the problems or complexities of the decision­
making approach which requires access to monumental amounts 
of "hard-to-come-by" information concerning the internal 
workings of government.
Common to McClelland’s, Rosecrance 's , and Kaplan’s con­
ceptual frameworks of the international system is their con­
cern about stability and change. This concern is illustrated 
by Kaplan’s interest in transformation rules, by McClelland’s 
emphasis on the ability of an "open and adaptive" system to 
change in order to cope with disturbances, and by Rosecrance’s 
principal preoccupation with the capacity of a system to contain
disturbances, in part through his regulator mechanism.
6 2Richard Rosecrance, who bases his system analysis on 
nine historical models which existed in succession from 17^0- 
1960— (1) 18th Century, 1740-1789; (2) Revolutionary Imperium, 
1789-1814; (3) Concert of Europe, I8l4-l822; (4) Truncated 
Concert, 1822-1848; (5) Shattered Concert, 1848-1871; (6 ) 
Bismarckian Concert, 1871-189O; (7) Imperialist Nationalism, 
1890-1918; (8 ) Totalitarian Militarism, 1918-1945; (9) Post 
War, 1945-1960— constructs an analytic framework which is
20
equally applicable to all of them. Rosecrance, whose primary 
preoccupation is with the capacity of a system to deal with 
disturbance, holds that a system is comprised of disturbance 
inputs, a regulator which reacts to the disturbance inputs, 
the environmental restraints which influence the possible 
outcomes, and the outcomes themselves. The disturbance input 
usually refers to one or more national actors who are behaving 
in a potentially disruptive fashion, from such forces as 
ideologies, domestic insecurity, conflicts in national interest, 
disparities in national actors' capabilities. The regulator, 
the formal or informal mechanisms such as the Concert of 
Europe, the League of Nations, the balance of power, or the 
United Nations, reacts to the disturbance input and attempts 
to maintain the system. The environmental restraints limit 
the range of possible outcomes— for example, in certain 
historical systems the environment permitted conflicts among 
European national actors to be assuaged by compensations in 
other parts of the system, such as competition for colonies, 
compensation through empire building, etc. Outcomes, which 
are limited by environmental constraints, refers to the regu­
lator's action or actions. The equilibrium or stability of the 
system is related to the strength of the regulator versus the 
strength of the disturbance. If the outcomes are generally 
acceptable to all participants, then the system is considered
to be equilibrial.^3
Rosecrance puts a tremendous emphasis on national elites 
and questions whether the elite is satisfied with its role
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domestically, threatened by international events, secure in 
its position, etc. He examines the sources of inputs and 
the factors that influence the behavior of systems. He 
develops four determinants : ideologies or attitudinal di­
rection of elites, degree of elite control, resources avail­
able to the controlling elites, and capacity of the system 
to mitigate disturbances. After examination of his histor­
ical system in relationship to his four determinants, Rosecrance 
found that at least four of his nine systems were unstable 
and five were stable. In the stable historical systems the 
amount of disturbance was at a minimum, the regulator was 
able to cope with the input disturbance since the elite in­
volved were secure and satisfied with the status quo and 
were willing to solve their problems short of war. Moreover, 
the environmental constraints were adequate to ease the dis­
turbance by either assuaging the disturbed actor without 
affecting the national interests or without causing major 
losses to other actors, or by transferring territorial am­
bition to colonial areas. On the other hand, in the unstable 
systems the degree of actor disturbance was greater than the 
regulator's ability to cope with it. The variety of means at 
the disposal of the regulator was minimal, the environmental 
restraints failed to play a role in constraining the distur­
bances. The elites were dissatisfied with the status quo, 
both within their own respective national units and in the 
international system, the elites felt insecure, and they
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attempted to Improve their own position by mobilizing resources 
and by appealing to nationalism and ideology. In the unstable 
systems national actors would undertake to improve their position
65at a cost of disrupting the entire system.
Rosecrance's major conclusion is that there is a corre­
lation between international instability and the domestic 
insecurity of e l i t e s . H e  states,
if the impact of domestic factors has been somewhat 
neglected, the present study strives to remedy the 
defect: if any single thesis emerges from the follow­
ing pages it is that international constellations 
and patterns of conflict are very often determined 
as the inadvertent by-product of domestic change.
Morton Kaplan constructs six actual and hypothetical
models of the international system and specifies rules and
patterns of interaction within each model. He writes,
The conception that underlies System and Process is 
fairly simple. If the number, type, and behavior of 
nations differ over time, and if their military capa­
bilities, their economic assets, and their information 
also vary over time, then there is some likely inter­
connection between these elements such that different 
structural and behavioral systems can be discerned 
to operate at different periods of history. This con­
ception may turn out to be incorrect, but it does not 
seem an unreasonable basis for an investigation of the 
subject matter. To conduct such an investigation 
requires systematic hypotheses concerning the nature 
of the connections of the variables. Only after these 
are made can past history be examined in a way that 
illuminates the hypotheses. Otherwise the investigator 
has no criteria on the basis of which he can pick and 
choose from among the infinite reservoir of facts 
available to him. These initial hypotheses indicate 
the areas of facts which have the greatest importance 
for this type of investigation; presumably if the hypo­
theses are wrong, this will become reasonably evident 
in the course of attempting to use them.""
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Within each of his six models— balance-of-power system, loose 
bipolar system, tight bipolar system, universal international 
system, hierarchical international system, unit-veto system—  
Kaplan has developed five sets of variables : the essential
rules, transformation rules, the actor classificatory vari­
ables which set forth the structural characteristics of actors, 
the capability variables which refer to the resources and the 
national actor's ability to use resources to attain goals, 
and the information variables which refer to the levels of 
communication within the system. The first two sets of vari­
ables, which will be discussed at greater length, concern the 
nature of the international system, whereas the last three 
sets of variables cover the types of things that are investi­
gated at lower levels of analysis.
The essential rules describe the behavior necessary to 
maintain equilibrium in the system; the rules stipulate the 
conditions under which national actors comprising that system 
should negotiate, fight, mobilize resources, stop fighting, 
become members of alliances, contest changes and accommodate 
other changes. For example, the "balance-of-power" inter­
national system is characterized by the operation of the 
following essential rules: (1) increase capabilities, but 
negotiate rather than fight; (2) fight rather than fail to 
increase capabilities; (3) stop fighting rather than eliminate 
an essential actor; (4) oppose any coalition or single actor 
that tends to assume a position of predominance within the
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system; (5) constrain actors who subscribe to supranational 
organizational principles; and (6) permit defeated or constrained 
essential national actors to re-enter the system as acceptable 
role partners, or act to bring some previously Inessential 
actor within the essential actor classification. Treat all
69essential actors as acceptable role partners. Another 
example Is the loose bipolar system; (1) blocs subscribing 
to directive hierarchical or mixed hierarchical Integrating 
principles eliminate the rival bloc, negotiate rather than 
fight, fight minor wars rather than major wars, and fight major 
wars rather than fall to eliminate the rival bloc; (2) bloc 
actors Increase their capabilities In relation to those of 
the opposing bloc; (3) bloc actors subscribing to nonhlerarchlcal 
or nondirective hierarchical organizational principles nego­
tiate rather than fight to Increase capabilities, but refrain 
from Initiating major wars for this purpose; (4) bloc actors 
engage In a major war rather than permit the rival bloc to 
gain preponderant strength; (5) bloc members subordinate the 
objectives of universal actor to the objectives of their 
bloc; (6) universal actors reduce the Incompatibility between 
blocs and mobilize nonbloc member national actors against
cases of major deviation, such as resorting to force, by 
70a bloc actor.
Even though a single actor could change the system state 
by breaking one or more of the essential rules, the rules 
themselves are not dependent upon the behavior of any one
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national actor, they are derived from the overall patterns of
interaction among the actors comprising the system. Thus,
from the perspective of a single national actor, the essential
rules are a part of its environment and ^  the prevailing
system is to persist, the national actor, irrespective of
previously-acquired policy and value orientations of the
decision-makers and irrespective of situations with which
the decision makers must deal, must conform its actions to
71the systemic requirements. Kaplan does emphasize the 
environmental contexts, however, the scope of his model is 
limited. His formulation of environmental interdependencies 
"is essentially addressed to the issue-area bounded by ques­
tions of military and national security which, while extremely 
important, are far from a predominant majority of the external 
problems with which societies must contend. There are many
areas of foreign policy behavior for which the essential
72rules of Kaplan’s model are irrelevant."
The second set of variables embraces transformation 
rules, which specify the ways in which a system changes as 
inputs other than those necessary for equilibrium enter the 
system. A system which transforms itself in response to a 
major disturbance input is considered changed when a different 
systems model is needed to account for its behavior. Kaplan 
states,
We will adopt the following constriction: when the
system changes in such a way that a different theory is 
needed to account for its behavior, we will say that the 
system has changed. Thus the change from "balance of 
power" system to bipolar system will be called a system 
change.73
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Kaplan’s formulation acknowledges that the international system 
is not permanent and that its interdependencies can undergo 
transformation, but it does not deal with the processes whereby 
the system is transformed from one state to another. Therefore, 
even in Kaplan’s terms, "during periods of transformation 
decision-makers will presumably have difficulty adjusting
7  4their behavior to the systemic requirements." Kaplan claims
that by specifying rules for system change, a step level
function, to have built into his models a means of under-
75standing how international systems are transformed.
Kaplan’s six systems,which in no way exhausts the possi­
bilities for useful model building for analytical purposes 
in international politics, represents "positions along a
Vspectrum of schemes of international political organization." 
Moreover, depending upon the structural characteristics of 
actors, Kaplan distinguishes between directive and non-direc­
tive systems— "the non-directive international system functions 
according to political rules generally operative in democracies.
The directive hierarchical system is authoritarian in char- 
77acter." — which in turn may be system dominant or subsystem 
dominant. The assumption underlying the distinction between 
directive and non-directive systems is that historical commit­
ments and value orientations of the two types of systems will
cause different interpretations of how adherence to the essen-
7 Qtial rules of a particular system should be achieved.
The balance of power system has a minimum of five essential
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national actors and no universal actor. It is distinguished 
by an international social system but lacks a political sub­
system. The loose bipolar system consists of two major blocs, 
a leading national actor within each bloc, non-bloc national 
actors, and universal actors such as the United Nations. The 
way in which the loose bipolar system operates reflects the 
internal organization of bloc actors: if the blocs are non-
hierarchically organized, it resembles to a degree the balance 
of power system; if both blocs are hierarchically organized, 
their membership becomes rigid and only non-bloc members can 
shift in alignments. The tight bipolar system tends to be 
transformed into the loose bipolar system if both bloc 
actors are not hierarchically organized. The integrating 
mechanisms are weak in the tight bipolar system. By extending 
the functions of the universal actor of the loose bipolar 
system, the universal-international system could develop.
This system has a political subsystem which can allocate 
rewards to both national actors and individuals; nevertheless, 
national actors still make the important decisions and take 
independent action. The universal international system does 
possess integrating mechanisms which perform political, 
economic, and administrative functions. The universal inter­
national system possess resources and facilities which are 
superior to those of any national actor system; the universal 
international system is able to coordinate and integrate value 
structures of the national actors. If the universal inter-
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national system is unable to integrate the domestic values of
the different national actors within a common system, it will
be unstable. The hierarchical system, which may be directive
or non-directive, evolves from a universal international
system. This system operates directly upon individuals, and
national actors are not independent political actors, rather
they are merely territorial subdivisions of the international
system. Interest groups become the primary actors, and
"functional cross-cutting makes it most difficult to organize
successfully against the international system or to withdraw 
79from it." Moreover, channels of communication facilitate 
central control, and make it almost impossible for local 
regions to revolt or secede. This system is characterized 
by great stability, in fact, once a hierarchical system is
Q Q
established it becomes almost impossible to displace it.
If Kaplan's six systems were ranged along a scale of integrative 
activity, the hierarchical system would be considered the most 
integrated and the unit veto system the least integrated.
The unit veto system is a Hobbesian system in which "the 
interests of all were opposed— were, in fact, at war— but 
in which each actor responded to the negative golden rule 
of natural law by not doing to others what he would not have
Q 1them do to him." This system could only exist if all actors 
had weapons capable of destroying any other actor. National 
actors equipped with nuclear forces would tend to be self- 
sufficient and to reject any outside pressure. Universal
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actors would have no role to play, alliances would recede in 
importance, and major nuclear actors would tend to have 
isolationist policies. This system would be stable as long 
as national actors were prepared to retaliate in case of 
attack, and their willingness to do so would serve as a
8 2credible deterrent to attack by another national actor.
In each of the above models, Kaplan directs attention 
to the following: (1) the organizational focus of decisions 
which includes the nature of actors’ goals and the capabil­
ities available to attain them; (2) the allocation of rewards 
which includes the degree to which they are allocated by the 
system or the subsystem; (3) the alignment preferences of 
actors; (4) the direction and scope of political activity;
(5) the flexibility or adaptability of actors in their
Q n
behavior.
In the words of System and Process in International
Politics, "systems models are merely tools for investigating 
84reality." Kaplan's models which are less complex than the 
real international system are designed "to facilitate com­
parison with the real world, to contribute to a meaningful
85ordering of data, and to build theory at the macro-level."
Although Kaplan has made tremendous analytical contri­
butions by constructing models of the international system 
which stress universal rules and requirements which are 
binding on all national actors, the major part of his analysis 
has consisted of alternative sets of system-wide rules. In
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their concern for the international system, Kaplan and other 
international analysts generally have tended to underplay the 
critical role which domestic politics of the member states 
play in determining the rules and operation of the system.
In recent years, a predominant interest of James Rosenau's 
has been to modify the outlook on conceptual boundaries between 
national and International systems. Rosenau in his book.
The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy, c o n t e n d s  that the 
traditional division between international and domestic 
politics obscures the linkages between them, linkages which 
make the independent study of each not very satisfying or 
fruitful. He observes that most theorists who specialize 
in international systems acknowledge that such systems are 
largely subsystem dominant, however, their models of global 
international systems do not allow for differential subsystem 
impacts. Inversely, most theorists of national systems models 
ignore the impact and operation of external variables and 
treat the national system as a self-contained unit. With the 
increasing obscuration of the boundaries between national 
political systems and the international environments, Rosenau 
believes that theorists must break down the rigid distinction 
between national and international politics and make adjust­
ments in their conceptual frameworks.
The linkage concept, which describes a relatively new 
approach within the political science discipline, implies 
that under certain circumstances an overlap or linkage exists
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between the two traditionally distinct subfields of comparative 
and international politics. Rosenau defines linkage "as any 
recurrent sequence of behavior that originates in one system 
and is reacted to in a n o t h e r . T h e  across-systems theorist®^
89ignores long-standing conceptual boundaries and focuses on 
different levels of aggregation; the theorist aspires to 
explanations in which actions and interactions at one level 
are at least partially accounted for by behavior and attributes 
at another level. The across-systems theorist is not willing 
to presume that variables or the dynamics operative at the 
system level that interests her (or him) can be adequately 
explained by holding the other levels constant. Thus, the 
dependent variables comprising the person's theory all con­
cern phenomena at the same systemic level, but the Independent 
variables will be taken from lesser or greater levels of 
aggregation as well as from the same level.
The decision as to which direction an across-systems 
theorist should move depends in the final analysis in the 
kind of phenomena that interest the theorist and the questions 
they lead the theorist to ask. In this across-systems study 
the concepts of Intervention and (to a lesser extent) pene­
tration in developing political systems are the focuses of 
Interaction between national and International political pro­
cesses. The dependent variables. Intervention and penetration, 
which comprise this study all concern phenomena at the same 
systemic level, however, the Independent variables, the struc-
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ture of the international system and the instability of devel­
oping nations in the system, are drawn from a greater level 
of aggregation as well as from the same level.
90Rosenau in "Pre-theory of Foreign Policy" recognizes 
that foreign policy or international policy is an interplay 
and combination of both external and internal variables. He 
has clustered what he believes are the relevant external and 
internal variables of foreign behavior of nations into five 
categories: the individual variables— the personal character­
istics of the decision-maker(s); role variables— the impact 
of the office on the officeholder; governmental variables—  
the structure of government upon officials; societal variables—  
the demands made upon officials by groups and individuals in 
the society; and systemic variables— the impact of the state 
of the world on a government’s attempt to deal with it (systemic 
referring to the international system). Rosenau asserts that 
all pre-theories of foreign policy are translatable into these 
five dimensions. In other words, all foreign policy analysts 
explain (or their explanations can be re-cast in terms of 
these five sets) the external behavior of national actors in 
terms of these five sets of variables.
Rosenau not only notes the intermixing of external and 
internal variables, but attempts to indicate the conditions 
under which one predominates over the other. He specifically 
assesses the relative potencies of the five sets of variables 
in terms of which set of variables contributes most to external
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behavior; the relative potencies of the five sets of variables
is determined by the nature of the country. He distinguishes
between large and small, developed and underdeveloped economies,
91and open and closed political systems. Rosenau's various 
rankings of the five sets of variables, which at this stage 
are not based on precise specifications, are neither a single­
cause explanation of foreign policy, nor a choice of employing 
only one of the sets of variables; it is a relative assess­
ment of which set of variables contribute most to external 
behavior, which ranks next in Influence, etc. Thus, Rosenau's 
pre-theory assumes international policy is shaped by individual, 
role, governmental, societal, and systemic factors and his 
ranking is one of determining how to treat each set of variables 
relative to the others.
Rosenau contends that systemic variables are more impor­
tant for small underdeveloped countries than large ones since 
small ones are more dependent on their environment and lack 
the resources to change it very much. Thus, in a small under­
developed country like Laos or Cambodia, which lacks capa­
bilities, the systemic variables are more potent and ranked 
higher than in large developed countries like the United States, 
where systemic variables are ranked low, since it has the 
resources to influence and change the environment, and role 
•variables are ranked high.
Building upon the assumption that Rosenau's categories 
of clustered variables can be applied to a study of inter­
vention in and penetration of developing political systems.
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one must first decide the relative potency of individual,
role, governmental, societal, and systemic variables. Both
92individual and systemic variables rank high as sources of 
intervention and penetration. This analysis recognizes the 
potency of individual variables— different leaders respond 
differently to the same developments in the international 
system— but it will focus and stress the potency of systemic 
variables. Two systemic variables, the basic structure of 
the international system and the stability/instability of 
the nations in the system, will be especially potent as 
sources of intervention and penetration for those leaders 
who are predisposed to undertake such behavior or policy.
The basic structure of the international system refers 
to the degree to which "the capability for affecting the con­
duct of international life is concentrated or dispersed within 
93the system." According to Kaplan, even though "the causes
of internal war are themselves internal in the sense that their
origin is likely to be found in the social and political struc-
94ture of the nation involved," the international system by its 
nature encourages or discourages intervention. For example, 
in the balance of power model, intervention in the domestic 
affairs of another state is discouraged since "if the inter­
vention— for instance in favor of the rebels— were to succeed, 
there might be a permanent alliance between them or a tutelage 
of one over the other. Since this arrangement would injure 
all other states in the system and tend to create active
95opposition, the intervention would be unwise or unsuccessful."
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If It were unsuccessful, the intervened actor could become a
permanent enemy of the intervening actor. As Kaplan notes,
"these reasons are not absolutely compelling, but they are
strong enough to make likely general observance of the rule
96of non-intervention in a balance-of-power type of system."
On the other hand, the constraints present in the balance-
of-power system would not be operative in the loose bipolar
system. Even though fear of confrontation and escalation
would inhibit intervention to some extent or be a factor in
decisions concerning interventions, the consequence feared
"is not so direct and massive in its weight that it would
prove overriding. Moreover, most interventions would be in-
97direct and covert." Intervention is a feature of the loose 
bipolar system, and there is "the continued probability of 
the incitement of internal wars and of bloc aid to internal
98wars that have begun for indigenous reasons."
The greater the dispersion of capabilities, like in a 
polypolar structure, the less likelihood that the system can 
be radically altered by a single development; hence, global 
actors are less likely to engage in interventionary behavior. 
Whereas in a bipolar structure, where capabilities are con­
centrated or tightly structured, a shift in allegiance or 
loyalty of a national actor will seem more threatening to a 
global actor and interventionary behavior is more likely to 
occur. Thus, this study will examine first the structure of 
the international system. However, since the international 
system has been undergoing extensive change, a new mode for
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conceptualizing the distribution of power in the current inter­
national system will be presented; this paradigm will be referred 
to as the triangular polyarchic international system. (The 
loose bipolar system is in the process of being transformed 
into this triangular polyarchic system.)
The second independent variable in this study is the 
instability of national actors in the system. The more pre­
carious the authority structures in developing national actors, 
the greater the chance that global actors will attempt to 
preserve or alter them through intervention or penetration.
(The third chapter will define instability and examine the 
developing nations of Laos, Burma, and Cambodia in the inter­
national system.)
Rosenau, in his article "Internal War as an International
QQEvent," examines the characteristics of internal wars in 
the loose bipolar international system, and posits that internal 
wars can be differentiated as follows :
PERSONNEL wars are those which are perceived as 
being fought over the occupancy of existing roles in 
the existing structure of political authority, with no 
aspiration on the part of the insurgents to alter either 
the other substructures of the society or its major 
domestic and foreign policies. Latin American "coups 
d'etat" in which one junta replaces another are examples 
of personnel wars.
AUTHORITY wars are those which are perceived as 
being fought over the arrangement (as well as the 
occupancy) of the roles in the structure of political 
authority, but with no aspiration on the part of the 
insurgents to alter either the other substructures of 
the society or its major domestic and foreign policies. 
Struggles to achieve independence from colonial regimes, 
or those based on efforts to replace dictatorships with 
democracies, would ordinarily be classified as authority 
wars.
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STRUCTURAL wars are those which are perceived as 
being not only contests over personnel and the struc­
ture of political authority, but also as struggles over 
other substructures of the society (such as the system 
of ownership, the educational system, etc.) or its major 
domestic and foreign policies. A war involving a 
Communist faction exemplifies a structural war, as 
does an agrarian revolt and possibly the present 
situation in the Union of South Africa. It is diffi­
cult to imagine structural wars which are not also 
personnel and authority wars, and thus is the most 
comprehensive type.100
Rosenau hypothesizes that a direct relationship exists between 
the scope of the internal war and its external repercussions: 
the wider the scope of a conflict, the greater the reper­
cussions. (See Figure I) According to Rosenau, structural 
wars can be both functional and dysfunctional for the inter­
national system. Bloc confrontation renders the international 
system more rigid and more unstable; also such situations 
always contain "a serious danger of escalation," since members 
of both blocs maintain extensive commitments— Laos, Vietnam—  
in the bipolar s y s t e m . O n  the other hand, Rosenau contends 
that structural wars and intervention by major national actors 
can actually enhance international stability since structural 
wars provide a means for the two blocs to compete through an 
intermediary, the war-torn society. However, as Rosenau notes, 
"the war-torn society certainly pays a high price for this
low-cost technique of maintaining the global system, as the
102South Koreans, Laotians, and Vietnamese well know." The 
instability of the social and political structures in developing 
nations provides ample opportunity for intervention by global 
actors who have the desire or the incentive (which as noted
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Source: James Rosenau, "Internal War as an International Event,"
in International Aspects of Civil Strife, ed. by J. Rosenau 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), p. 65.
C.R. Mitchell in his article "Civil Strife and the In-
lO'Rvolvement of External Parties," contends that an implicit
assumption in some of the theoretical work on civil strife
and external parties is that "a situation of violent civil
strife between two domestic parties must ’inevitably' entail
a third external party becoming involved in the conflict on
the side of one or the other of the domestic parties.
105For example, George Modelski speaks of the "inevitability" 
of internal parties being forced to make an appeal for external 
assistance, since any domestic group engaged in an internal 
war is fighting to overpower the opposing group, and, therefore, 
must ask some foreign actor for aid if this is the only way 
to achieve this goal. Modelski states "...the demand for
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outside aid is the basic mechanism for 'internationalization'
of internal war; it inheres in the fundamental condition of
the struggle for power found in internal war...the demand
for foreign involvement is implicit in the logic of the
s i t u a t i o n . M i t c h e l l  is skeptical of the idea that some
logic in internal conflict situations impel domestic parties
to appeal for aid, since there are many examples where civil
strife existed but no demands for external aid were made and
no significant foreign involvement took place. Mitchell
posits that Modelski and some others who have written about
civil strife and internal war have "confined themselves to
studying the tip of a rather vast iceberg properly labelled
'social conflict.'" He suggests that when "enquiring whether
outside involvement is likely, questions should be asked
107about the nature and intensity of internal conflict."
Mitchell posits that key elements in determining whether to 
appeal for external involvement appears to be associated with 
"the level of social integration and political legitimacy 
achieved by the political system, and the relative importance
1 ftattached by the parties in conflict to achieving their goals." 
Mitchell notes that the degree of internal cohesion or unity 
and of shared values and sense of group integration within 
any state are likely to be important factors deciding whether 
conflicts reach levels of violence. However, since a high 
level of internal conflict is not enough in itself to bring 
about intervention, attention must also be directed "to those
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factors outside the situation of domestic strife itself which
109help to decide whether external involvement takes place." 
According to Mitchell, if a situation of high level civil 
strife exists within a state, at least one necessary condition 
for external intervention has been fulfilled. External in­
volvement can then occur in two circumstances, "(1) when a 
direct appeal has been made to an external party; (2) when 
no such appeal has been raade."^^^ Hence, in the latter cir­
cumstance, neither group in internal war may wish or ask for 
external intervention or aid but bloc actors may intervene 
sans invitation.
After examining the two independent variables— the inter­
national structure and the instability of developing national 
actors in the system— intervention and penetration of developing 
actors will be defined, examined, and illustrated in chapter 
four. Intervention is the study of the unconventional in 
international politics. It cannot be defined so broadly as 
to equate intervention with any action directed toward another 
national actor. The definition must distinguish interven­
tionary behavior from penetrative behavior, and then differ­
entiate these phenomena from other aspects of international 
politics.
In this study, two prime characteristics of intervention 
are the basis for operationalizing the concept: its con­
vention-breaking character and its authority-oriented nature.
The behavior of an international actor is interventionary when­
4l
ever the form of behavior constitutes a sharp break with then-
existing patterns. However, this unconventional behavior must
be directed at changing or preserving the structure of political
authority in the intervened nation. The convention-breaking
behavior must be directed at preserving or altering the authority
structure in order to be defined as interventionary. Thus, this
definition distinguishes interventionary behavior from other
types of convention-breaking foreign policy actions such as
the Marshall Plan or Cuban missile crisis, which did represent
sharp breaks with past policies but were not directed at the
authority structures— they were directed at the policies or
112capabilities of other national actors.
In the international system persistent patterns of be­
havior have a way of establishing their own legitimacy, ir­
respective of their original illegitimacy. Thus, intervention 
is a temporary phenomena since the unconventional becomes 
conventional the longer it persists. Intervention is more 
readily recognized and more easily operationalized and measured 
than other types of behavior because it has a beginning— when 
conventional modes of behavior are abandoned, and end— when 
conventional modes of conduct are restored or when the un­
conventional mode of behavior becomes conventional through 
113persistent use. This definition does not equate such 
phenomena as imperialism, colonialism, or neo-colonialism 
with intervention, since intervention is defined as coming 
to an end when the presence of the intervening actor in the 
target nation becomes conventional. The above-mentioned
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phenomena would come under the concept of penetration.
The behavior of the intervening actor can no longer be 
considered interventionary if the unconventional mode of 
behavior becomes conventional or accepted and established 
through persistent use, even though the presence of the 
intervening actor in the intervened society remains undi­
minished. This phenomena associated with the prolonged and 
routinized process whereby one national actor is continually
involved in the domestic affairs of another comes under the
114concept of penetration. Thus, penetrative behavior
replaces interventionary behavior when the presence of the 
intervening actor becomes conventional or routinized. The 
satellite arrangements between the Soviet Union and the actors 
of Eastern Europe since World War II illustrates this point. 
Penetration is not always permanent; it ceases if the pene­
trating actor withdraws— i.e., withdrawal of Soviet technicians 
from mainland China in I96O— or it reverts to intervention if 
the penetrating actor drastically alters its accepted mode 
of behavior with respect to the authority structure— i.e., 
the use of Russian troops in Hungary in 1956 and in Czechoslo­
vakia in 1968. (With the removal of troops the interventionary 
behavior was once again replaced by penetrative behavior.) 
However, one major problem is that it is not always clear 
when unconventional mode of conduct has persisted long enough 
to have established a new convention. Thus, in some cases 
one cannot determine precisely when interventionary behavior 
becomes penetrative behavior since viewing behavior as inter-
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ventionary may dissipate slowly— i.e., acceptance of United 
States bombing in Vietnam (February 1965), or acceptance of 
500,000 American troops fighting in Vietnam, would dissipate 
slowly
The penetrative process transforms a national political 
system into a penetrated political system. A penetrated 
political system permits legitimacy to become attached to 
the direct participation of the non-member in the allocation 
of its values. However, penetrated political systems like 
national and international ones, are not static. In chapter 
five, the concluding chapter, this study will examine the 
penetrated polity in terms of the Third World and the inter­
national system.
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Chapter II
THE TRIANGULAR-POLYARCHIC INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM
The basic structure of the international system may be
characterized in terms of the degree to which the capabilities
for affecting the conduct of international life is dispersed or
concentrated within the system. Since World War 11, world
politics have been characterized as a bipolar system, dominated
by the tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union.
However, in the past decade, a number of fundamental changes
have occurred, causing the gradual erosion of bipolarity.
The following developments— the splintering of the two basic
blocs and the breaking down of the alliances, the emergence
of Red China as a superpower, and the appearance of several
"middle power" actors— have created a significant movement
"in toto" toward the development of a triangular polyarchic
international system.^
By the igGO's, it became clear that major shifts were
occurring in the global bipolarity because of the internal
changes in the two blocs and in the alliances. The splintering
in the two basic blocs is reflected in the current polycentralism
2of the Soviet sphere, which suggests that the international 
communist movement can no longer be regarded as monolithic 
(the idea that all Communist power and authority emanate 
from the Kremlin); the Sino-Soviet schism; and in the decen-
50
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trallzatlon among American allies. The alliances may endure 
in some form for quite a few years, but it is extremely im­
probable that the alliances and the political relations within 
them can ever take the form that they did during the 1950's. 
Discordant personalities and political styles contributed to 
and accelerated the disintegration of the alliance unity.
However, due to more fundamental differences between bloc 
members and bloc leaders, the changes in leadership (DeGaulle,
Johnson, Khrushchev) could not restore Soviet and American
3hegemony over their respective alliances.
France and China, each having been extremely dependent 
on its respective bloc leader for economic reconstruction and 
national security, could have been considered penetrated 
polities in the 1950’s.^ However, by the 1960's, France and 
China became the most deviating or non-conforming members of 
their respective alliances. Leaders in both France and China 
became concerned with the asymmetrical nature of their alliances 
and began to redefine international alignments in a manner 
somewhat different from their bloc leaders and this led to 
deviation from alliance norms.
Various crises precipitated by the bloc leaders in the 
1950's and 1960's (i.e., Berlin crisis of I96I-I962, the Cuban 
Missile crisis, the U.S. involvement in the Vietnam war) brought 
alliance members to the brink of war, and caused France and 
China to perceive an imbalance of risks or costs over benefits 
derived from their respective alliances. The potential risks 
of alliance membership were not balanced off by the benefits.
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because of the lack of bloc leadership support for the alliance 
members' vital interests. For example, the Soviet Union did 
not support China's quest to regain offshore islands in the 
Taiwan Straits, China's nuclear weapon program, or China's 
frontier campaign against India in 1962. Similarly, the United 
States did not support France in the Indochina and Algerian 
wars, the 1956 Suez Crisis, or France's nuclear weapon program. 
The lack of support by both superpowers precipitated a loss 
of confidence within both superpower alliances and destroyed 
or weakened earlier allegiances. Also, the tightness of 
dependencies dissipated as the cold war diminished, and as a 
community of interest between Moscow and Washington developed—
i.e.. Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (which France and China refused 
to sign); SALT (which DeGaulle had repeatedly warned against 
as diminishing the degree of protection afforded to Europe 
by the United States); and economic trade. (See Figure I)
The decentralization among American allies and the 
development of polycentralism within the Soviet bloc reflect 
the disintegration of unity within the two alliances. A few 
indications of the decentralization among American allies 
were: France's withdrawal from the military sector of NATO;
DeGaulle's call for an end to the European sector of the cold 
war and the creation of a Europe from "the Atlantic to the 
U r a l s a n d  the preoccupation with national sovereignty, 
which is illustrated by West Germany's Ostpolilik.^ Ostpolilik 
is aimed at creating a climate of detente in order to estab­
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coexistence or cooperation with the Soviet Union. Werner 
Kaltefleiter in his article "Europe and the Nixon Doctrine" 
contends that "Ostpolilik is in part the German answer to the 
alliance’s inability to define common objectives and to the 
accelerating tendency among the most important member countries
g
to pursue strictly national interests." It represents the 
Federal Republic’s drift away from its alliance orientation, 
which was due, in part, to lack of leadership in NATO and the 
rejection by the United States of partnership within NATO in 
nuclear questions. (Domestic political issues also played a 
role, as did a general decrease in the perception of threat 
from the East.)^
The continued polycentric character of the Soviet bloc 
(reduced Soviet control and increased demands for independence 
by the bloc members) despite Soviet intervention and suppression 
of revolts in Eastern Europe is indicated by the independent
54
foreign policies undertaken by Yugoslavia, which has pulled 
out of the Warsaw Pact entirely; Albania, which has aligned 
itself with Communist China; and Rumania, whose independence 
can be illustrated by the 1972 invitation to Prime Minister 
Golda Meir of Israel to visit B u c h a r e s t . A n o t h e r  indication 
of the fissures in the Soviet bloc is the bitter public debate 
between Moscow and Peking, which is reflected in Lin Piao’s 
thesis of a "confrontation between the cities of the world 
and the countryside of the w o r l d , p r e d i c a t e d  upon a change 
in international alignments and a new role for China and 
the Soviet Union. Moreover, data indicate an extensive and 
severe rupture between the Soviet Union and China. Perhaps 
more clearly than any other indicator, foreign trade data 
(See Figure II) reveal how extensively Chinese relations 
with the Soviet Union have changed in recent years. During 
the first decade of the Peoples' Republic's existence, or as 
late as i960, there appeared little reason to believe that 
China's economy was not becoming increasingly dependent on 
the Soviet Union. Since then Chinese trade relations with 
the Soviet Union have changed drastically and one might con­
clude that the Sino-Soviet rift has severely disrupted trade 
12relations. In the past few years, China's trade patterns
have changed; today, some of China's most active trade partners 
include Japan, Australia, Great Britain, West Germany, Canada, 
and Prance.
Morganthau and Liska^^ perceive the lack of alliance co­
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in character, whereas Holstl, Sullivan, Kissinger, and Diner- 
1 c;stein contend that the schisms within the Communist system 
are far more serious. It is not within the scope of this 
study to assess the competing explanation of nonconforming 
alliance policies or to identify all the "events" which 
"caused" alliance disintegration, such as the Sino-Soviet 
conflict, or the differences between Washington and Paris. 
This analysis merely notes these developments since they did 
contribute to the decline of the bipolar system.
The Sino-Soviet split is a prime factor and can be con­
sidered the most important single cause of the change from 
a bipolar system^^ to a triangular polyarchic situation.
The Sino-Soviet dispute created a situation that convinced 
Peking that its national security was threatened in such a 
way that it should pursue more flexible policies toward much 
of the rest of the world. The Sino-Soviet dispute convinced 
the United States that it was both possible and desirable to 
deal with Moscow and Peking separately rather than as parts 
of a single bloc. Thus, President Nixon and Dr. Kissinger 
began to reassess U.S. policies on the premise that a new
international structure was emerging and thereby reevaluated
17United State-China policy in a context which perceived of
China as a major actor.
The Sino-Soviet dispute has created genuine concern in
l8Moscow about a potential "Chinese threat" to the Russians 
whose historical memories include the Mongol "hordes," the 
sparce Siberian population and the dense Chinese population.
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an emotional anti-Chinese feeling, and an uneasiness about the 
"irrational" behavior of the Chinese leaders. From the Soviet 
perspective the Chinese threat, which in some ways is comparable 
to the American views which prevailed in the 1950’s and early 
1960's, was assessed as dangerous enough to the Soviet Union's 
security and interests (even though the Soviet Union has over­
whelming military superiority) to cause Moscow to carry out
IQa huge military buildup on the Russian-Chinese borders.
Moscow's buildup on the Chinese borders and the articulation
of the Brezhnev Doctrine caused China increased concern and
forced China to develop new relationships in order to counter-
20balance and to constrain Moscow.
Perceptions and misperceptions play a major role in
international politics. Policy measures are often the result
of selective attention to and interpretations of international 
PIphenomena. The Sino-American relations during the 1950's 
offers a clear example of policies rooted in misperceptions, 
which exacerbated existing conflicts. China today is not a 
superpower, nevertheless, the United States and the Soviet 
Union perceive and treat her as a major actor in the inter­
national system.
The decline in bipolarity is related to the emergence 
(or indicated emergence) of a new great power actor, China, 
and several new (or resurgent) "middle power" actors in the 
international system, which are now displaying a significant 
degree of independence and dynamism in their international 
activities. The most obvious examples are Japan, Germany,
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Prance, and possibly the development of certain regional 
PPa c t o r s — i.e., integrated Western Europe, Organization of 
Petroleum Countries (OPEC)— as effective actors in inter­
national politics.
The breakdown in the bipolar hierarchical patterns of 
influence and the development of fragmentation along regional 
lines is and will be a characteristic of the transitional 
period and the mature triangular polyarchic system. A con­
sequence of regional fragmentation of bargaining is the 
growth of regional intergovernmental organizations, multi­
purpose organizations, and specialized economic and social 
organizations which create conditions for bargaining among 
actors within a specialized area. Even though actors are 
involved with actors in other regions, bargaining inter­
actions are occurring more frequently and across a larger 
number of issues within specific geographical regions 
(Organization of African Unity, the Arab League, the Council 
of Europe, etc.). Moreover, there is a tendency for actors
of the same subsystem to interact more frequently and to
2Hvote together in the United Nations.
The case of the potential development of Europe is 
closely linked with progress in the different processes of 
political and economic integration. The European Economic 
Community (Common Market) which originally consisted of the 
"inner six" countries (Belgium, Prance, Italy, Luxembourg, 
the Netherlands, and West Germany) expanded in 1972 to include 
Denmark, Ireland, and the United K i n g d o m . I n  the area of
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economics, trade within the Common Market has become increasingly
larger than trade between the six members and the outside 
Pfiworld. Since 1958, when the Market was established, trade
27among the "inner six" has increased twelvefold. The socio­
economic integration is high; the people of the six Western 
European states freely cross national borders. As Haas notes, 
policy influencer integration ("the extent to which policy 
influencers in two or more states cooperate with each other
and/or Identify intergovernmental institutions as targets for
P ftmutual activities" ) is extensive among Common Market states.
He states that a set of "inner six" partisan, interest, bureau­
cratic, and mass influencers now exist:
The character of decision-making (for the inner-six 
organizations) stimulate interest groups to make them­
selves heard; it spurs political parties in Strasbourg 
and Luxembourg to work out common positions; it creates 
enormous pressure on high national civil servants to 
get to know and establish rapport with their opposite 
numbers.29
Compared to the Western European subsystem, the South­
east Asian regional subsystem has not progressed very far.
Until the mid-1960's, the Southeast Asia actors permitted 
their traditional rivalries and desires for direct external 
assistance to override their shared interests in limiting 
the role of outsiders in their a f f a i r s . D u r i n g  the past 
decade. Southeast Asian actors have notably increased consul­
tations and interchanges apparently realizing that they must 
assume greater responsibility for coping with their own domestic 
and foreign policy problems. They realize that they must 
broaden their international relationships rather than depend
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upon one outside power for support. The habit and practice 
of consultation resulting in policy reconciliation is developing 
in the Southeast Asian subsystem. This is contributing to 
an increasingly complex network of multinational organizations 
and cross-cutting associational links, i.e., Asian Development 
Bank (ADB), Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
The desire for regional cooperation in Southeast Asia is seen 
in the formation of the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) 
by Thailand, the Philippines, and Malaya in I96I. This regional 
organization merged with ASEAN in 1967; ASEAN has brought 
together the leaders of Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indo­
nesia, and the Philippines for regular consultation. By ob­
taining resources through multilateral institutions, such as 
the Economic Commission for Asia and the Par East (ECAFE) or 
the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the dependence of a Southeast 
Asian actor on any one outside actor is minimized, and the 
recipients are insulated from undue direct influence by a 
single donor actor. Nevertheless, it is unrealistic to view 
these developments as a movement toward regional integration, 
but they do represent fragile steps toward institutionalizing 
mutual consultations and orderly examination of differences 
among Southeast Asian actors. For example, under the auspices 
of ECAFE, there have been numerous meetings of specialists 
on investment finance and marketing, which have made Southeast 
Asian actors aware of their neighbors• problems. The hope 
of these organizations is to reconcile differences and to 
collaborate or to concert a common policy toward a major
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development within the region.
Although there is a possibility that some regional units 
may coalesce to replace some of the present traditional states 
as effective actors, developments in the Southeast Asia sub­
system have not yet proceeded very far. Nevertheless, one can 
observe a number of attempts to make at least the first steps 
toward regional coordination in international politics. In 
the present system, there is no uniform trend of any type. 
Regional actors may coordinate their activities on some sub­
stantive issues and not others. A survey of the present 
international system would show movement toward regional 
coordination in some regional subsystems coexisting with 
movement in the opposite direction in other subsystems. Also, 
issue area fragmentation which leads two actors to cooperate 
on some issues and disagree on others is a characteristic 
of the triangular polyarchic system.
The trend toward declining bipolarity is related to the 
increase in the number of extrabloc actors. The nonaligned 
and noncommitted actors have acquired a great deal of influ­
ence by their structural position between the two major blocs. 
Because of superpower competition for the allegiance of the 
uncommitted actors, the uncommitted actors have been able to 
escape the domination of either bloc. As Young notes, "in 
the realm of positive actions, many nonaligned states have 
demonstrated an ability to manipulate their structural position 
with sufficient skill to guarantee themselves a freedom of 
action that goes well beyond that which would be supported by
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their ability to control the more tangible elements of p o w e r . "^2 
Moreover, with the admission of the uncommitted actors of 
Asia, Africa, and the Middle East (former colonial states) to 
the United Nations, the United Nations has been transformed 
from a tool by which the superpowers could police the world
into an instrument by which mini-powers can put pressure on
33the superpowers.
Leaders of some of the uncommitted nations of the Third 
World view the cold war as a parochial power conflict, and 
believe the question of communism versus anti-communism as 
peripheral and irrelevant. These uncommitted leaders have 
redefined the problems of world politics. They consider the 
real struggle to be between the economically "have and have 
nots" rather than between communist and anti-communist; 
between the economically developed societies and economically 
primitive ones rather than between the Russians and the 
Americans; between the North and South, rather than between 
the East and West.^^
At the United Nations Stockholm Conference on the Human 
Environment^^ in June 1972, the conflict between the North 
and the South (developed and developing actors) was much 
more salient than the conflict between the East and the West. 
With the increasing depolarization of the international system 
and with the lack of cohesiveness within the East and West 
blocs, peoples of the Third World bloc of nations were not 
content to be only recognized as neutrals, since they saw 
themselves as an aggregate of nations with their own interests
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and concerns. The emergence of the Third World with their own 
issues was evident at the Stockholm Conference in 1972. The 
Third World delegates used their superior voting strength to 
insure that their viewpoint was represented in most official 
pronouncements, which mainly called for action rather than 
initiating it, or stated a policy in principle rather than 
practice.* The North-South split was reflected in the Third 
World proposals— proposals blaming developed actors for the 
pollution of the environment; insisting on their right of 
sovereign control over their natural resources; and suggesting 
that the natural resources in the oceans be used to finance 
their economic development. (This last proposal to be 
considered at the Law of the Sea Conference.)
The major nations of the North are entering "the post­
industrial era," whereas the nations of the South are generally 
struggling to enter "the industrial era;" the different time 
perspective engenders different viewpoints among the leader­
ship of these nations regardless of their ideology. This 
conflict of interest was dramatized in the meetings of the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), 
where the delegates of the developing South urged the dele­
gates of the industrialized North to permit the developing
*An exception to this statement was the establishment of 
a global monitoring system called EartHwatch, which will keep 
track of and measure the pollution of the environment.
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nations to ship increased quantities of manufactured products 
to them and to establish mechanisms for the transfer of large 
amounts of capital and other resources from the developed 
nations to the developing ones. The delegates of the North 
answered these demands with a resounding ”No." With the re­
ceding cold war and with the new power configuration, the con­
frontation between the industrialized North and the developing 
South becomes increasingly important in the international 
system.37
g Q
The triangular polyarchic structure involves a greater 
dispersion of capabilities than a bipolar system, thus, the 
triangular polyarchic system is more complex, fragmented, 
and diplomatically flexible than the bipolar system. The 
following overview gives the essential characteristics of 
the triangular polyarchic international system.
1. The triangular polyarchic system stresses the impor­
tance of systemwide and regional variables and emphasizes the 
complex pattern of their interaction. While global actors 
and issues are important in each subsystem, the autonomy of 
various subsystems and national actors is greater than in the 
bipolar system. Regional subsystems can be viewed as comple­
mentary to the global nature of the overall national system. 
Global actors’ existence and interests underlie the inter­
connection between subsystem and the overall international 
system.
2. With the fragmentation of the international system 
and with partial disengagement from the world by major actors
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(US/USSR), previous bloc actors, non-essential actors, regional 
actors, and the universal (or international) actor increase 
their independence and flexibility. In the bipolar system, 
interest articulation is performed by bloc leaders, by actors 
aligned with neither bloc, and by the international actor. In 
the triangular polyarchic system,interest articulation is less 
stratified since there are a greater number of autonomous 
centers of power; thus, there is more functional diffusion 
in frequency and locus of performance of interest articulation. 
In the bipolar system, aggregation is performed by the bloc 
leaders to insure bloc solidarity and strength; however, in 
the triangular polyarchic system, the two blocs have become 
less hierarchical in structure, and national actors are dis­
associating themselves from the blocs' aggregated goals. The 
growth in regionalism in the triangular system reflects in 
part aspirations for regularized aggregation of goals by 
regional actors.
3 . Ideological conflict is muted or diminished in the 
triangular polyarchic system.
4. In the triangular polyarchic system, the three 
essential actors monopolize or have a preponderance of nuclear 
weapons. System equilibrium is related to three essential 
actors whose capabilities are relatively equal; equal capa­
bilities restrain essential actors' aggressions. Each essen­
tial actor competes to increase its capabilities, but nego­
tiates to limit capabilities in order to avoid nuclear war.
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However, each essential actor will fight a major conventional 
war, rather than permit other essential actors to attain a 
position of preponderant strength.
5. There are three global or essential actors. (If the 
number of essential actors increases, the system is transformed 
into a polypolar system.) All essential actors are acceptable 
role partners. Essential actors temporarily align depending 
upon issue area, regional subsystem, etc. No essential actor 
can be eliminated by other essential actors. Two of the three 
essential actors cannot permanently align; this would cause 
system transformation.
6. A "limited adversary" relationship exists among the 
three essential actors. Essential actors are competitive but 
competition is not conflictuel. There are both areas of con­
flict and cooperation between each of the essential actors. 
Essential actors subordinate their common rivalry to their 
common interest whenever possible. Essential actors must re­
main aware of common interests even while they prosecute a 
variety of conflicting interests in various regional subsystems; 
thus, essential actors are constrained to modify their conflict 
in any given subsystem by the fact that they have important 
common interests in other subsystems which they do not wish
to Jeopardize. Essential actors cooperate within limits to 
prevent occurrences which might escalate and lead to direct 
nuclear confrontations.
7. Essential actors have an important but diminished role 
with previous "bloc actors."
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8. Since essential actors reject the zero sum aspects of 
bipolarity, no attempt is made by essential actors to acquire 
a worldwide network of allies; thus, changes by non-essential 
actors may occur without drastic action being taken by essential 
actors.
9 . Essential actors or the universal actor act as regu­
lators for conflict among non-essential actors. The role of 
the universal actor is to lower tensions among the various 
national actors, and to play a major role at the request of 
the essential actors.
10. Essential actors, even when cooperating, cannot always 
dominate non-essential actors.
11. The relationship between essential actors, and 
between essential actors and non-essential actors, is deter­
mined by the specific issue, the regional subsystem, and the 
set of circumstances in the whole international system.
12. The more precarious the authority structures of a 
non-essential actor, the greater the possibility that con­
vention-breaking attempts to preserve or alter them will 
be launched by foreign actors.
13. The structure of the triangular polyarchic system 
lessens interventionary behavior by essential actors. But, 
since the international system has a preponderance of un­
stable subsystems (Third World), and non-essential actors 
have a greater degree of freedom, interventionary behavior 
and penetrative behavior will be a recurrent feature of the 
triangular polyarchic system. There will be a tendency toward
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less superpower Intervention, but more nonsuperpower, non- 
supportive, and nondominant interventions in the Third 
World.
The thirteenth point was examined empirically by testing 
the general hypothesis that with the increasing tendencies of 
nonsupportive, nondominant interventions over time, there 
should be a decreasing trend in US-USSR dominant interventionary 
behavior.* The conclusions found from investigating this hypo­
thesis were as follows: (1) in the future there is a possi­
bility of decreasing superpower intervention; (2) if the 
intervention is of a nonsupportive nature (nonsupportive inter­
vention is defined as an intervention without a commitment 
to the existing political situation or political actors, 
i.e., peace-keeping force), it is less likely that the U.S. 
or the U.S.S.R. will be involved; conversely, if it is a 
supportive action (supporting either the government or rebellious 
group) then the US-USSR might possibly be involved in the 
intervention even though the overall trend tends to indicate 
less superpower intervention over time; (3) there is a probable 
tendency that the US-USSR will be less likely to intervene in 
less-dominant situations (a dominant type of intervention or 
less-dominant type of intervention is determined by the type 
of group used by the intervener: i.e., dominant type of inter­
vention = intervener crosses national border; less-dominant
*See Technical Annex.
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type of Intervention = intervener uses mercenary forces, or 
supports rebel groups, or U.N. organizational forces);
(4) the data tends to indicate that US-USSR interventions 
have a positive relationship to Europe, Asia, and North 
America; (5) the tendency toward intervention in Africa, the 
Middle East, and the South Pacific should be negative in the 
case of US-USSR involvement.
The data findings tend to support the systemic explanation 
(the structure of the international system and the stability/ 
instability of national actors in the system) of intervention/ 
penetration. The data have a tendency to support the obser­
vation that in the bipolar period (compared to the triangular 
polyarchic) superpower intervention could have been character­
ized as a greater amount, supportive (supportive of govern­
ment or rebel group, rather than nonsupportive of both, i.e., 
third party intervening to stabilize situation), dominant 
(which is determined by type of group— mainly troops crossing 
borders, and having troops already in the intervened country), 
whereas in the triangular polyarchic system there is and will 
be more of a tendency toward less superpower intervention but 
more nonsuperpower interventions, nonsupportive and non­
dominant interventions.
The bipolar system with its emphasis on the importance 
of a single dominant axis of conflict, its tendency to view 
regional and national actors and to conceptualize issues (i.e., 
civil wars, coup d'etats) in relationship to the underlying 
bipolar axis of the system tends to explain why superpowers
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would intervene in local conflicts, and support the government 
or rebel group rather than be nonsupportive of both. Moreover, 
when the superpowers intervened they had the power and desire 
(because of the perceived dire consequences) to dominate the 
situation (i.e., Hungary, Vietnam); thus, superpower inter­
vention tended to be by "nation crossing border" or troops 
(i.e., alliance troops) already within the intervened country, 
rather than by the "less dominating" (or controlling) method 
which weaker interveners must use— rebel group supported by/ 
or residing in another country, mercenaries, or international 
organization.
The triangular polyarchic system rejects both the zero- 
sum view and a worldwide network of allies, and presumes that 
the interest of two essential actors can be advanced simul­
taneously, i.e., Sino-American detente, Soviet-American detente. 
Moreover, superpowers must remain aware of common interest even 
while they prosecute a variety of conflicting interests in
•3 0various regional subsystems.^ Thus, it seems reasonable
(as the data tend to indicate) that with the trend toward
Sino-American and Soviet-American detente, that superpowers
in order not to jeopardize their mutual interests would
agree to more nonsupportive, less-dominating third party
interventions to stabilize situations, i.e., Congo, Middle
East.^O Moreover, since this new power situation is more
diffuse and fluid, and since local conflicts are perceived
as less threatening to the overall balance than in the bipolar 
4lsystem, it seems reasonable that superpower intervention
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would decrease and if they do desire to aid an ally they
will do so with a "lower profile," or with "less-dominating"
methods, or indirectly penetrate the polity with foreign aid, 
hotrade, etc. The Nixon Doctrine toward Asia which continues 
the policy of repression of Asian communism, hopes to avoid 
involvement by "Asianization"— the substitution of indigenous 
forces equipped through enlarged United States military 
assistance (Military Assistance Program 1972) for American 
troops.
Data indicate US/USSR interventions have been mainly in
Europe, Asia, and North America (Caribbean). The respective
superpowers have intervened in their geographic "spheres of
influence," Eastern Europe and the Caribbean; 70.1 percent
of the Union of the Soviet Socialists Republic interventions
(from 1948-1967) have been in Eastern Europe, and 48.4 percent
of the United States interventions (from 1948-1967) have been
in the Caribbean. (See Figure III) These areas seemed mainly
44off-limits to other actors' interventions. Thus, military 
intervention in the Caribbean bears fewer costs (which is 
always a critical determinant of public tolerance or oppo­
sition) and fewer risks for the United States than any other 
a r e a . T h e  new structure reduces the compulsions of the 
superpower leaders to consider major direct (dominant type) 
military intervention, however, there are reasons (i.e., 
Czechoslovakia, 1968,^^ Dominican Republic, 1965, Chile,
157347) to believe that the prevalence of intervention within









































Y = number of interventions / X = intervened area
SOURCE: The World Handbook Data as collected under the
direction of Taylor and Hudson (John Sullivan, "Interventionary 
Data"); as made available by the Inter-University Consortium 
for Political Research; also see C. Taylor and M. Hudson,
World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1972).
will continue during the transitional period and only decline
4qin the mature triangular polyarchic system.
In Western Europe the United States tends to rely on 
economic expansion, and penetration by means of capital and 
technology, whereas the Soviet Union tends to rely more on 
a physical presence, above all the military (deployment of 
soldiers, technicians, bases and other permanent installations); 
therefore, as the alliances show advancing signs of disarray; 
as national actors on both sides display signs of independence 
in their foreign policy; as national leaders' perceptions of 
serious external threats (an important source of coordination
50
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within alliances and coalitions) totally fades away; and, as
the trend toward the resurgence of national particularisms and
individual goals among bloc members continues to grow, the
Soviet Union by military intervention may attempt to halt this
loosening of the intrabloc cohesion and solidarity and force
its bloc members to stop pursuing objectives at variance with
the goals prescribed for them by their formal bloc commitment.
This contention is based on two major factors: (1) the previously
noted Soviet intervention patterns— 70.1 percent being in
Eastern Europe; and (2) the Brezhnev Doctrine of limited
sovereignty and the right of Soviet intervention within the
51Communist bloc, articulated in September 1968 and the resulting 
invasion of Czechoslovakia. The Brezhnev Doctrine may repre­
sent Soviet behavior during this transformation period, since
during transformation periods, decision-makers have difficulty
52adjusting their behavior to the new systemic requirements.
Asia has been another area of essential actors’ inter­
ventions (U.S. = 30.4 percent, U.S.S.R. = 19.1 percent,
53China = 89 p e r c e n t — as noted in the "Technical Annex" all 
figures are slightly distorted since Vietnam and Korean 
figures are not included), however, the data tend to indicate 
a possibility for decreasing intervention. Two major features 
of the triangular polyarchic system, the rejection of the zero- 
sum game (as previously noted) and the triangular structure 
which resulted from the Sino-Soviet dispute, should reduce the 
possibilities for essential actors’ interventions in this area.
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The Sino-Sovlet dispute is a dominating determinant in the three 
essential actors' decision-making (concerning intervention in 
local disputes). In the bipolar system and part of the trans­
formation period, the presence of China and the desire to 
offset her potential influence were important factors in 
America's decision-makers proclivity to intervene in unstable
Cllsituations in Asia. With the continued development and 
U.S. leaders' recognition of the Sino-Soviet dispute (which 
was a major determinant in the creation of the Sino-American 
detente*^^) and the triangular international balance, the 
compulsive American fear of the Chinese presence becomes 
subsumed to the new detente relationship, which is now an 
increasingly important element in U.S. decision-making. The 
United States has begun to take a somewhat more relaxed view 
of the consequences of many local conflicts, and tries to 
avoid direct military participation in most local Asian
Egconflicts, i.e. Nixon Doctrine.
The Dispute and resulting Sino-American detente have 
contradictory effects on Soviet interventionary behavior.
The Soviet incentive to intervene in unstable situations in 
the Third World, especially Asia, to offset the potential 
influence of China is increased. However, the Soviet Union 
is restrained from taking this type of action by the following
*The detente was slowed down by U.S. invasion of Laos 
and Cambodia in 1970-1971.
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factors: Moscow is uncertain about American and Chinese
reactions to any overt military intervention; Moscow does
not wish to become entangled with the United States through
the process of competitive intervention in the affairs of 
57minor actors; and, Moscow is not willing to endanger the 
detente with the United States. Thus, Moscow has responded 
to the conflict with China by competing with the Chinese in 
many and varied situations in the Third World. For example, 
Soviet interest in containing suspected Chinese ambitions 
in Southeast Asia is suggested in Moscow's proposal in 1969 
for a collective security pact for Asia. The Soviet navy 
has made its presence felt in Southeast Asian waters and 
Moscow has been economically and diplomatically active in 
Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand, and militarily 
active in North Vietnam. Moscow's backing of India in the 
Sino-Indian War of 1962 and its general interest in India's
58security capability is part of Moscow's anti-Chinese policy. 
The importance of South and Southeast Asia to the Soviet 
Union is not of the same order as it is to China, whose 
leaders have regarded Southeast Asia in general as their 
sphere of influence, thus, Soviet Southeast and South Asia 
policy must be seen as a response to perceived danger from 
C h i n a . A t  the same time, the dispute imposes constraints 
on interventionary behavior of China, whose leaders are both 
apprehensive about a hostile Soviet Union at their rear, and 
the possibility of "collusion" between the United States and 
the Soviet Union. Thus, the Sino-Soviet dispute and the
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blurring of Ideological lines have tended to defuse the auto­
matic hostility characteristic of the cold war relationships 
between the United States and Soviet Union and the United 
States and China.
Prom the data and other facts, it seems reasonable to 
expect a decreasing tendency of essential actor intervention 
in Asia; and a continued negative tendency of superpower inter­
vention in Africa which has been left to the United Nations 
(i.e., Congo) and previous colonial powers.
The Middle East, which both the United States and the 
Soviet Union have penetrated but in which both have avoided
intervention, continues to be a major factor of instability
6 2and of potential friction in superpower relationship. 
Nevertheless, both have a common interest in preventing 
superpower intervention and confrontation as a result of 
some local Middle East crisis. It is a major area of inter­
vention by non-superpower actors^^ and to control crises may 
prove difficult for the simple reason that neither the United
States nor Soviet Union is in control as far as events inside
64the area are concerned. The balance of power in the Middle
East can be upset by internal developments in one or more
65countries in this region or by regional interest.
The triangular polyarchic system is more flexible than 
the bipolar system, but does constrain any essential actor's 
tendency toward adventurism. Essential actors will be more 
cautious in intervening in local conflicts because the outcome 
of a local conflict is perceived as less consequential than
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before, and, there is greater unpredictability and flexibility 
about how the other essential actors would react.
The Soviet Union, the United States, and China will all 
compete in the Third World subsystem and all have, at least, 
a limited low-key involvement. However, in this system neither 
Moscow, Peking, nor Washington will develop genuine intimacy 
and if any of these actors suspects or perceives of a threat 
to its interests by pursuing a moderate policy, which permits 
the limited interests of each actor to be pursued at a minimum 
cost to each, or if one of the major actors is tempted by the 
vulnerability of the Third World to embark on a more competitive 
aggressive policy or on a truly hegemonic venture, then inter­
vention and penetration by major actors will increase in the 
Third World.
Thus, from a long-term perspective it seems probable 
that the prevalence of superpower intervention will be reduced 
with the establishment of the triangular polyarchic system 
since it creates a complex pattern of mutual constraints that 
inhibit and limit big power intervention in local internal 
structural wars and encourages major actors to pursue their 
interests increasingly through political, diplomatic and 
economic competition and maneuvering, and through penetrative 
behavior. The new power configurations means continued major 
actor involvement in world politics. For example, the United 
States continues to be involved (penetration rather than inter­
vention) in the Indochina area— not for national security 
reasons but partly from previous systemic requirements and
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commitments and because of the new power configurations in 
that area resulting from the detentes: China favors a
"balkanized" Indochina and in order to obtain it China needs 
United States support; the Soviet Union is for a unified V i e t ­
nam which would penetrate Laos and Cambodia, thus encompassing 
China and undermining the United S t a t e s ’ influence.
The new power configuration reduces big power inter­
ventions, however, interventions and threats to the stability 
of the system will come from middle power actors (i.e., Turkey 
and Greece over Cyprus, Egypt, Syria, and Israel in the 
Middle East^^) which have greater independence in this 
system. For example, in the Southeast Asian subsystem the
stability of the region could be endangered by the North 
70Vietnamese’s or T h a i ’s nationalism which might cause one 
of these actors to pursue militant pre-colonial policies and 
actions toward its neighbor Cambodia which in pre-colonial 
centuries was a vassal to Thailand or Vietnam or both. Thus, 
intervention by small and middle actors increases with their 
autonomy. The Middle East and Southeast Asia continue to be 
an unsettled conflict area (and an area of potential conflict) 
in which the interests of both major and minor actors are 
involved.
Even though the data have a tendency to indicate a de ­
clining trend in US/USSR interventions, data also clearly 
indicate that frequencies in intervention over the last 
twenty years have increased. (See Figure IV) Intervention 
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feature in the triangular polyarchic system since (a) the non- 
essential actors have a greater degree of independence, flexi­
bility, and freedom of action due to the fragmentation of the 
international system and the partial superpower "disengagement" 
from the world; and (b) because the present international 
system has a preponderance of unstable subsystems (Third 
World) and the more precarious the authority structures of 
a non-essential actor, the greater the possibility that con­
vention-breaking attempts to preserve or alter them will be
71launched by foreign actors. The Third World contains a 
large number of new states lacking in internal viability and 
their politics are characterized by boundary problems, internal 
civil strife, and the dangers of interventions in internal 
upheavals. As Pearson notes:
In terms of geographic location, Middle Eastern and 
Asian states were the most frequent intervention targets 
(excluding alleged interventions) from 1948-196?. The 
ten most frequent targets in order were Jordan, Israel, 
Congo K., South Vietnam, Malaysia, the UAR, Syria, 
Cambodia, Cyprus, and the South Arabian Sheikdoms; in 
all 58 countries were targets of interventions from 
1948-67, and 4? of these were in Asia, the Middle East 
or Africa; of 34 intervening countries, 27 of these 
were in these regions. The relatively frequent Middle 
Eastern, African, and Asian interventions were often 
characterized by territorial and social disputes...'2
The following small and middle-size powers were more prone
to intervene than would be expected by their size, power,
population, or resources alone: South Vietnam, New Zealand,
Greece, Syria, Jordan, Somalia, North Vietnam, Yemen, and
Saudi A r a b i a . A m o n g  the ex-colonial Europeans, Prance (93
interventions) and Britain (60 interventions) were the most
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prone to intervene and their interventions were mainly in ex-
7l\colonies. Among the three big powers, the United States 
(l84 interventions excluding Vietnam), was much more prone to 
intervene militarily and overtly than the Soviet Union (51 
interventions) or China (19 interventions).^^
The facts and data support this researcher's theory that 
in the triangular polyarchic system superpower intervention 
will have a tendency to decline but intervention in general 
has a tendency to increase in the Third World.
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TECHNICAL ANNEX: Chapter II
Hypothesis: With the Increasing tendencies of non-supportive,
non-dominant interventions over time, there might be a 
decreasing trend in US/USSR dominant interventionary behaviors, 
even in the areas of Europe, North America and Asia.
Stepwise multiple regression has been used to analyze 
the data and to test this hypothesis. Stepwise multiple 
regression is a statistical technique for analyzing a relation­
ship between a dependent variable (y) and a set of independent 
variables (x^, x^,..., x^) and for selecting the independent 
variables in order of their importance. The criterion of 
importance is based on the reduction of sums of squares, and 
the independent variable most important in this reduction in a 
given step is entered in the regression. This step procedure 
continues until all of the independent variables that explain 
the reduction of sum of squares at the one percent level are 
included. The independent variables are called predictors and 
the dependent variable is called the criterion. This analysis 
was performed using the Regression subprogram of the Statistical 
Package for the Social Sciences^ on the IBM 370 at the Univer­
sity of Texas at Arlington's branch of the North Texas Regional
2Computer Center.
The sample comprised 1073 "intervention" events in 136 
countries^ over a twenty-year period (1948-1967). The sample
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was drawn from the World Handbook data collection.^ "Inter­
vention" in this analysis has been defined as "any attempt 
to engage in military activity within the borders of another 
country with intent of influencing the authority structure of 
that country."5 Also notable is the lack of data relating 
to the Korean and Vietnamese conflicts. In the case of the 
Vietnam conflict the only data involved are those interventions 
which occurred in periphery nations such as Laos which might 
have some relation to the more major conflict.
In this analysis the dependent variable "Intervention 
by the US and/or the USSR," was measured on the following 
scale :
0 = the intervention involved neither the US nor
USSR
1 = the intervention involved the US
2 = the intervention involved the USSR
3 = the intervention involved both the US and the
USSR
The independent or predictor variables were initially 
ten in number, but one was discarded in the course of the step 
process as of insufficient importance. The nine predictors 
remaining included six regional variables (Africa, Middle 
East, Europe, North America, Asia and South Pacific; South 
America was the variable dropped as explaining little of the 
variance, and Central America had been omitted by the researcher 
because its explanatory role duplicated that of Asia). (See 
Table A) Each of the six regional variables was scored as
Table A
Countries within Geographic Regions
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North America Europe con. Africa con. Mainland
United States Finland Libya Central
Puerto Rico Sweden Sudan America
Canada Norway Barbados
Cuba Denmark Middle East Mexico
Haiti Iceland Iran Guatemala
Dorn. Republic Turkey Honduras
Jamaica Africa Iraq El Salvador
Trinidad & The Gambia U. Arab Rep. Nicaragua
Tobago Mall Syria Costa Rica
Senegal Lebanon Panama
South America Dahomey Jordan Colombia
Venezuela Mauritania Israel
Guyana Niger Saudi Arabia
Ecuador Ivory Coast Yemen
Peru Guinea Southern Yemen
Brazil Upper Volta Kuwait
Bolivia Liberia





Europe Gabon Hong Kong
United Kingdom Cen. Af. Rep. North Korea
Ireland Chad South Korea
Netherlands Congo (B.) Japan




Spain Burundi Maldlve Is.
Portugal Rwanda Nepal
W . Germany Somalia Thailand
E . Germany Ethiopia Cambodia
Poland Angola Laos
Austria Mozambique North Vietnam
Hungary Zambia South Vietnam
Czechoslovakia Rhodesia
Italy Malawi South Pacific
Malta S. Africa Malaysia.
Albania Lesotho Singapore
Yugoslavia Botswana Philippines
Greece Malagasy Rep. Indonesia
Cyprus Mauritius Australia
Bulgaria Morocco Papua
Rumania Algeria New Guinea
Soviet Union Tunisia New Zealand
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follows for each intervention:
0 = the intervention did not occur in this region
1 = the intervention occurred in this region 
The other three predictors, with score values were:
Year of intervention (scored as a time series):
48 = the intervention occurred in 1948...
67 = the intervention occurred in I967
Type of intervention:
1 = intervention in which a nation crosses a
national border
2 = intervener has troops already established
in the country (i.e., colonial or alliance 
troops)
3 = rebel forces "supported by and/or residing
in another nation"
4 = mercenary forces
5 = international organization forces
Support decision of intervenor (or intention of inter- 
venor supporting action):
0 = non-supportive intervention (Intervention
without a commitment to the existing political 
situation or political actors within the nation, 
i.e., peace keeping force or conquering nation)
1 = supporting the government in power
2 = support of a rebellious group
In the discussion of the stepwise multiple regression 
analysis, the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics at times will be referred to as the superpowers or 
superpower intervenons; thus the criterion variable may be 
thought of as scaled on a non-superpower-superpower continuum.
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The mean for the criterion variable was .2656 which tends to 
indicate that most of the intervention occurred with neither 
of the superpowers involved. (See Table B) The predictor 
variable "Year of Intervention" was scaled as a time series 
with a mean of 6I .69 or I96I and 8.28 months with a standard 
deviation of 4.35 (years).
The "Type of Intervention" predictor variable was per­
ceived by the researcher as a dominance scale (or a power 
scale) with smaller values indicating coercive power to 
dominate the intervened nation and larger values indicating 
insufficient strength to directly intervene or coercively 
dominate within the intervened nation. The mean for "Type 




839 cases 78.2% Neither superpower involi
183 cases 1 7 .1% US intervening
51 cases 4.8% USSR intervening
0 cases 0.0% Both intervening
1073 cases 100.0% TOTAL
The predictor variable "Support Decision of the Intervener" 
could be characterized as the intention of the intervener the 
direction of the intervener support-action. The mean for the 
"Support Decision of Intervener" variable is 1.276 with a
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deviation of .7297, which tends to indicate that most of 
the interveners chose to support either the government or 
rebellious groups. (See Table C)
Table C






Supporting the government in power 
Support of a rebellious group
TOTAL
Through multiple regression analysis (stepwise regression 
used) the plane of prediction or plane of best fit was developed. 
(See Figure I) This plane had a Y (US-USSR intervention) inter­
cept of 1.25 and a slope (a ratio of US-USSR intervention/other 
independent variables) of .58276. The confidence interval of 
the slope was found at the .01 level meaning that the sample 
slope will be found at the .01 level of the population (only 
one out of 100 will a case be found outside of the confidence 
range). Even though the correlations of the independent variables 
with the dependent variables (See Table D) are not large but 
not small either, this analysis proved to be significant well 
beyond the .01 level (F = 60.74074 DF 9(1063) because of the 
large number of degrees of freedom.






Xg = Mid. East
Xg = Support
Xi| = Type grp./inter.
X5 = Europe
Xg = Nor. Am.
Xy — Asia
Xo = Yr. inter.
Xg = So. Pacific
Regression formula Y (intervention) = -O.9085 Xn -O.O8698 Xp -0.14605 Xo -0.21333 Xk































Thirty-four percent of the variance or the change in 
superpower vs. non-superpower intervention was explained by 
the nine variables. The standard error of estimate was .43977. 
The standard error is the standard deviation of the differences 
between predicted and actual values of Y, and this is a measure 
of the average distance from the line of the residuals. The
sum of squares for the regression line was 105-72 with a mean
square of 11.7469. The sum of squares for the residuals was
205.578 with a mean square of .19342. The discussion of the
coefficients of the independent variables will be in terms 
of Beta coefficients or standardized scores. (See Table E)
All of the independent variables except for the variable 
South Pacific were significant at the .01 level. South Pacific
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was significant at the .05 level. Because the standard error 
of estimate is smaller in all cases one can assume confidence 
that the sign for B is correct.
Table E 
VARIABLES IN THE EQUATION
Variable B Beta STD er. B F
Africa -0.09877 -0.09085 0.06270 2.482
Mid. East -0.13153 -0.08698 0.06820 3.720
Support dec. -0.10786 -0.14605 0.02062 27.353
Type Inter. -0.08445 -0.21333 0.01156 53.351
Europe 0.48281 0.26519 0.06980 47.850
Nor. Am. 0.51591 0.29401 0.07221 51.052
Asia 0.24521 0.15564 0.06715 13.333
Yr. Inter. -0.01192 -0.09624 0.00356 11.210
So. Pac. -0.15925 -0.03999 0.11370 1.962
(constant) 1.25045
The standard error in South Pacific being close to B in 
size would tend to indicate that it can not be interpreted with 
the same confidence.
There was a change in the coefficient in Africa and the 
Middle East during the stepwise process. These changes seemed 
to occur when variables were entered which explained or accounted 
for variance in Africa and the Middle East that was not accounted 
for in the dependent or criterion variable (US-USSR intervention 
variable). As variables are entered into the equation they add 
to the unique variance in the criterion variable (intervention).
The major findings of the multiple regression:
1. The analysis tends to indicate that as years increase there
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will probably be a decrease in superpower (US-USSR) interven­
tion as shown by the negative Beta coefficient of years of 
intervention (-0.09624).
2. If the intervention is of a non-supportive nature, it 
is less likely that the US or USSR will be involved. Con­
versely, if it is a supportive action then the US-USSR might 
possibly be involved in the intervention even though the overall 
trend tends to indicate less intervention by the US-USSR over 
time. These trends are indicated by the negative Beta co­
efficient (-0.14605).
3. The analysis indicates a probable tendency of the US-USSR 
being less likely to intervene in less dominant situations.
The dominance or lack of dominance will be indicated by the 
type of group. The negative Beta coefficient, -.21333, indi­
cates this trend. The data tend to indicate an increase in 
less dominant interventions which might tend to indicate a 
lesser role for the US-USSR as interventionary actors.
4. The data tend to indicate that the US-USSR interventions 
have a positive relationship to Europe, Asia, and North America 
as shown by the Beta coefficients, 0.26519, 0.15564, and 0.29401.
5. The tendency of intervention in Africa, the Middle East, 
and the South Pacific should be negative in the case of US- 
USSR involvement as indicated by the negative Beta coefficients,
-0 .09085, -0 .08698, and -0 .03999.
The correlations developed in this analysis are significantly 
different from zero at the .01 level, thus the hypothesis was 
proven not false.
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NOTES— TECHNICAL ANNEX: Chapter II
^Norman Nie, Dale H. Bent, C.H. Hull, SPSS, Statistical 
Package for the Social Sciences (New York: McGraw-Hill
Company, 1970).
^Nancy B. Saunders served as technical assistant- 
programme r.
^Includes international organization (i.e., U.N.) inter­
ventions. See Yale Handbook codebook, lUCPR.
^(The Yale World Handbook Data as collected under the 
direction of Taylor and Hudson— John Sullivan, "Interventionary 
Data.") As made available by the Inter-University Consortium 
for Political Research; also citing published version Charles 
Lewis Taylor and Michael C. Hudson, World Handbook of Political 
and Social Indicators (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1972), pp. 124-127, and Table 3.6 "External Interventions."
5john D . Sullivan defined intervention as "any attempt 
to engage in military activity within the borders of another 
country with the intent of influencing the authority structure 
of that country." This data refers to the initial intervention 
but not to the continuance of that event. See World Handbook 
Codebook, Part IV, p. 2.
Chapter III
THE INSTABILITY OF NATIONAL ACTORS IN DEVELOPING AREAS
The triangular polyarchic international structure serves
to dampen the incentive of superpower interventions, however,
the instability of the social and political structures in
the Third World provide ample opportunity for intervention
and penetration. Although political instability is a concept
which can be explicated in more than one way, this analysis
is only concerned with one condition of instability— low
level of integration. This analysis, which uses Laos as
its major case study, assumes that the processes of integration
have important effects on the stability or instability of
developing political systems. Integration is an important
concomitant of political stability or instability. Generally,
a high level of integration modifies conflict and inhibits
instability.^ The basic assumption is that there is a strong
negative or inverse relationship between integration of a
system and political instability. Integration generally
refers to the process of bringing together culturally and
socially discrete groups into a single territorial unit and
2the establishment of a national identity. The term "inte­
gration" is used to cover an extraordinary large range of 
political phenomena. In order to resolve the ambiguous
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definition, this analysis focuses on and identifies separable 
dimensions of integration which are related to, but not identi­
cal with instability/stability. This analysis operationally 
defines and identifies three dimensions of Integration— terri­
torial, national, and political.
TERRITORIAL INTEGRATION
Territorial integration refers to the establishment by 
the central government of its authority o v b t  its territory.
No government claiming international recognition willingly 
admits that it cannot exercise authority in areas under its 
recognized jurisdiction, for to do so is to invite the strong 
to penetrate into the territory of the weak. Nevertheless, 
political systems that are territorially unintegrated invite 
penetration by outside powers. For example, Laos with its 
rugged terrain, its internal political divisions based on 
regions, its diversified and small population (migrating 
groups have frequently pushed into Laos meeting little resis­
tance because of low population density), its regionalism, 
its tribal and village isolation, and its strategic location, 
is ideally suited for penetration by its neighbors or guerrilla 
warfare.
Sovereignty is characterized by an exclusive control 
over territory; however, many developing nations face problems 
in efforts to establish central authority over the entire 
territory. Some colonial powers made no effort to establish 
"de facto" control over border areas since both sides of a
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border were often under the same colonial government— (Laos-
Vietnam) as in French Indochina, or French West Africa— or
because a weak independent power bordered the colony— India-
Tibet, Burma-China, Laos-China— or because recalcitrant tribes
resisted or ignored efforts to be incorporated into a larger
nation-state. In most instances, the new governments have
been left to fill the gap between "de Jure" and "de facto"
control. Some of the new governments have wisely not attempted
to exercise control over subordinate authorities since their
ability to do so is often very limited. However, no modern
government can accept for long a situation in which its laws
5are not observed in portions of its territory. For most new 
states the establishment of a territory precedes the estab­
lishment of subjective loyalties (the nation). Territorial 
integration is related to the problem of "state-building."
Almond refers to the problem of state-building as the problem 
of penetration and integration. According to Almond, "state- 
building occurs when the political elite creates new struc­
tures and organizations designed to 'penetrate* the society 
in order to regulate behavior in it and draw a larger volume 
of resources from it.
In Asia, the authority of the state is often questioned 
or meaningless, making state disintegration a general possi-
7bility. There is no precolonial basis for secular legitimacy, 
and there is no traditional concept of the state as a territory
g
with demarcated boundaries. Thus, colonial rule and legacy 
has created many problems for the new nations of the Third World,
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Two of the main problems these developing nations must
solve are their national boundaries and their minorities. If
one looks at a map, one realizes what nonsense the imperial
era has made of the boundaries of countries now launched as
sovereign nation-states. Lines were drawn arbitrarily by
competing imperialists; territories were added by imperial
adventurers, and boundaries were inherited by unthinking usage.
There was no regard for ethnic groups, and national borders
are left crossing obvious ethnic boundaries. Thus, even though
these territories are now labelled nation-states, their past
lives on and their political, racial, dynastic and social
9rivalries survive into the present. The Kingdom of Laos and 
the Union of Burma serve as illustrative examples.
Burma, whose present-day political boundaries are largely 
the product of British colonial efforts and British attempts 
to define a zone of influence as against those of China and 
France, faces major state-building problems. One of the present 
problems of Burma is that minorities not only form a very large 
portion of the population, but they are strategically placed 
on all borders. The mountainous regions which presently 
make up the international boundaries with Bangladesh, India, 
China, Thailand and Laos are occupied by such non-Burmese 
(in speech and other cultural aspects) groups as the Chin, 
Kachin, Wa, Shan, Karen, and Mon. Some of these groups like 
the Shan rivaled the Burmans in political influence and cultural 
developments. The British who recognized this put such terri­
tories as the Shan States and Kayah (or Red Karens) under a
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special administrative Jurisdiction which was not directly 
related to Burma proper. The area which has become the Union 
of Burma was treated as a section of Britain's Indian empire 
and largely administered by members of the Indian Civil 
Service. When the British agreed to Burma's independence, 
problems developed as to the type of government and the "fate" 
of various "minority" groups over which the Burmans never had 
exercised firm political control. Dissatisfaction with the 
"solutions" to these problems as well as post-independence 
government policies resulted in many long and violent attempts 
among such groups as the Shan and Karen to assert their political 
and cultural independence.^^
Boundary and minority problems are especially evident in 
the Kingdom of Laos which is an artificial creation, the off­
spring of a French colonial administrative unit. The concept 
of a Laotian nation-state exists more in the Western press 
and in Laos' international legal status than in the minds and 
actions of most of its people, whose activities and primary 
loyalties tend to be limited to tribal, familial, and regional 
units that fall short of the nation-state. The fact that this 
ex-colonial state has been given the status of nation-state, 
even though it is really only a geographic expression, poses 
many state-building problems. These problems can best be 
understood by looking at the background to the emergence of 
Laos as an independent state.
The parent kingdom of present-day Laos can be traced back 
to the Kingdom of Lan Xang (Land of the Million Elephants) in
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1353. Its rule did not correspond to the present boundaries 
of the country, but from that time may be dated a tradition 
which has bearing on the present day. For five hundred years 
after Lan Xang emerged, the territory was under attack from 
three stronger powers: Burma, Thailand and Vietnam. The
kingdom that emerged in 1353 survived in a tenuous way until 
1570 when Burmese strength brought it under a vague suzerainty. 
By 1637, independent again and under the ruling authority of 
King Soulingavongsa, it remained unified until his death in 
1694. At this time, it split into three kingdoms or prince­
doms: Luang Prabang, Vientiane, and Champassak.^^ Continual
dynastic struggles among the princedoms coupled with foreign
12interference characterized this area from 1694 until 1899.
During the early part of the eighteenth century, the 
whole territory came under Thailand's domination mainly because 
of the internal conflict among rival monarchs of Luang Prabang, 
Vientiane, and Champassak. An attempt to break loose from 
Thailand's domination led to war in 1826, but it failed, and 
as a result Vientiane was sacked and much of the population 
moved across the Mekong River into what is now northeastern 
Thailand, where their descendants remain in as great a number 
as they do in present-day Laos itself. Besides Vientiane's 
being sacked, the royal house of Vientiane was extinguished, 
and Thailand established direct control over the Kingdom of 
Vientiane. Under the French, the city of Vientiane in the 
province of Vientiane also became the administrative seat of
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13the government, as it has continued since Laotian independence.
It was in this area that the wealthy non-royal elite evolved.
For almost two centuries, until the French came, no
unified state existed. In I887, the Kingdom of Luang Prabang
became a French protectorate; the French ruled indirectly
through the royal house. In I888, the French forced Thailand
to give them what is northeastern Laos. The next phase of
French expansion resulted in the relinquishment by the Thais
of all territory east of the Mekong River. After a series of
Franco-Siamese treaties between 1893 and 1907, the frontiers
iHof Laos became what they are today.
From this confused tracing of Laos’ history, several 
relevant factors emerge. Laos has never been a country: "it
was a patchwork of kingdoms overlaid by a short period of 
French influence. Laos has not been, nor is it now an 
entity in any nation-state sense. It found itself independent 
in 1954 with more Lao across the Mekong River in Thailand than 
there were in Laos itself. The Mekong and other boundaries, 
created by the French, really have very little meaning. With­
in Laos, especially in the north, there are tribal minority 
populations. On the border between Laos and China, between Laos 
and North Vietnam, and between Laos and Thailand, there is no 
ethnic distinction; the minority tribes in the north and the 
Lao in the east straddle both sides. There is little control 
over the constant movement of these peoples. Geographic features 
rather than tribal boundaries have been used to define Laos’ 
borders. The Chinese-Laotian border follows the watershed of
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the Nam Ou, a small river. The borders shared with China and 
Burma are permeable and unpopulated. The borders between 
Laos and Thailand follow the mainstream of the Mekong; the 
ethnic Lao on both sides of the river are more oriented to 
their ethnic community than to their respective nation-state. 
Laos* border with South and North Vietnam is decided by the 
watershed of the Annamite Chain; the people living in the 
northern Laotian-Vietnamese frontier zones are tribesmen who 
do not think of the international boundary as a real dividing 
line between kinsmen living on either side. (The French who 
controlled both sides of the border had only "de jure" control 
of this area.) The Laotian government's influence has been 
extremely weak and at points nonexistent along this border.
The frontier zones are so mountainous and so generally 
covered by thick jungles, that boundaries are poorly defined 
and hardly patrolled. Since the land is too rugged for easy 
communication, communication facilities in the frontier areas 
and borderlands are nonexistent or inadequate. In terms of 
transportation, Laos has one of the poorest road density 
ratings in the world.* A good part of upland Laos and fron­
tier zones can only be reached by narrow trails which are 
unsuited to vehicular traffic. The topography and poor 
internal communication and transportation system encourage 
tribal (as well as village and regional) isolation and put
*Transportation and communication will be discussed in 
more detail in the section on national integration.
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obstacles in the way of any attempt to integrate these areas
17administratively and govern them from a single center. Be­
cause the Laotian political process does not adequately encompass 
the hill tribes or integrate the isolated villages, and because 
of the general weakness of the central government, the Laotian 
border provinces can anticipate possible penetration by its 
neighbors— Burma, China, Thailand, Cambodia, and Vietnam.
These border regions not only provide excellent conditions 
for infiltration and exfiltration, but also for small groups
18of guerrillas to hide out and to survive.
Another threat to Laos* state-building is regionalism,
which is a type of sub-territorial solidarity. The precolonial
political systems in this area were much smaller in scale, and
a number of traditional monarchies were absorbed within the
19new Laotian boundaries (as well as numerous societies).
One can discern residual regional loyalties revolving around 
the traditional Laotian principalities of Champassak, Vientiane, 
and Luang Prabang. Another factor which emerges from the 
tracing of Laos* history is that a certain rivalry has always 
existed between its kingdoms or princedoms. As a result, 
internal dynastic and regional quarrels have broken up tem­
porarily established centralized control; but what is more 
important, regional rulers have attempted to further their 
ambitions by seeking political association with neighboring 
states, threatening the existence of an independent state. Laos 
has always been plagued by neighbors stronger than itself.
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Thus, throughout history, the conditions for survival of an
independent state have been the presence of a ruler powerful
enough to attract the allegiance of regions inward toward
himself and the existence of a balance of power among its 
20neighbors. (The history of Lan Xang is not without parallels 
to the current problems and situation in Laos.)
Laos is presently divided into military regions based 
on the historical regional princedoms. Each region is ruled 
by a coalition of traditional ruling families and right-wing 
generals (supported by the U.S.). These regions operate 
autonomously and have proven incapable of significant coope­
ration. The central government has little influence within
these regions, where the word of the traditional ruling
21families and the allied military commander is law. Neither
the National Assembly whose membership is made up of men mostly
from the traditional ruling regional families and which Laotians
regard as a powerless debating club, nor the king wield notice-
22able influence outside of Luang Prabang. A United States 
official reported to the Senate that "many people in his area 
(150 miles from Luang Prabang) do not know who the king is, 
they do not know what he looks like."^^ (A theme— geographic 
remoteness from political centers— is reflected in the above 
example and in the following pages.)
Regional loyalties, rivalries (and foreign support of 
these rivalries), and semi-autonomy threaten territorial inte­
gration and continue to be a factor in the confused kaleidoscope 
of Laotian politics. The conflict between the Laotian elite
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symbolizes regional opposition to the central government. The
Lao elite have tended to disrupt national unity rather than 
24encourage it. Laos remains a country where regionalism
rather than centralized authority largely determines the
25pattern of political, social, and economic life.
The threats to state-building in Laos have not only 
come from regionalism, tribal-village and frontier isolation, 
but also from "internal withdrawl" from the political system 
by the Pathet Lao.* Internal withdrawal refers to the prac­
tice where remote areas satisfied with a near-subsistence
level of economic activity simply stop obeying central authority,
Pfiwithout overtly seceding. The Pathet Lao represent one form 
of internal withdrawal. Laos is territorially divided into 
two areas, one controlled by the Royal Laotian government 
and the other by the Pathet Lao. (The exceptions are some 
pockets of enemy resistance in each area.) Ever since Laotian 
independence an autonomous Pathet Lao state has existed. More­
over, the two political zones tend to coincide with ethnic 
zones— Laos of the plains which are the domain of the ethnic 
Lao is controlled by the Royal Laotian Government (RLG), and 
Laos of the (uplands) hills and mountain Jungles which are
distinguished by a heavy concentration of diverse non-Lao
27ethnic groups is where the Pathet Lao prevail.
States like Laos, Burma, Indonesia, with weak administrative 
capacities and traditions tend to encounter local withdrawal.
*In 1965j the Pathet Lao changed its name to the Lao 
People’s Liberation Army.
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Moreover, central government's efforts at coercion are often 
rendered difficult by the terrain. Lucian Pye contends that 
countries like Burma and Indonesia are able to tolerate the 
loss of administrative control of large regions for protracted
28periods, as long as the center is not threatened.
The specter of separatism such as the Katanga effort to 
separate from the Congo, is not as great in Asia as in Africa.
As Fred R. von der Mehden notes, "the existence of prominent 
ideological cleavages in the Asian context, often cutting 
across the cultural divisions, tend to blur the edges of 
separatist m o v e m e n t . I n  Burma, for instance, there have 
been a structured series of rebellions (since independence) in 
which religion, ethnicity, and Communism interact and overlap 
in a complex way. The groups which have participated in 
violent rejection of the authority of the Burmese government 
can be divided into three categories. The first category is 
the ethnic groups. Ethnic groups which have included the Karens 
in the southeast, the Shans in the northeast, the Kachins of 
the north, and the Arakanese and Mons of the south (these 
latter two have not caused large-scale depredations), have 
gone into rebellion, but usually not in a highly coordinated 
action. The various rebel groups have not been able to agree 
to cooperate and coordinate their military and political actions. 
Once numbering at over 25,000 the Communists which include two 
mutually antagonistic subgroups— the Red Flag Communist 
("Trotskyists") and White Flag Communist ("regulars")— are
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mainly guerrilla bands which roam rural areas of Burma and
carry out hit-and-run attacks. The third group of insurgents,
the paramilitary units such as the Burma Rifles, participated
in anti-government military action in order to bring down the
government or militarily force it to "reform." These groups
never did fully cooperate with other rebels in the field.
These various groups have different grievances and goals and
have not been able to unify to fight the Government. Thus,
none of these groups have been able to escalate into large
units since 1950; however, the Government has been unsuccessful
in eliminating the rebels. Burma remains like other areas of
Southeast Asia, a scene of political turbulence and violence.
Another factor in Asia which inhibits separatism is the
"Marxist-Leninist ideological commitment of some Asian groups
31who might otherwise be tempted by separation." For example,
in Laos the Pathet Lao have not been tempted by separatism
because of their commitment to a unified liberated Laos— the
Marxist-Leninist imperative which is eventual control of
all Laos, not legalization and consolidation of the separate
32zone as an independent state. Thus, up to this point, 
liberationist or autonomist^^ aspirations have had to be 
achieved in Laos and Burma by the simple expedient of internal 
withdrawal from the political system; in both of these countries, 




National intégration is closely related to territorial 
integration, since sovereign control over a territory may 
be accompanied by a feeling of nationality. National inte­
gration refers specifically to the process of creating a 
national culture, a subjective loyalty on the part of the 
population within that territory which overshadows, or
■3i}eliminates, or subordinates parochial loyalties. National 
integration is related to Almond’s concept of "nation-building" 
in developing political systems. Nation-building, which em­
phasizes the cultural aspects of political development, is the 
process whereby "people transfer their commitment and loyalty
from smaller tribes, villages, and petty principalities to
35the larger central political system." The ultimate sanc­
tions for the failure of nation-building are internal violence 
or disintegration of the nation-state. The ethnic diversity 
of many Southeast Asian nations, for instance Laos or Burma, 
makes nation-building there a complex process.
The Laotian population, which is estimated to be between 
two and a half and three million (no precise population figures 
exist), comprises a variety of ethnic groups, whose diversity 
and in many cases isolation makes the realization of true 
national and cultural unity extremely difficult. The multi­
cultural society exhibits great ethnic and linguistic diversity, 
but it is possible to distinguish four main groups: the Lao
(the predominant group who constitute a little less than half
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of the population), the Tai, the Meo, and the Kha. Each retains
37its own language and culture.
The Lao occupy the Mekong plains and the alluvial fingers 
ascending the tributaries which are the only fertile lowlands 
in Laos. These people form a roughly continuous settlement 
which is the most unified of any area inhabited by ethnic 
groups. The Lao make up about forty-nine percent of the popu­
lation and live mainly in the provinces of Champassak, Khammouane, 
and Vientiane. The Lao speak Laotian-Thai which is a dialect 
belonging to the central and southwestern branches of the wide­
spread Thai family; it is a Sino-Tibetan language. The Lao 
are related to their neighboring Thai speakers, the Siamese; 
many Lao live across the Mekong River in Thailand and the 
artificial political border is no barrier to constant movement. 
This is because the Lao were originally part of a widespread 
ethnic group that came south from what is now China; the Lao 
share especially with the Siamese and to a lesser extent other 
Thai peoples— language, social and political organization, 
agricultural methods, artifacts.
Even though the Lao people have the same language, it 
is written by these people in several different forms; the 
Lao, in different parts of Laos, use different written styles 
according to their preference. There is no standardization ' 
of spelling. This local variation among the Lao also exists 
in custom and behavior. The majority of Lao are peasants.
On the whole these people are sedentary wet-rice cultivators;
114
however, the small elite and the royalty of Laos are also
Lao.38
The Tai Tribes who differ from the Lao but share their 
cultural origins speak a Lolo dialect of the Tibet-Burman 
family of the Sino-Tibetan stock. The Tai Tribes are made 
up of different ethnic subgroups. The main subgroups are:
Tai Dam, Tai Deng, Tai Neua, Tai Phong and Phou Tai. These 
tribes live chiefly in the mountain valleys of northern Laos. 
Their widely scattered settlements are too isolated to allow 
any extensive sense of political or racial unity; thus, 
political organization in these tribes rarely extends beyond 
the immediate village area and its local trading and social 
relationships. The Tai Tribes are primarily wet-rice growers, 
although millet, sweet potatoes, corn, and beans are often 
cultivated. The mountain slopes are used for dry rice and 
wheat. These Tai Tribes are self-sufficient in their basic 
food and clothing requirements, but they have always traded 
with the lowland Lao for certain items.
Even though the Lao and the Tai have similar basic lan­
guages and cultures (Sino-Tibetan family), the Lao regard 
these tribes as their inferiors; whereas, the Tai Tribes 
think that they are superior to the Lao. The Tai have a 
general suspicion and dislike for the Lao; this inhibits 
assimilation. Communication is possible between the Lao and 
the Tai, for the Tai dialects, of the same general structure 
as the Lao, are for the most part mutually intelligible.
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Another closely related group is the Meo and the Man 
Tribes. Linguistically, they are close to the Tai and the 
Lao, but they exhibit strong evidence of influence from the 
Chinese culture. This may be the result of their proximity 
to the Chinese border. The outstanding peculiarity of these 
people is that they practice "slash-and-burn agriculture" to 
a more intensive degree than the other tribal people in Laos. 
They habitually exhaust the soil to the degree that natural 
vegetation cannot return.
The Meo are proud people and disdainful of the Lao 
lowlander. The Meo, even though they live in scattered small 
villages on the mountaintops, seem to have achieved some degree 
of political unity. They are the only tribal group which has 
an elected deputy in the National Assembly. This is rather
linamazing since they only represent one-tenth of the population.
The above groups have a certain linguistic unity and to 
a lesser degree similar cultural origins. This can be con­
trasted with the so-called Kha Tribes who make up about a 
fourth of the population in Laos. The Kha Tribes are believed 
to be speakers of various Mon-Khmer languages which are 
unrelated, historically, to the Sino-Tibetan stock. These 
groups have in the course of time become to a small degree 
acculturated to the Lao culture; this has been the result of 
these tribes being conquered and enslaved by the Lao in 
ancient times. Kha is the Laotian word for "slave;" even 
though it is greatly resented, it is still applied by the Lao 
to the people of these sixty different Kha Tribes.
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These sixty different Kha Tribes have little sense of 
ethnic or political unity. The Kha people are often distin­
guished by darker skin color. These tribes live on mountain- 
tops above the Lao and subsist by cultivating rice, maize, 
tobacco, cotton, and other crops, largely by means of the 
"slash-and-burn method." The various languages spoken by 
the Kha are very different in structure from the Lao's language, 
Some Kha speakers know a little Lao or Tai language. However, 
acculturation and assimilation of the Kha Tribes is going to 
remain a problem for the Laotian Government, for there is a 
long history of deep-seated antagonism and resentment between 
the Kha and the Lao. At the moment there are no effective 
plans for dealing with these groups which make up one-fourth
9
of the population.
There are other tribal groups in Laos but they are 
unclassifiable. No one group is significant in number or 
political importance. Together they constitute about ten 
percent of the population. The only other group in Laos 
which has not yet been discussed is the foreign minorities.
In Laos, since independence, there are about six thousand 
Europeans, nine thousand Vietnamese, thirty thousand Chinese, 
and about one thousand Pakistanis and Indians. Most of these 
groups are concentrated in the urban centers while most 
natives inhabit the rural areas.
The Vietnamese are craftsmen and merchants; they were 
also used by the French to fill administrative, teaching, 
skilled labor, and clerical posts. The Chinese besides being
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in the urban areas, are found throughout the rice-growing 
areas as millers, moneylenders and traders. The foreign 
minorities in Laos are a small but important group, for they 
have filled (and continue to fill) key engineering and admini­
strative posts. Since independence, which caused the with­
drawal of much of the foreign personnel, a vacuum was created 
which has been difficult to fill.
Each of Laos' ethnic groups do, to a great degree, preserve
a distinct sub-society and geographic region. Generally
speaking, the Lao Loum prefer the lowlands, the Tai the
mountain valleys, the Kha the mid-mountain level, and the Meo
the mountain tops. (Wartime dislocation has modified this
42 \stratification slightly. ) They each have their own language, 
culture, and religion; each tends to view the other as foreign. 
There is little acculturation because before the present 
century many of these people were enemies among whom armed 
clashes were very frequent. Thus, to this day they continue 
to resist intensive contact and intermarriage. The only 
political and cultural unity the Kingdom possesses is provided 
by the Lao who form the largest group. Their common language 
and traditions give the Kingdom a loose economic and political 
system. However, Laos, like Burma and other Southeast Asian 
countries, remains an extremely diverse and highly hetero­
geneous society, which in reality cannot even be regarded as 
a single society.
The social and political structure in Laos is based to 
a large extent on these racial groups. The diverse tribal
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people of the highlands are at the bottom of the scale; the 
Lao peasant villagers who barely outnumber the tribes are next 
on the scale. Above this, is perched the very small Lao 
elite which includes about twenty families which have deep 
regional roots and have deeply rooted antipathies toward 
each other. An unimaginably wide gap (which will be covered 
in the section on political integration) separates the widely 
traveled, multilingual elite who are highly educated in both 
Eastern and Western traditions, from the mass of primitive 
rice cultivators.
In Thailand, Vietnam, and Cambodia, the ethnic diversity 
is less important than in Laos, since the Thai, Vietnamese, 
and Khmer form overwhelming majorities compared to the rela­
tively few members of the ethnic minority. However, in these 
countries, the small minorities have been ignored. In South 
Vietnam and Cambodia the minority problem has been officially 
denied existence. For instance, Cambodia has a single domi­
nating culture; the Khmer make up ninety percent of the 
population, and the Vietnamese and Chinese constitute most 
of the remainder. However, according to Prince Sihanouk in 
1965, "Cambodia is not their homeland (speaking about the 
Vietnamese and Chinese populations in Cambodia) we do not
Il 3have minorities, only foreigners."  ̂ The Vietnamese in 
Cambodia, who have maintained themselves as a community apart 
from the Cambodians since there is a long history of enmity 
between the two peoples, are believed to be sympathetic with the
119
views of the North Vietnamese government and are considered 
behind-the-scenes supporters of the small Cambodian Communist 
Party, the Pracheachon, which had little backing until the 
fall of S i h a n o u k . T h i s  can be contrasted with South Vietnam 
where divisive sentiments derive from religion and strong 
sectional feeling. In South Vietnam about eighty-five percent 
of the population are culturally and linguistically Vietnamese, 
but the existence of several sects within the Vietnamese 
Buddhist religion, and the existence of minority religions 
have been a significant source of social cleavage. Moreover, 
a certain type of sect, i.e. Hao Hoa, is identified with a
Il5given region. Thus internal cleavages in its major religion 
and minority religions are of great significance in Vietnam.
As Badgley notes, "Strong religious identification among minor­
ities— Catholic and Mahayana Buddhist Chinese and Vietnamese, 
Theravada Buddhist Khmer, Cao Dai and Hao Hoa sects, and
animist hill tribes— accentuate the differences among Viet- 
hSnamese." Even though tribal groups in Vietnam constitute 
less than a tenth of the population, they occupy over half 
of the territory and further divide the country. The multi­
farious identities of the population makes the process of 
acculturation and governing very difficult. In Thailand, 
problems of nation-building are caused by the distrust of 
subcultures in different areas of the country, particularly 
the northeast where some of the hill tribes are situated. 
Nevertheless, compared to its neighbors, Laos and Burma,
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48Thailand is a relatively unified and Integrated state.
Thailand, Cambodia, and South Vietnam are more culturally 
homogeneous than Laos, but even In these countries there 
are some barriers to national Integration.
Other Southeast Aslan countries, such as Burma and
Indonesia share with Laos a similar set of ethnic and cultural
problems. In each of these countries, one religion and one
ethnlc-language community (respectively, the Burmans-Theravada
Buddhist, Javanese-Musllm, Lao-Theravada Buddhist) dominate
the nationalization process and most Institutions at the national
49level, and Important minorities are excluded.
In Laos a small minority of Lao dominate the government 
and administration. The non-Lao have been barred from all 
but token opportunities for educational and social advance­
ment. The Lao do not govern oppressively, but this may simply 
be because they have not extended their administration very 
far or very effectively. The Lao elite who have had a nearly 
"nonexistent" assimilation policy for the other ethnic groups 
simply have acted upon the assumption that the minorities 
would become Lao In dress, language, religion, etc. In Laos, 
as well as In Burma, the army, which could be used as an 
assimilation and Integration tool. Is controlled by men from 
the dominant ethnic community. In Burma, officers from ethnic 
minorities usually are placed In technical or specialized 
duty away from command positions (and decisions) that are 
filled and controlled by the Burmese. The military has not
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assimilated minorities in Laos and Burma, rather, it has
tended to reinforce the interests of the dominant ethnic 
cncommunity. Thus, in Laos as well as in other Southeast 
Asian countries, there are important minority communities 
which find themselves cut off from influence in politics, 
the military, the education system, and the economic process. 
The existence of these unsocialized minorities has impeded 
national integration and has led to serious political friction 
and even to military conflict. In Burma both military and 
civilian governments of the dominant Burmese have problems 
ruling such minority groups as the Karens, Kachins, and 
Shans. In Vietnam the "montagnards," or hill tribes, have 
always resented central government c o n t r o l . I n  Laos a 
clear indication of the ethnic (as well as political) nature 
of the struggle between the Royal Laotian Government and 
the Pathet Lao is the composition of the contending armies—  
the former is made up of the ethnic Lao, the latter the hill 
tribes
The Pathet Lao have consistently and successfully 
appealed to ethnic groups and have emphasized the minorities’ 
grievances against the Lao. The Pathet Lao have been actively 
promoting education in their "liberated areas" and have paid 
special attention to the schooling of the minorities. They 
have permitted tribal languages and schools in their areas 
and have sent members of tribes to school in North Vietnam, 
the Soviet Union, and C h i n a . I n  contrast, the Royal Laotian 
Government does not recognize tribal languages and has for-
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bidden publication of such languages. The Pathet Lao rely
heavily on ethnic minority cadres, and have their main bases
in regions inhabited by minorities; the Pathet Lao have
stressed "minority policies" and have devoted considerable
55effort to harmonizing relations between ethnic groups.
Most vital to the nation-building process is a national 
language and educational system; the usefulness of education 
in the nationalizing process is obvious. However, in countries 
where most of the population is illiterate it is not an easy 
undertaking. The problem of language also presents obstacles.
A multitude of languages, with no common language to serve 
as a means of communication inhibits nation-building. As 
indicated in the brief survey of the peoples of Laos, ethnic- 
linguistic differences remain a barrier to communication and 
unity. In Laos there is widespread illiteracy and no common 
language. The literacy rate is estimated at fifteen percent 
and it is the elite and the foreign minorities who make up 
much of this percentage. This has reinforced separatism and 
diversity and continuing tribal isolation. There are no 
common tools which can be used to spread ideals and integrate 
the "society."
Literacy is a measure of the degree to which a population 
has already been educated; whereas educational expenditures 
and enrollment ratios can serve as measures of "how much 
total effort a country is devoting to primary and secondary 




Country Literacy Enrol. Ratio* Ed. $ Per Capita
Mean 54% 47 24.55
North Vietnam 65 NA 6.79
South Vietnam 45 47 4.96
Cambodia 41 42 5.07
Laos 15 27 2.50
Burma 65 30 1.58
Thailand 70 38 2.81
*School enrollment 
first and second 
lation aged five
ratio relates the school enrollment 
levels of education to the estimated 
to nineteen years, inclusive.
at the 
popu-
Source: C . Taylor and M. Hudson, World Handbook of Political
and Social Indicators (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1972), pp. 30-32, 203 , 232-234; 225-27.
where the task of making education available to the youth has 
not been an easy one in view of the lack of ground work laid 
by the French, North Vietnam has the highest literacy rate,
65 percent, and the highest educational expenditure per 
capita, $6.79; South Vietnam with 45 percent has a higher 
literacy rate and enrollment ratio, 47, than Cambodia whose 
literacy rate is 4l percent and enrollment ratio 42; however, 
Cambodia has a higher educational expenditure per capita, 
$5.07 than South Vietnam, $4.96; Laos has an extremely low
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literacy rate, 15 percent, and comparatively low enrollment
57ratio, 27, and educational expenditures per capita, $2.50.
Burma, which inherited an educational system from the British 
which produced a limited number of liberal arts educated 
leaders and a mass of people who could read and write English, 
has a comparatively high literacy rate, 65 percent, but a low 
enrollment ratio, 30, and per capita expenditure, $1.58. Burma's 
and Laos' low rankings tend to indicate that their present 
educational policies, and Laos' past policies, are inadequate 
in terms of being supportive of national integration. Thailand 
has a high literacy rate, 70 percent, a relatively lower 
enrollment ratio, 38, and per capita expenditure, $2.81. Since 
Thailand has always been independent, her educational system 
has evolved steadily, which seems to be reflected in her lower 
expenditure rate but higher literacy rate; therefore, she does 
not have the acute problem of the previous French colonies—  
developing an educational system where one was nearly non­
existent— or the previous British colony— developing a Burmese 
administration and staff to replace the British and reorienting
the system to the new Burmese state, i.e., using Burmese rather
59than English as the language of instruction.
By comparing the defense expenditures to the educational 
expenditures, these quantitative measures provide evidence of 
policy priorities within each country. (It also tends to 
indicate the degree of instability in these countries; however, 
this, with other indicators, will be covered in the section on
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political integration.) Except for Thailand, all the countries 
expend considerably more money on defense than education. (See 
Table B) Laos, for instance, spends five times as much on 
defense as education. Before Laos can begin to have an 
effective education system, there are many practical problems 
which must be contended with: the ethnic and language vari­
ation, the inadequacy of funds for expansion of education, the 
scarcity and the extremely limited opportunities for higher 
education.
If Lucien Pye's assumption— that the basic functions of 
representative government are critical in the nation-building 
process^O— is valid, then education is one of the most impor­
tant problems which faces the new states. If a nation is to 
have economic modernization which requires skill at all levels, 
and, democratic institutions* which require a large body of 
educated people who can articulate and aggregate their interests 
and from whom leaders can be chosen, the benefits of education 
must penetrate the whole society. Education is a necessary 
tool in the creation of a new social ideal or national culture; 
the essence of nation-building "is the search for a new sense 
of collective identity for an entire people— a sense of identity 
which will be built around a command of all the potentialities 
inherent in the universal and cosmopolitan culture of the modern 
world, and a full expression of self respect for all that is














North Vietnam 19.7 6.8
Laos 15.6 2.9




Source: This data was obtained from the World Handbook Data
as collected under the direction of Taylor and Hudson; as 
made available by the Inter-University Consortium for Political 
Research. Date, 1965- C . Taylor and M. Hudson, World Handbook 
of Political and Social Indicators (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1972).
distinctive in one’s h e r i t a g e . I t  is the blending of the 
universal and parochial cultures.
Regionalism, racialism, tribal and village isolation are 
also perpetuated by the character of the economy. Ninety-five 
percent of the Laotian population is engaged in some type of 
subsistence agriculture. The people for the most part live 
in villages along the main roads and the river banks. The 
typical Laotian village is composed of about fifty houses and 
two hundred and fifty people. The Lao in the lowlands are 
predominantly wet-rice cultivators; each family farms an area
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just large enough to supply the family needs. The farmer
plants, cultivates, and harvests his crops by methods his
ancestors have followed for centuries. Not enough rice is
grown locally to feed the urban population. The Lao who is
the practitioner of a subsistence agriculture is completely
complacent and sees no advantage in employment for hire. Even
under the French administrators, Vietnamese had to be imported;
hence, the Laotian labor force under the French remained
almost entirely agricultural and lacked even semi-skilled 
fi Plabor. As a result of these characteristics, there has been 
a lack of integration and interdependence among the different 
elements of the population. For with industrialization and 
the division of labor, village isolation, racial barriers, 
and tradition often break down and acculturation and assimila­
tion become easier.
Educational statistics offer a key to present and future 
manpower resources, which affect industrialization and urbani­
zation, and this in turn reduces village isolation and the 
elite-mass gap. Educational enrollment as a percentage of
the whole population is an indicator of the proportion of
fi Peducated manpower a country has. According to Peasley and 
6^Badgley, "sustained economic growth is associated with the
following enrollments as a percentage of total population:
primary 10 percent, secondary 2 percent, and higher education
65above 0.3 percent." The exact ratio, according to Peasley, 
is not as important as the balance among these three, if the
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developed states are to be used as a criterion for a desirable 
educational model. (See Table C) The percentage of total 
population enrolled at each level in Thailand was l4, 0.99, and 
0 .16; in Burma the ratios were 8.4, 1.1, O.08; Cambodia—
9 .8, 0 .82, and university insignificant; Laos— 6.1, 0.2,
0.01; South Vietnam— 9.2, 1.7, 0.11; North Vietnam— 12.8,
0 .28, 0 .09. North Vietnam’s and South Vietnam’s low educa­
tional enrollments tend to be misleading in terms of manpower 
potential available for productive purposes, since these 
countries have experienced rapid social and political mobili­
zation because of the war. The Impact of the war quickens 
urbanization and Industrialization as significant numbers of 
wartime-travelled* village youths seek urban opportunities. 
Thus, in these two countries, the urban-rural gap and village 
isolation will be reduced by the urbanization trend, which is 
”a behavior pattern common to modern postwar situations.
The educational ratios of Thailand, Burma, Cambodia, and Laos 
are comparable; their low percentages illustrate the long 
distance all of these states will have to go before their 
manpower base will be adequate for sustained economic growth 
which leads to urbanization. Unlike North and South Vietnam, 
the armies of these states tend to be too small and weak to
C n
have significant impact on mass attitudes. Although their 
primary enrollments are increasing, all these countries have
*Those youths who have broken the village umbilicus by 
serving and travelling with the army.
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Table C
Manpower: Enrollments as a Percent of the
Total Population
Country Primary Secondary Higher
Education
Ideal ratio 10.0 2.0 .3
Thailand 14.0 .99 .16
Burma 8.4 1.1 .08
Cambodia 9.8 .82 insignificai
Laos 6.1 .2 .01
South Vietnam 9.2 1.7 .11
North Vietnam 12.8 .28 .09
Source: John Badgley, Asian Development (New York: 
Press, 1971), pp. 79-85.
Free
very weak secondary systems and higher education lags. Laos 
in particular is extremely weak, however, none of these coun­
tries are well off in terms of skilled manpower resources. 
Transportation and communications increase mobility, 
hasten the break down of localism, and advance the national­
ization of the society, the political system, and the economy. 
Village self-sufficiency and village-tribal isolation is 
encouraged by lack of transportation and communication. 
Cambodia, Burma, and Laos have embryonic transportation systems 
Laos, for instance, has to depend upon river transport for 
much of its traffic; the principal and most important artery
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of transportation is the Mekong River. However, its rapids,
waterfalls, and often narrow channels make navigation difficult.
Laos is laid on a north-south axis, however, the rudimentary
road system built by the French runs from east to west, i.e.,
Vietnam to Laos. Few roads cut across it and those which do
68are nonpassable during the rainy season. In the absence of 
an adequate system of highways and no railroad, great reliance 
has been placed on air transportation. Domestic as well as 
international air transportation facilities of the country 
have been greatly expanded since the war. Laos has three 
all-weather international airports located at Vientiane,
Seno, and Fakee; it also has a dozen other fields for national 
traffic. This has not really solved the problem of village 
isolation. Efforts have been made mainly to improve inter­
national transportation, rather than unify and integrate the
69villages and tribes by a transportation network.
In few countries are public information and communication 
more primitive than in Laos. The effectiveness of the printed 
word is severely limited by the illiteracy and language vari­
ation. All formal information media are controlled by the 
government or persons closely associated with high governmental 
circles. At the present, however, word-of-mouth communication 
is by far the most important source of news for the majority of 
Laotians. This is done by boatmen and ballad singers who travel 
from village to village. This keeps the Laotians near the 
rivers or towns fairly well informed on local matters; but.
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the tribal groups which make up forty percent of the population
see far fewer travelers high in the mountains, and as a result
70they are ignorant of affairs other than their own. On the 
whole, the government has never consciously attempted to use 
these traditional newscarriers; thus, political and govern­
mental problems have not been popularized and disseminated to 
the masses of the people. There are a few printed newspapers 
which are mostly privately owned; these are circulated only in 
the area in which they are printed. Laos has one radio station
which broadcasts six hours a day. It has one thousand tele-
71phones which are out of order most of the time. Transpor­
tation and communication, which are vital if a country expects 
to be integrated and have national social cohesion, are lacking 
in Laos,
Laos is a good example of a nation in which poor communi­
cations have been partially responsible for a serious lack of 
national identity. As Pred von der Mehden notes, "without 
railroads or good radio transmission, with one of the poorest 
road density ratings in the world, and with the fifth lowest
72newspaper circulation per capita, national unity is not great." 
However, Laos’ poorly-developed transportation and communication 
systems are not unique in Southeast Asia; Burma, Cambodia, and 
to a lesser extent Thailand also have deficient systems. Like 
Laos, Thailand utilizes extensive water transport to supplement 
the road and rail link; Thailand, whose transportation network 
is far superior to Laos’, still has poor transportation links
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and communication lines in frontier hill regions to the north 
and northwest where the hill tribe minorities live, in the 
peninsula, and the Korat plain area. Nevertheless, the trans­
portation and communication system is much better developed 
in Thailand, than in Laos, Burma, or Cambodia. Thailand has 
one km of road per 0.6 square miles, whereas Laos has 1.1 km 
per 100 square km, Burma has 2.5, and Cambodia has 3.7 km of 
road per 100 square km. Laos has no railroads, Burma has 
0.45 km of railroad per 100 square km, and Cambodia has 0.23 
per 100 square km. Comparatively speaking, Laos is the worst 
off in terms of roads and railroads; Cambodia and Burma are
in a slightly better position with Cambodia having more roads
73per square km and Burma having a better railroad system.
(South Vietnam and North Vietnam, whose railroad and road
systems were disrupted by bombing or war in general, have had
to use water transport and air transport as a substitute. The
high costs of rail and road construction means that they
probably will not recover quickly or advance rapidly. In
terms of communications. North Vietnam relies extensively on
speaker systems in the villages and hamlets, as well as radios
in urban areas. Because of the war, telephone communication
is primitive and television does not exist. In South Vietnam,
radio communication has developed rapidly due to American aid.)
In communications, Thailand is the most developed with
thirteen newspapers per thousand people, Burma has ten, Cam-
74bodia has seven, and Laos five. Except for Thailand, which
133
has about one million television sets, none of these countries 
have television. Burma, Laos, and Cambodia have less than 
fifteen radios per thousand people. Except for Thailand, 
these figures indicate primitive transportation and communica­
tion systems in Burma, Laos and Cambodia. The implication 
of this generally primitive condition of communication and 
transportation is obvious; these countries will not be able
to integrate territorially, nationally, or politically until
75an infrastructure is built. Moreover, as Daniel Lerner
emphasizes in his classical study, political as well as
economic modernization is dependent upon the development
of psychic mobility and empathy in individuals; this was once
gained by physical mobility but now it is multiplied by
y 6mediated experience through the mass media.
Nation-builders, seeking to secure the loyalty of the
citizen for the state alone, face serious competition. The
state has emerged apart from the local community structure
and village people. Religion serves as a basis of social and
77individual identification in Laos, Burma, and Cambodia. To 
the exclusion of the state. Buddhism, the village community 
structure, and the local Lao culture interact and reinforce 
each other. This interaction between Lao-Buddhism and the 
indigenous culture is illustrated in the following overview 
of Lao-Buddhism and values.
Buddhism is the predominant faith in Laos. Buddhism, 
which plays a very important role and goes a long way in
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explaining and understanding these people and their values, 
is the single greatest influence on the Lao people. Buddhism 
is one of the few features in the Lao culture which peasants 
and elite have in common.
Buddhism is based upon three main concepts: (1) the 
doctrine of Buddha, a guide to right action and belief;
(2) the retribution of actions, or the responsibility of a 
man for the sum of his actions in prior incarnations and to 
date in his present incarnation; (3) the religious community, 
the ascetic order within which a man can improve the sum of 
his actions. There is no promise of heaven or a life after 
death— Buddha did not preach the existence of a soul— but 
there is salvation in the form of a release from the cycle 
of births and deaths. The essence of Buddhism is contained 
in the Pour Noble Truths: (1) suffering exists; (2) suffering
has a cause— the craving for existence; (3) suffering can be 
ended by extinguishing this craving; (4) there is an eight-
7 8fold path by which a permanent state of peace can be obtained.
Buddhism stresses the fact of suffering. Life is suffer­
ing. Existence is pain; the struggle to maintain individuality 
is painful. The reason one suffers is because of the transi­
ency, the impermanence of human existence. There is sorrow 
because all things pass away. One’s dreams, hopes, desires—  
all will be forgotten as if they never had been. This is a 
universal principle common to all things. "’Whatever is
79subject to origination is subject also to destruction.’"
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According to this view, desire causes suffering, since what 
one desires Is Impermanent, changing, and perishing. These 
desires are caused by Ignorance. One Is Ignorant concerning 
his true nature and the nature of the universe In which he 
lives. However, he may be freed from his Ignorance by 
following the Middle Path which was taught by Buddha.
This Is not a doctrine of despair, for everyone can be 
saved finally. Through the wisdom which comes from reflection 
on the transltorlness of life, and by following the Path 
taught by the Buddha, everyone can attain Enlightenment.
One may also cancel out suffering In this life or future 
lives by the acquisition of merit. Man Is In this way treated 
Indlvlduallstlcally and shown that he can progress or regress 
through his own merit.
Tolerance has been an outstanding characteristic of 
Buddhism from earliest times. Buddhists are generally noted 
for their liberal attitude toward other religions, whether 
polytheistic, monotheistic, or atheistic. Buddhists admit 
the truth of any moral and philosophical system, whether prim­
itive or developed, provided only that It Is capable of 
leading men at least part way toward their final goal. Thus, 
Buddhism Is not prescriptive, authoritarian, prohibitive, or 
exclusive In Its attitude toward Its followers or other relig­
ions .
According to Buddhism, faith becomes superstition when 
It Is not examined by reason. "Gautama was described as one
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who reasoned according to the truth rather than on the basis
of the authority of the Vedas or tradition. Theravada and
Mahayana Buddhism have accepted two standards for the truth
of a statement: it must be in accord with the scriptures
80and must be proved true reasoning." No Buddhist is expected
to believe anything which does not meet these two tests. The
acceptance of rational analysis of the nature of human existence
has been a continuing characteristic of Buddhism. In Buddhism,
faith is an introductory means to the attainment of truth, not
81an acceptance of definite dogmas.
The central theme of Buddhism is that, by following the
right Path, one can free oneself from the bondage of existence 
and come to the realization of the Supreme Truth. All Budd­
hists agree that Enlightenment is realization of the Supreme 
Truth. All Buddhists agree that Enlightenment is their goal 
and that it is attained by following the right Path. One who 
has attained Enlightenment is far from having dissolved into 
non-being; it is not he who is extinct, but the life of illusion, 
passions, and desires. This ideal state is called Nirvana, 
"extinction of afflictions." Nirvana is a lasting state of 
happiness and peace, to be reached here on earth by "the ex­
tinction of the fires of passions." It is the highest happi-
82ness, the bliss that does not pass away.
The Doctrine of the Buddha is not a system of philosophy 
in the Western sense but is rather a Path. A Buddha is simply 
one who has trodden this Path and can report to others on what
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he has found. All Buddhists aim to teach the way to realize 
an ideal life. In Buddhism, the entire stress lies on the 
mode of living, on the saintliness of life, on the removal 
of attachment to the world. Buddhism simply offers a way for 
those who will follow. Buddhism contains the ideal to which 
the Lao offers reverence. The people generally respect the 
Buddhist moral code and attempt to follow its more basic rules. 
The importance of merit-making and the acquisition of merit 
in preparation for one's future existence remains a dominant
O 3
theme in the lives of the Laotian Buddhists.
The ten immoral actions according to Buddhist doctrine 
are: killing any living thing, stealing, unchastity, lying,
slandering, harsh language, frivolous talk, covetousness, 
ill will, false views. These actions are to be avoided by 
following the Middle Path. A "middle way" between the extremes 
of conduct is characterized ideally by gentleness, acceptance 
of nature, avoidance of conflict, and respect for all life, 
but within these bounds there is freedom of choice and by 
implication, the right to have this choice respected by others. 
In the Lao value system, compassion, serenity, and moderation 
are held in high esteem.
According to Theravada Buddhist doctrine, every adult 
male should become a bonze. This means at least three months 
of monastic life. The bonze subjects himself to trials of 
voluntary ugliness, asceticism, and chastity. He attempts 
to learn perfect detachment and "will unconsciously be influ-
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enced by the fact that he is most highly regarded by society
84when he exists in a state of material poverty." The experi­
ence in the monastery creates an apathy, an indifference to 
others, disinterest, and nonchalance. This monastic experience
is "at the same time a great ’savoir-vivre’ and a block to all 
85real effort." In his youth, every Laotian male has spent 
a period in a monastery learning to apply the precepts of 
Buddhism. Buddhist doctrinal practices have come to have a 
great influence on the affairs of the people, their pattern of 
life, customs, values, and attitudes. It is the major social­
ization agent for the average Laotian male.
Giving alms to the bonzes and supporting pagoda projects 
are still a basic part of the life of the common believer and 
an effective way to gain merit. Nearly every sizeable village 
in Laos supports one pagoda, which is the focus of the religious 
and social life of the villagers. There were an estimated 1,868 
pagodas in Laos at the last count in the I960’s. As Meeker 
states, "The Lao people continue to be completely, if some­
times casually, religious, with the pagoda as much a part of 
their daily lives as were the cathedrals of medieval Europe
Q r
to the people who lived around them." "Indeed the ’vat’ 
(Buddhist monastery) is both the symbol and the center of the 
rural collectivity.
The worth of surplus goods to the Lao lies in the potential 
it gives him for satisfying his two foremost concerns— religious 
merit and pleasure. The Laotian is willing to work hard— but
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only as hard as necessary. Growing a larger crop merely to
increase one's wealth is not within the Lao scheme of values.
Prestige or merit is not gained by mere acquisition or hoarding.
The man who acquires a surplus and saves it would lose rather
88than gain prestige.
The Laotian people are quite different from the Vietnamese;
the Laotians are not nearly as energetic or enterprising. In
Laos no peasant is exploited by rapacious landlords; each man
owns his ground. And if he wants more, he only has to wrest
another acre or two from the forest, and include them within
his primitive irrigation system. However, some serious need
like an increased family, will prompt a Laotian to take such
a step. The Vietnamese call him lazy, but he thinks his is
a pleasant way of life. He is devoid of ambition: wealth
means nothing to him; he is content with so little though
much more is available for the taking. "The attitude of the
89Laotians is one of tranquility and repose. Not laziness." 
However, as a result of this, the French had to bring in 
Vietnamese and Chinese to do all their skilled work. These 
limited aspirations, inherent in their values, help to per­
petuate a self-sufficient village economy, inhibiting nation- 
building.
King Savang Vatthana was quoted as saying: "In Laos no
one ever suffers from a nervous breakdown, if anyone did, it 
would be foreigners in the country who are administering eco­
nomic a i d . T h e  Lao are gentle, peaceful, innocent, and
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charming. They are festive and fun loving; they are dreamy 
non-aggressive people.
There is a congruence of religion, personal, and social 
values in Lao society. The Buddhist doctrine emphasizes the 
gentle virtues of self-restraint, modesty, generosity, and 
serenity, and by extension the subsidiary values of careful 
good manners, hospitality, and respect for others. Another 
highly regarded value in interpersonal relations may be descri­
bed as serenity, equanimity, or imperturbability. It is 
characterized by moderation of speech, lack of argumentative­
ness, and the concealment of any displeasing emotion. Another 
aspect of the distaste for open conflict in interpersonal
relations is a readiness to compromise, which is entirely
qiconsonant with the Buddhist concept of a middle way.
Unlike certain institutionalized religious systems. 
Buddhism— at least as it has developed in Laos— has not in­
volved itself directly with any kind of nationalistic move- 
Q2ment. For the average Laotian villager, concepts such as 
democracy, communism, or even nationalism are meaningless.
Even to the Lao elite the traditional Laotian values, such 
as family loyalty, proper Laotian behavior, or the importance 
of compromising conflicting interests, frequently override 
ideological or policy considerations in determining the course 
of Laotian politics. Buddhist sensibilities against taking 
human life are more meaningful to the average Laotian soldier 
than fighting for political objectives. As Stevenson notes:
I4l
There is a basic peacefulness of the people. Armed 
forces have always been external creations, financed 
first by French and later by Americans. Most United 
States officials with experience in Laos have commented 
on the reluctance of the Lao to fight or to be diverted 
from their simple personal pleasures. The mediocre 
combat record of Laotian forces (other than Meo) bears 
witness to their lack of enthusiasm for war.93
If one contrasts the value systems of the Lao and the 
Westerner, one begins to realize that until Laotian values 
are modified. Western concepts will have little place in the 
Lao way of life. The Laotians prize quiescence, stability, 
traditionalism; whereas the Westerner admires rugged individ­
ualism, initiative, change, and what he calls progress. His
Qi|character structure is generally competitive and acquisitive.
Because the "Westerner" lives in a society obsessed by economic
growth and banishment of poverty, he thinks that a country like
Laos must want to do the same. But as one can see by the
different value systems, the driving motives and goals are
not the same. There is an incongruity between the Laotian
set of values and the twentieth-century Western concepts.
Thus, a major problem of the nation-building process in Laos,
as in all developing societies, is to develop a new identity
and ideology which blends or merges the parochial and the
95cosmopolitan (or universal).
Western concepts such as progress, political responsi­
bility, and nationalism or nation-state mean little in the
rural world of Laos which "knows above all the autonomous
96cell, that is the village living around the vat." Badgley 
contends that "the blending of this Western institution, the
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state. Into indigenous cultures (of Asia) may never transpire, 
and if it does it will certainly function differently from its 
Western counterpart."^7 Up to this point, in Laos and other 
Asian countries, nation-building has not yet succeeded: village,
tribal and regional loyalty continues to persist. Southeast 
Asian cultures are magnificently endowed with institutions; 
however, as noted, few of the strong institutions in which 
villagers believe are related to the state. Most are pro­
vincial or local in character, such as tribal practices, 
religion, religious leadership, cultivation practices, and a 
host of other local institutions. Seriously missing are 
institutionalized methods of organizing politics, law enforce­
ment, education, taxation, and equitable justice under the
oftaegis of the state. This is partially due to the fact that
only weak connections (or a low level of political integration)
existed between village folk, or most Aslans, and the colonial
regimes. The political "architecture Europeans and Americans
created was poorly designed to serve the cause of statehood.
Once independent, the governments in fact, were nearly as
99alien to villagers as were colonial regimes."
All Southeast Asian societies are attempting to discover 
or create their own ideological identity. The appeals of 
nationalism which were focused against the colonials or 
foreigners during the fights for national independence have 
lost their basic unity. In fact the processes of social change 
have challenged the very legitimacy of most of the governments
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of Southeast Asia. In their attempt to transform the tradi­
tional system into a modern society, in varying degrees, the 
elites (leaders, thinkers, writers) of Southeast Asian countries 
have been looking for the meaning of their particular societies 
and for the essence of their national c u l t u r e s . T h i s  
searching is reflected in large measure in the lack of con­
sensus in these countries. There is a lack of consensus on 
the basic ideological question which is how these changing 
countries can preserve their traditional sense of identity 
while coping with the modern world. There is also the problem 
of a lack of value congruence, or the developing of value 
integration which is part of the process of political inte­
gration.
POLITICAL INTEGRATION
Political integration has two dimensions: it encompasses
both value integration among the elite (elites and their 
followers) and elite-mass integration. Value integration 
among the elite (elites and followers) means that there are 
acceptable procedures for the resolution of conflict. It 
includes the legitimacy of the constitutional framework, or 
acceptance of common values related to the authority structure; 
it refers to the minimum value consensus necessary to maintain 
social o r d e r . I n  the culturally pluralistic and ideologi­
cally disunified new nations, one of the major problems has 
been one of finding acceptable procedures and institutions for
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the management of conflict. Elite-mass integration refers to 
the degree to which the elite and masses are linked together. 
In developing nations, it is common to speak of an elite- 
mass gap, which implies that some basic cultural, attitudinal, 
political, and communication gaps exist between the "elite" 
or "governors" who are secular-minded, French or English 
speaking. Western educated, and most likely Western oriented, 
and, the "governed" or "mass" who remain oriented toward 
traditional values, and who are basically religious and are 
vernacular speaking. The elite-mass gap is the problem where 
elites are so cut off from the mass they govern that they can 
neither mobilize the masses nor be influenced by them. The 
elite-mass gap also indicates that communications are inade­
quate, "that is, that the elite is oriented toward persuading 
the mass to change their orientation, but the feedback of 
political demands is not heard or, if heard, not responded
1 f)2to." In elite-mass relations, attention must be given to 
the development of "infrastructures," i.e. political parties, 
newspapers, universities, and the like which can provide a 
two-way channel between the government and the populace. 
Existing differences in values and goals among the elite, 
and between the governing elite and the governed mass does 
not constitute political disintegration, if those who are 
governed accept the right of the governing elite to govern. 
Thus, a degree of political integration exists, not when 
differences among the elite and/or differences between
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"governors" and "governed" disappear, but when a pattern of 
consent is established.
Many Southeast Asian countries are having major problems 
building politically-integrated systems. In many of these 
developing countries the elites out of power feel that the 
goals involved with national independence have not been 
achieved; the regimes or elites out of power have adopted 
"revolution" as the prominent ideological and political sym­
bol for the nation. "The revolution" as a political symbol
is seen in Laos, Burma, South Vietnam, the Philippines,
104Malaysia, and Thailand. These "out of power" elites or 
groups are attempting to overthrow the system. (In Cambodia, 
the symbol of revolution was not particularly salient in 
political life or rhetoric until after the fall of Sihanouk.) 
The majority of these countries are under attack by communist 
revolutionaries, but "there is very often a coincidence of 
Marxism or ethnic or regional grievances in the rhetoric of 
the r e v o l u t i o n . F o r  instance, the Pathet Lao mixes 
communism with resentment of Mekong Lao domination of hill 
tribes. (For example, Malayan Communist statements and docu­
ments have long had a strong tinge of Chinese chauvinism.)
In Laos, there is no consensus among the elite on basic 
goals, and sharp conflicts exist among the elite and their 
different ideologies. Partially because of the lack of value 
integration, the Kingdom of Laos has been in turmoil and the 
Laotian elite have been incapable of establishing a stable 
system of government. Due to the conscious and at times
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unconscious acts of the ruling group, and their inability to 
cope with problems of ethnic and ideological disunity, polit­
ical disintegration is a real possibility. Unlike some 
countries of Southeast Asia, which developed obstacles to 
political integration after independence and after "the 
failure of the revolution" in achieving its g o a l s , t h e  
problems affecting political integration in Laos developed 
during the colonial period and have continued to plague Laos 
to the present. Even before independence, disunity among 
the Laotian elite existed; it stemmed from a lack of unanimity 
on the question of independence from France and the question 
of present and future relations with the French, Vietnamese, 
and the Thai. In Laos, the appeals of nationalism were not 
focused against the "foreigner" during the drive for inde­
pendence as it was in many countries; thus, neither the 
Laotian elite nor the nation ever had a semblance of ideological 
or political unity. Moreover, the elites’ pattern of behavior, 
their ideology and relationship to foreign actors, were estab­
lished before independence and have continued into the present.
Among the Lao elite there are many who see a unified 
and politically integrated system as something to be highly 
desired; but the historical pattern of this heterogeneous 
elite, who were sometimes in alliance, more often in rivalry, 
was perpetuated in the colonial and post-war period and has 
continued to dominate the post-independence political scene. 
Regional rivalry, dependence on protection from outside and
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a consequent insecurity have fostered frustrations which 
are reflected in the factionalism of the Lao elite.
There are three main dynastic divisions in the present- 
day royal elite. The senior branch of the royal family of 
Luang Prabang, which has provided the ruling line, is repre­
sented by the King and Crown Prince. The cadet branch of the 
royal family of Luang Prabang include the late Prince 
Phetsarath, Prince Souvanna Phouma, and Prince Souphanouvong.
The senior branch and the cadet branch of the royal house of 
Luang Prabang are descendants of the elder and younger sons, 
respectively, of King Anourouth of Luang Prabang who ruled 
from 1791 until I815. The princes of the Kingdom of Champassak, 
the most well known being Prince Boun Oum, like those of
Luang Prabang, trace their descent from King Soulingavongsa 
107of Lan Xang.
Thus, there are three main dynastic divisions in Laos, 
which are comprised of the descendants of the senior branch 
of the royal house of Luang Prabang who reside in Luang 
Prabang; the descendants of the cadet branch of the royal 
house of Luang Prabang who gravitated to the administrative 
capitol at Vientiane; and the descendants of the royal house 
of Champassak who reside in southern Laos. In 1946, under 
French coercive influence. Prince Boun Oum renounced his 
rights over the Kingdom of Champassak, so that the territorial 
unification of Laos could be accomplished; consequently, the 
King of Luang Prabang became the King of Laos. However, this
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nominal unification did not wipe away deep-seated antagonism 
and rivalry between the Kingdoms of Luang Prabang and Champassak; 
separatist sentiment and regional loyalty continue to exist.
During the Second World War and after, foreign actors 
were or became aligned with rival internal dynastic groups.
In the royal capitol of Luang Prabang, the King and Crown 
Prince were pro-French; whereas in the administrative capitol 
of Vientiane the cadet branch, which had few Francophile 
figures, developed a policy of independence from France. The 
cadet branch created the "Free Laos" movement; however, the 
cadet branch soon became divided within itself. In order to 
understand these different divisions and alignments which con­
tinue into the present day, it is necessary to look briefly 
at the post-war history of Laos.
During the Second World War, under the instigation of 
the Japanese, Prince Phetsarath proclaimed the independence 
of Laos from France. In 1945, the Prince announced that 
independence from France, proclaimed earlier, was not to be 
compromised. Under Prince Phetsarath a committee of Lao 
Issara (Free Laos) was formed. It included members of his 
family— Prince Souvanna Phouma and Prince Souphanouvong—  
non-royal elite, and a few Vietnamese who had held official 
positions in Laos.
Many in this group believed that independence could be 
attained through French good will. However, when France 
sought a return to pre-war status, the French alienated the
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Free Laos Movement. After the French entered Luang Prabang,
the King, who had always been pro-French, decided to declare
his loyalty to France and to accept the resumption of the
French protectorate. The Free Laos Movement which included
the majority of the most capable elite was forced to take
refuge in Thailand; a government in exile under Prince
10 3Phetsarath was set up in Bangkok in March 1946.
The Free Lao movement did not remain united during its 
four-year period of exile. Prince Phetsarath, at its head, 
was obviously ambitious for the crown and remained resolutely 
anti-French. Prince Souvanna Phouma led a group who desired 
complete independence but were inclined to work with the French 
to achieve it; this group shared a fear of the Vietnamese, 
but also distrusted the Thai, and, therefore was unwilling 
to break with the French. Prince Boun Oum and other members 
of the southern regional elite, who have been traditionally 
linked to Thailand, favored reliance on Thai protection and 
aid, or like Souvanna Phouma*s group, worked cautiously with 
the French for independence. Prince Souphanouvong, who had 
little faith in French sincerity and offers, favored armed 
resistance in concert with the Viet Minh; he shared the Viet 
Minh's view that the war for independence involved all of 
Indochina. Prince Souphanouvong, who represented the extreme 
nationalist wing of the movement, held at this time the position 
of foreign minister in the Bangkok organization and was 
commander of the Free Lao forces. In July 1946, he visited
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Ho Chi Minh and established closer ties with the Viet Minh. 
This began to arouse the doubts of his colleagues who were 
traditionally "pro-Thai” and suspicious of Vietnamese motives 
toward Laos.^^^ Souphanouvong had few illusions about Viet­
namese ambitions, however, he believed that a strong Lao 
Issara under his own or similar leadership could control 
the Vietnamese influence accompanying proffered aid.^^^
Prince Souphanouvong devoted his attention during this period 
to the organization of resistance among the hill tribes in 
northern Laos. The Kha and Meo Tribes were the two most 
prominent tribes that took part in the resistance. The mili­
tant resistance relied for its indigenous support mainly on 
the hill peoples, rather than on the Lao lowlander. In May 
1949, Prince Souphanouvong was removed from his post of 
foreign minister in the exile government and of commander 
o f ‘the resistance force, because it was believed by his
colleagues that he was leading the resistance movement too
112fast and too far to the Left.
After the reoccupation of Vientiane and Luang Prabang, 
the French made conciliatory moves which led to the Pranco- 
Lao Agreement of 19^7; it confirmed a unified Laos under the 
sovereignty of Luang Prabang and established a constitutional 
monarchy. A new convention in 19^9 confirmed the autonomy 
of Laos within the French Union and gave the country greater 
liberty in the conduct of foreign relations. This left the 
exile government with so little in the way of issues that it
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dissolved itself in late 19^9. Most of the leaders, with the 
notable exception of Prince Phetsarath and Prince Souphanouvong, 
who were repelled by the limited nature of the French concessions 
and the avidity with which the Lao-Issara accepted them,
11-3returned to Laos to re-enter governmental affairs. Prince
Souphanouvong moved to Vietnam and then, in 1950, set up a 
resistance group in northern Laos. These militant nationalists, 
who later adopted the name of Pathet Lao (which was changed in 
1965 to the Lao Liberation Army), could not have survived as a 
meaningful political and military force without Viet Minh 
aid.""
The Lao Government, which included the exiles, saw advan­
tages in a continuing association with France. They wanted 
political and economic independence, but were not so emotionally 
concerned about national independence as were the Pathet Lao 
and Vietnamese. In fact, they wished to rely on a further 
period of French aid for defense and for the cushioning effect 
that economic links with France would have through the French 
Union. The moderates of the Lao Issara who chose, like some 
Vietnamese and Cambodians, collaboration with the French, 
"reproduced a very traditional pattern of seeking effective 
patronage not only to safeguard the Kingdom but perhaps more
115important to protect their privileges as an elite group."
These elite feared that increasing independence from France 
would result in ultimate domination by the strongest of the 
Associated States— Vietnam. Thus, traditional fear and
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suspicion of her neighbors, internal dynastic divisions, and
a realization of the weakness and insecurity of Laos resulted
in the weak nationalist movement for independence. Moreover,
among the Lao Issara moderates, a lack of ideology and social
concern permitted the easy transformation of a moderate political
nationalism keyed to the achievement of Laotian independence
"into an increasingly conservative political, economic,
military, and psychological dependence. The Laotian came
to see clientship as necessary to the preservation of their
elite model of government from increasingly effective attack
and counterorganization by the Pathet Lao."^^^
The main drive for independence came from the people of
Vietnam; Ho Chi Minh's Viet Minh was the militant spearhead
of the nationalist revolt in Indochina. It was the nationalist
revolt in Vietnam, not in Laos, which finally led to the Geneva
117Conference in 195^. Thus, Laos found itself independent,
but barely viable politically. There was no social change; 
the people remained indifferent. Rivalries between the 
survivors of the old kingdoms continued. As a result there 
was bound to be competition among rival groups and conflict 
between the interests of powerful neighbors who supported 
these different rival groups. This pattern of divisive elite 
backed by foreign actors, can be contrasted with the Burman 
elite, who have different ideologies concerning internal 
politics, but who have consistently and strictly (since inde­
pendence in 19^8) adhered to a policy of nonalignment. This
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XI8has continued to be a dominant feature up to the present. 
Cambodia, from 195% until the fall of Norodom Sihanouk, main­
tained a policy of neutralism toward the communist and non­
communist. Under the guidance of Prince Sihanouk, neutralism 
was the Cambodian method of dealing with its pro-American 
neighbors, Thailand and South Vietnam; it was also used to 
deal with Communist China, which is viewed as the long-run 
influence in the region. Sihanouk’s neutralism, which at 
times tended to be anti-Western, sought to provoke the United 
States into making its allies and associates, Thailand and 
Vietnam, more accommodating to Cambodian w i s h e s . H o w e v e r ,  
since the overthrow of Sihanouk, as in Laos, the elite of 
Cambodia have looked to foreign actors for backing. Sihanouk 
has gone into exile in Communist China (forced out of a policy 
of nonalignment, perhaps, even if he regains power) and the 
American-backed regime of Lon Nol is relying on Thai troops
(which Lon Nol claims are necessary because his officers
120might still be loyal to Sihanouk) to contain a rising 
insurgency.
Another major problem facing Asian states has generally 
been the establishment of the state itself as a legitimate 
institution. A common problem among developing nations with 
traditional societies is the great gap between the elites and 
the rural masses. In Laos, for instance, the wealthy French- 
educated elite constitute five to ten percent of the popu­
lation, and the mass of the people who are subsistence agricul-
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turalists constitute ninety to ninety-five percent of the popu­
lation. This gap is reinforced by poor communication and 
transportation systems, lack of education in rural areas, lack 
of government concern and rural policies, and lack of economic 
development.
Lack of education, illiteracy, racial diversity, tribal
isolation, and political elitism have left the vast majority
of Laotians with no awareness of the central government. In
actuality, about twenty families control the political scene
in Laos; most of the people are not even represented in the
National Assembly. Most of the fifty-eight seats are held
by the urban dwellers and the Lao elite. The Lao peasants
very rarely hold a seat. To the Laotian villager, questions
of parliamentary representation and administration are the
concern of a few number of more or less westernized urban
dwellers who "are the beneficiaries of foreign economic and
military aid, and the successors to the class of nobles and 
121madarins." As a result, the activities and policies of 
the country reflect the attitudes of the elite who have no 
contact with the majority of the population. The fact that the 
central government has never been particularly close to the 
people outside of the cities is reflected in the opinion 
surveys. The surveys indicated that most Lao, if they know 
anything at all about government, tend to view it in a passive 
sense, as something that may be affecting their lives, but 
in which they themselves are not personally involved. Indicative
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of the level of political awareness was the fact that by one
opinion survey some three-quarters of the villagers interviewed
failed to respond at all to a question asking them to give the
names of two men whom they would consider the most important
leaders in Laos today. The number of "don't know's" to this
question was somewhat lower in the provincial capitols, but
122still came to over fifty percent. Another survey revealed
that fewer than half the people questioned knew the name of
their own country, and only ten percent knew the name of the
prime minister. It also indicated that the farther one
travels from the major towns the less important are the political
12^struggles in the capitol.
Generally speaking, political parties throughout most
of Southeast Asia, and specifically in Laos, have failed to
overcome the basic problems of bringing together the world of
the ruling elite and the world of the peasant-masses. Even
in countries (not in Laos) where parties have attempted to
reach out into the villages, they have tended to upset old
relationships and have been unable to provide the basis of
124new relationships. They have been unable to perform the
type of functions that political parties are called to perform
in the West. Political parties have been highly unstable,
since the parties have been highly personalized organizations
ipqreflecting personalities of the leading figures.
In Laos, for instance, political parties with the exception 
of the Neo Lao Hak Sat— NLHS— which is the political arm of
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the Pathet Lao, are little more than transient groupings of
politicians who are united by neither Ideology nor platforms.
Expediency prompts a political aspirant to adopt one party
label over another; political alignments within the elite are
1 ? 6neither permanent nor rigid. As Stevenson notes:
Parties which have formed, reformed, merged, disinte­
grated, and otherwise transmogrified over the years, 
have tended to be the organization of strong leaders 
rather than special Interest and Ideological commitment. '
Political parties, especially In the Royal Government area are
little known popularly outside the city limits of Vientiane.
They have absolutely no grassroots organizations and their
leaders are "concerned more often than not with promoting
their Individual Interest. The level of politicization
Is relatively higher In the Pathet Lao zone because of the
grassroots organizations and the Influence of NLHS cadres who
work In nearly every sector of organized life. Although the
Pathet Lao and the NLHS have campaigned mainly among the
rural people. It must be noted that they have acquired large
followings In the towns as well. For example, In the 1958
election, most of Souphanouvong's 37,389 votes were obtained
In the capltol of Vientiane and the Immediate surrounding
area. It Is In this area that the disparity In the standard
of living between the elite and the mass Is most clearly seen
1 2Qand keenly felt. The NLHS has aided greatly In the political 
education of the people by Introducing a dissenting voice against 
the government. By focusing attention upon the deprivations 
of the peasantry and tribal people, the Pathet Lao and the
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NLHS have begun to make the people realize that they do not
have to be resigned to their lot and they have the right to
certain services from the central government. Moreover, the
Pathet Lao and the NLHS "have forced the governing elite to
l^Opay at least lip service to reforms."
Since political parties lack deep roots within Southeast 
Asian societies, parties change their positions according to 
the whims of their leaders; this just increases instabilities 
for all. Pye contends that "above all, however, the parties 
have failed in Southeast Asia for the basic reason that they 
have been unable to serve effectively either as representational 
parties, because of the lack of interest groups, or as ideological 
organizations, because of the lack of coherent feelings of 
national identity.
The attitudes of the governing elite in many Southeast 
Asian countries toward political opposition does not encourage 
party competition or participation. It is not uncommon for 
the governing elite to accuse the opposition of being disloyal 
to the nation or a threat to national security simply because 
it criticizes the government. In Cambodia, for instance, 
candidates of the left-wing Pracheachon party were arrested 
for "conspiring with agents of foreign powers;" they were
lopexecuted one month before the election. Similar methods
to harass the opposition have been used in South Vietnam, 
where anti-government candidates have often been pressured 
and "advised not to run" and have been warned that if elected
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133they "would be accused of violating election laws." Some 
elites in developing nations deny the validity of party com­
petition, based on their ideological interpretations. For 
instance, in Burma a socialist leader stated:
By definition, a socialist framework means a social 
setting in which all forces antagonistic to socialism 
are nonexistent. How can therefore be (sic) a com­
petition of political parties in a socialist frame­
work? ...Competitive socialism is indeed a contradiction 
in terms.134
Both subtle and unsubtle means have been used to dis­
courage opposition and participation. For example, in the 
first two national elections in Burma and Cambodia, which 
were one-party dominant states, the fragmentation of the 
opposition parties indirectly helped the majority party.
These states had a type of single-member district, under which 
the electoral method did not result in strict proportional 
representation. In the parliamentary system of Cambodia, 
the opposition polled twenty percent of the votes but 
received no seats; in Burma, the APPFL polled only 47.7 
percent of the national vote but obtained over sixty percent
of the seats and the party that polled the third largest
13Svotes received no seats. Less subtle means have also 
been used in developing countries; abuses of the election 
machinery are related to the absence of a tradition of a 
politically-neutral civil service in handling elections, and 
to the governing elite who use their patronage and power to
get votes.
159
In Laos, the electoral system and laws have been so rigged 
that the government party Is given a powerful advantage; at 
times, the opposition party has been denied a place on the 
ballot. Because of the following reasons— candidates have 
not offered the voters a choice of platforms, the NLHS was 
either excluded from or boycotted the elections, NLHS candidates 
were put in jail at the time of the election for "national 
security" reasons, elections were rigged to ensure the defeat 
of leftist candidates, and the government passed biased elec­
tion laws— elections have been worthless or little more than 
r i t u a l s . O n e  exception was the 1958 supplementary election 
in which the NLHS participated. The NLHS won nine out of the 
thirteen seats which it contested (there were twenty-one seats 
being contested in all); its success was due to the popular 
support of its programs, its good organization, and the poor 
organization of the other parties. However, because of the 
NLHS success, the government passed the I960 election law, 
whose purpose was to ensure victory of pro-government candidates 
by reducing competition among the candidates and especially 
by limiting NLHS participation in the election. By the I960 
law, to be a National Assembly candidate, one has to "have 
completed the equivalent of junior high school, or be a civil 
servant with at least fifteen years of service or be a business-
1 *3 O
man who has paid his taxes regularly for five years." More­
over, a candidate has a filing deposit of $250.00 which is 
forfeited if he does not obtain twenty percent of the vote in
160
his district. These stringent restrictions were aimed at 
limiting NLHS participation, however, these restrictions have 
had another effect, mainly to widen even further the gap 
between constituents and their representatives. These require­
ments were so severe "that virtually all but the elite and 
the moneyed were excluded from candidacy." Partially
because of the lack of broadly-based political organization 
and the lack of meaningful general elections, the Individual’s 
participation In Laotian national life and his Influence over 
the affairs of central government are minimal or nonexistent, 
despite the existence of an elected national assembly. General 
elections which are held every five years, or with a vote of 
no confidence, do not provide the electorate with a channel 
through which mass-based partisan competition can take place.
In actuality, political activities are mainly controlled and 
Influenced by such nonlnstltutlonal factors as family connec­
tions, regional considerations, and personal popularity among 
l40the elite.
Some developing countries have found It Impossible to 
nurture a pragmatic, contractual form of politics; thus, such 
countries as Burma, Cambodia, and Thailand must now rely on 
the Impact of leading personalities or such authoritative 
organizations as the army, which often preclude competition 
and popular participation. In Cambodia, dominance by Prince 
Sihanouk (until his fall) prevented Internal violence through 
either coup or competitive elections; however. It did cause
l6l
the political process to atrophy. Today, Cambodia is racked
iZjlwith violence and controlled by the military. In Burma,
the government has reflected the personality of either Prime 
Minister U Nu or General Ne Win and his Revolutionary Council.
In Burma, the disintegration of its dominant part, APPFL, led 
to the development of the authoritarian Revolutionary Council.
The APPFL in Burma, like many one-party systems in the developing 
area, was able to last a long time by emphasizing the "revolu­
tionary" heritage of the coalition, the need for unity, and 
the disloyalty of any opposition. Competition of sorts could 
be found within this one-party system. The APPFL was divided 
internally by personal conflicts and numerous factions. Since 
the leaders of the party were also leaders of affiliated organi­
zations, competition was generated among the organizations 
over the amount of influence they might have on government 
policy. However, since the organizations did not represent 
powerful interests within the society, conflict tended to 
become highly personalized. In 1958» the AFPFL split into 
two; this ended the nationalist coalition party control and 
created two parties of equal strength. The conflict after the 
split nearly caused a civil war, and this situation resulted 
in the Burmese Army, under General Ne Win, taking control in 
1958. In i960, elections (which were the fairest in Burmese 
history) were permitted; however, U Nu, who won, was unable 
to provide effective leadership. The army, which has always 
had a concern for the course of the nation's political develop-
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ment, believed that civilian rule was creating a threat to 
llipnational unity. The military believed the U Nu government 
was unable to cope with the problems of ethnic and ideological 
disunity. Thus, for the second time, the Burmese Army under 
General Ne Win assumed control of the government in 1962. A 
Revolutionary Council which ended representative government 
was created. The inability of the government of U Nu to 
cope with internal insurgency was viewed by the Revolutionary 
Council as the first cause of the coup in 1962. According to 
the military, their desire was not to become another Laos or
•j Ü oVietnam. No major civilian group or individual is able 
to heavily influence the military Revolutionary Council in
144its attempts to establish a socialist and integrated society.
The Revolutionary Council has a monopoly of power, but power
alone cannot solve the serious problem of winning and holding
popular support. The Burmese army, which is controlled by
the dominant Burman ethnic group, has never been popular with
the masses; it represents a class which has no social roots
l45with the masses, which reinforces the elite-mass gap. The 
Burmese government has not yet reduced the problem of loyalty 
to the central government nor has a central organization or 
political leader begun to bridge the barriers of trust between 
it and the diverse cultural communities.
In developing areas, the elite-mass gap is reinforced 
by the government's inability, ineffectiveness, or incompetence 
to penetrate the rural areas. This is illustrated in Laos by
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the structural inability of the Royal Laotian government to 
meet rural needs. Even though Laotian villages suffer from
liigthe classic Third World problems — poor diet, low life 
expectency, high infant mortality, and illiteracy— the Royal 
Laotian government uses most of its capital on luxury housing, 
imports, and amusements; it gives little money to rural or
147productive purposes.
In theory, any Laotian above the age of eighteen may be
appointed to public office; however, in actuality, education
and experience requirements tend to limit the opportunities
mainly to the French-educated Lao elite. A survey in 1971
showed that almost all high-ranking positions in civil service
l48were filled by this elite. Civil servants at the district 
level are the main government officials with whom the villagers 
have any contact. The civil servants are reported to be
149"feared because of their alleged authoritarian attitude"
and distrusted because of irregularities and maladministration
150in the civil service. Moreover, both high and low-ranking
officials in the Department of Rural Affairs and the Ministry
of Agriculture avoid visiting villages as much as possible.
Generally speaking, it is the "more incompetent and less well-
151connected officials who are forced to go to outlying areas."
The attitude of the government is reflected in the following
Laotian official's statement:
You know, our Laotian villagers are happy, peaceful 
people. They know how to cooperate together, in fact 
they have their own kind of communism. The best thing 
for our government to do is to leave them alone. Oh,
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we can build a few schools, a few roads. But the best 
thing is to leave them be, allow them to grow their 
rice and till their f i e l d s . ^52
In an attempt to change village attitudes of indifference and
resentment toward the Royal Laotian government, the American
Civilian Administration has given aid directly to a few refugee
villages. The direct channeling of United States aid to the
villages has failed to change village attitudes, but it has
highlighted the incompetence of the Royal Laotian government.
Moreover, villagers have explained "that Americans should not
try to pass anything through Royal Laotian government officials
to the villages for it is sure to be s t o l e n . T h e  Royal
Laotian government is weak, divided, disorganized, urban
centered, corrupt, and unpopular. Because of its fear of
becoming more unpopular, the weak central government refuses
to tax the villagers. (Civilian and military leaders pay
literally no taxes on their large incomes.) Because of the
government's corruption, weakness, and unpopularity, the
government has become dependent and penetrated by foreign
governments (i.e., U.S.) who provide sixty percent of the
166Laotian budgetary funds. Insurgency has thrived on the 
structural and political weaknesses of the government, which 
demands large input of American aid. The Pathet Lao has 
exploited to its advantage the issues of Western interference, 
misuse of American aid, and corruption in government. The 
rural people expect very little from the Laotian government; 
they assume that officials are corrupt; and consequently, the
l65
156populace Is not willing to serve the state.
In Southeast Aslan countries, such as Laos and Burma,
there Is substantial dissidence from peoples, who do not
believe their Interests are being served by the government.
There are Important tribal communities In these countries who
find themselves cut off or excluded from Influence In politics,
the universities, the military, and In the economic process.
In the multl-ethnlc country of Laos, there Is no political
process that encompasses the hill tribes so as to earn their
loyalty. The tribal people are disgruntled because they do
not share In any of the benefits of economic development. They
lack access to most government services. In particular,
educational facilities which would help assimilate them In
the Lao culture and would Increase their social mobility
have, to a large extent, been denied them. They are denied
participation In government to the extent which their size
1B7would normally dictate. The tremendous differences In
background of the multl-ethnlc population, the lack of a common 
language and culture, and economic Inequalities Inherent In 
the dissimilarities In habitats are not conducive to facile 
assimilation. Moreover, the Lao who feel superior to the 
tribesmen and who provide the governing class have had little 
Interest In assimilating the non-Lao. The Lao policy toward 
the tribes has been one of Informal discrimination. In the 
northern tribal areas, the government's policy has been one 
of non-lnvolvement; the authority of the central government
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158has been virtually nonexistent. For example, the Khas
have only a rudimentary administration; the main unit of
government is largely autonomous villages under traditional
headmen. In Xieng Khouang province, the Meos, who constitute
nearly a quarter of the population, enjoy virtual local autonomy
159under several clan organizations. Unlike other Southeast
Asian countries who have similar tribal problems, there are 
no departments, ministry, or division of the Laotian govern­
ment specifically assigned to or responsible for the administra­
tion of the hill tribes. The Laotian elite's explanation for 
this tribal administrative gap is the fact that the Laotian 
constitution gives citizenship to all permanent residents, 
regardless of race; they are guaranteed the same type of 
administration and the same rights and privileges. In reality, 
however, the provisions of the constitution do not apply to 
tribal people; the system discriminates against the tribal 
minorities. The court system offers an illustrative example 
of how the constitutional system operates: French and Lao
are the official languages of the Laotian law courts; tribal 
languages are barred, although, on occasion, tribal interpreters 
are admitted.
Even though tribesmen are considered to be citizens by 
the Laotian constitution, most of these tribal people have 
no special representation in the government. The government 
has not tried to organize minority interests, and it seems 
that they do not wish minorities, as such, to become organized.
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This reflects the traditional disdain of Lao-lowlanders toward
hill tribal people which has most likely been a more important
factor affecting the government-tribal relations in Laos than
any strategic or ideological consideration on the part of the
Laotian government. In contrast, the Pathet Lao movement with
its war of liberation has successfully recruited and organized
many hill tribal peoples. In 1971, about two-thirds of the
country's territory was under the Pathet Lao c o n t r o l i n
these areas, such as the provinces of Phong Saly and Sam Neua,
the local administration is based upon people's committees
whose membership reflect the tribal majorities in those 
]L 6 2areas. The Pathet Lao promise equality and a termination 
to oppression from colonialist and neo-colonialist. Rather 
than autonomous regions for tribal groups as found in the 
Democratic Republic of Vietnam, i.e. Meo districts of Thua- 
Chua and Mu Gang Chai in the Tay Bac Autonomous Zone, the 
Pathet Lao has emphasized a popular united front of all 
p e o p l e s . A  general survey not only of the Pathet Lao 
and its membership but of all Communist parties and their 
memberships in Southeast Asia, shows the strong role deprived 
racial groups play in Communist parties and the strong predis­
position of depressed minorities to participate in anti-
164government party activities.
The low level of political integration or the relationship 
between the rulers and the ruled is reflected in data on 
demonstrations, riots, armed attacks, and deaths from domestic
168
violence; they are also indicators of different types of 
participation within the political system. A protest demon­
stration is defined as a "non-violent gathering of people 
organized for the announced purpose of protesting against a 
regime, government, or one or more of its leaders; or against 
its ideology, policy, intended policy or lack of policy; or
165against its previous action or intended action." Since this 
variable is intended to encompass peaceful protest outside the 
formal structures of government, this category excludes 
election meetings, rallies, and boycotts which are associated 
with a particular formal process. From 1948 to 1967» data 
indicate a very low occurrence of peaceful demonstrations in 
most of the mainland Southeast Asian countries : Laos had no
peaceful demonstrations recorded, Cambodia 2, Thailand 3,
Burma 13; this can be contrasted with South Vietnam which 
had 199. This data tend to indicate either a low level of 
politicization on the part of the masses, or that the govern­
ment's coercive forces are used so that demonstrations may 
not occur. The comparatively higher rate of peaceful demon­
strations in South Vietnam might indicate a greater politici­
zation because of the war. The rejection of the political 
system and the use of more violent methods of protest is indi­
cated in all of these countries by the progressively higher 
incidence of riots and armed attacks. A riot is defined as 
"a violent demonstration or disturbance involving a large 
number of p e o p l e . V i o l e n c e  infers "the use of physical
169
force, which is usually evinced by the destruction of property,
the wounding or killing of people by the authorities or the
use of riot control equipment, and by the rioters' use of
167various weapons." Cambodia (still under Sihanouk)— 5
riots, and Thailand— 8, had a low incidence of riots; Burma
had 50 riots and South Vietnam had 96; Laos had the highest
incidence with 199- In terms of armed attacks, which refers
to "an act of violent political conflict carried out by an
organized group with the object of weakening or destroying
168the power exercised by another organized group," Cambodia
and Thailand again had the lowest incidents— Cambodia had %9,
Thailand 76; Laos, which had more riots than Burma and South
Vietnam, had fewer armed attacks— Laos 610, Burma 1,200,
South Vietnam 4,300. Closely related to armed attacks are
deaths from domestic political violence (this indicator is
not an event variable but a body count); these deaths have
occurred mainly in conjunction with armed attacks, but also
in relationship to riots. Cambodia had 135 deaths, Thailand
16q235, Laos 3,000, Burma 4,200, and South Vietnam 177,000.
(See Table D)
Military budgetary and military manpower allocations can
also serve as indicators of instability. If the money and
manpower are not being directed externally, a high level of
military expenditure and participation tend to indicate sub-
170stantial internal tension or repression. (If it is the




Country Demon Riots Arm. A t t . Deaths/ 
Dom. Vio.
Laos 0 191 610 3,011
South Vietnam 199 96 4,300 177,000
Cambodia 2 5 49 135
Burma 13 50 1,200 4,200
Thailand 3 8 76 235
Source: C . Taylor and M. Hudson, World Handbook of Political
and Social Indicators (New Haven: Yale University P r e s s ,
1972), pp. 66-8.
large armies "may indicate both actual domestic instability
171and a potential instability on the part of the suppressors." ) 
Small countries which rank extremely high in terms of military 
expenditures often hold their high ranking because of substantial 
foreign assistance which reflects penetration. In terms of 
high level of military manpower and expenditures. South Vietnam, 
which ranked highest in terms of armed attacks and death from 
domestic violence, ranks fourth out of 119 countries in terms 
of manpower and third in terms of expenditures; Laos ranks 
6,2; North Vietnam 10,1; Cambodia 49,18; Thailand 56,75 (how­
ever, this does not reflect U.S. military presence there).
Burma ranks relatively high in expenditures, nineteenth, but 
lower in manpower, 58. The high levels of military expenditures
171
by South Vietnam, Laos, and Burma as well as their high levels 
of domestic deaths (South Vietnam ranks second out of 120 
countries, Burma 23, and Laos 29) and armed attacks (South 
Vietnam ranks third out of 133 countries, Burma ranks ninth, 
and Laos fifteenth) tend to indicate a low level of integration 
and stability. Thailand's rankings (75 in military expendi­
tures, 58 in deaths from domestic violence, and 65 in armed 
attacks) and Cambodia's rankings (eighteenth in military 
expenditures, 68 in deaths from domestic violence, 73 in armed 
attacks) tend to indicate that these two countries are more 
stable than South Vietnam, Laos, and Burma, but they also
reflect elements of instability, especially Cambodia with
172its high level of military expenditures. (See Table E)
Another manifestation of low level of political inte­
gration and stability are coup d'etats or "irregular executive 
change events" which are characterized by "actual or threatened 
violence or by abnormal p r o c e d u r e s . F r o m  195% to 1967, 
South Vietnam which ranks first out of 136 countries (52 
countries out of the 136 had "irregular executive change"), 
experienced ten irregular changes; Laos ranks fifth with 
five irregular changes; Thailand ranks fifteenth with three 
changes ; Burma twenty-fourth with two changes. Cambodia had 
no coup d ’etats from 195% to 1967, however. In 1970 Prince 
Sihanouk's government was overthrown. These coup d'etats 
tend not only to reflect a low level of political integration 
but tend to reinforce it by alienating certain groups from the
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Table E






% of GNP Rank
(121)
South Vietnam 565 4 13.6 3
Laos 55 6 15.6 2
North Vietnam 350 10 19.7 1
Cambodia 49 49 6.4 18
Thailand 132 56 2.2 75
Burma 110 58 6.3 19
Source: C. Taylor and M. Hudson, World Handbook of Political
and Social Indicators (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1972)', pp. 19-21.
political system. For instance, U Nu, the prime minister of 
Burma before the 1962 coup d ’etat, declared in 1969 his inten­
tion to overthrow the leadership of Ne Win by peaceful or 
violent means. He is supported by armed insurgents; his group
17ljis known as the National United Front. Another example is 
Cambodia where with the overthrow of Prince Sihanouk, some 
alienated groups coalesced under the sponsorship of Sihanouk, 
and civil war began.
The past and present failures of culturally heterogeneous 
states, such as Laos, Burma, and Cambodia to deal with and 
reconcile antagonisms have led these states to suffer from 
both communal and ideological insurgencies. Cambodia has to
173
deal with the Khmer Serai movement which operates out of Thai­
land and Vietnam, as well as Sihanouk-sponsored insurgencies 
encouraged by Vietnamese and Chinese Communist groups. Burma 
has to cope with the White and Red Flag Communist parties which 
have several thousand insurgent members; a Kachin Independence 
Army which came into being after the 1962 coup; the Karen 
National Defense Organization, a loose confederation of Shan 
and Burmese dissidents; and the United National Front, a 
coalition of some minority groups and political dissidents 
under the leadership of U Nu. Laos has to deal with a strong 
Communist Pathet Lao group backed by the North Vietnamese, the 
general hostility of the hill tribes, and right-wing factions
within the military and aristocracy, which profit from Thai
175and American support.
As this chapter has indicated, low degrees of territorial, 
national, and political integration have led to instability, 
insurgencies, and war. The war in Laos is simultaneously a 
civil war, an ideological war, a war in which different tribes 
and minorities have aligned themselves with one side or another 
for local advantage, and a war in which foreign actors have, 
for their own objectives and goals, exploited ethnic and 
political differences. In some multi-ethnic nations war 
against a common external enemy or against foreign intervention 
may weld the peoples together; however, as chapter four will 
show, "foreign intervention does not 'help' to unify a Laotian 
nation but sides with particular ethnic groups, classes.
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factions, and individuals in a complex and unpredictable
country."^76
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Chapter IV
INTERVENTION/PENETRATION AND THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM
Two systemic variables, the structure of the international 
system and the stability/instability of the nations in the 
system, are especially potent as sources of intervention and 
penetration (for those leaders who are predisposed to under­
take such behavior or policy) . The instability of national 
actors in the Third World has provided ample opportunity for 
intervention and penetration by major actors. Southeast 
Asia, particularly Indochina, has been the focus of major 
power interventionary behavior. This chapter will illustrate 
the salience of these two variables on interventionary 
behavior. Specifically, superpower interventionary and non­
intervent ionary behavior will be examined in the Southeast 
Asia subsystem— focusing particularly on Laos, the major 
case study, Cambodia, and Burma— from 195% to 197^» thus, 
encompassing in this study an examination of interventionary 
behavior in both the bipolar and triangular polyarchic 
international systems.
The basic structure of the international system, which 
refers to the degree to which "the capabilities for affecting 
the conduct of international life is concentrated or dispersed 
within the system,"^ by its nature encourages or discourages
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intervention.* In a bipolar system, where capabilities are 
concentrated or tightly structured, a shift in allegiance or 
loyalty of a national actor will seem more threatening to a
global actor and interventionary behavior is more likely to
2occur. (This is illustrated by the "domino theory" and 
U.S. policy in Southeast Asia in the 1950's and 1960's.)
Although fear of confrontation and escalation would inhibit 
intervention to some extent or be a factor in decisions con­
cerning interventions, the feared consequence according to 
Morton Kaplan, "is not so direct and massive in its weight 
that it would prove overriding. Moreover, most interventions 
would be indirect and covert.
The greater the dispersion of capabilities, as in the 
triangular polyarchic system, the less likelihood that the 
system can be radically altered by a single development; 
hence, global actors are less likely to engage in inter­
ventionary behavior. The triangular polyarchic system rejects 
the zero-sum aspects of bipolarity and presumes that the 
interest of two essential actors can be advanced simultaneously, 
i.e., Sino-American detente, Soviet-American detente. More­
over, superpowers must remain aware of common interests even 
while they prosecute a variety of conflicting interests in 
various regional subsystems^ (i.e., Soviet policy to Laos in 
1962 and its policy to Cambodia in 1970). Additionally,
*Por a more detailed explanation see Chapters I and II.
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since this power configuration is more diffuse and fluid and 
since local conflicts are perceived as less threatening to
5the overall balance than in a bipolar system, it seems 
reasonable that superpower intervention would decrease (as 
it did in Laos) and if they do desire to aid an ally they 
will do so with a "lower profile," by either supporting 
third party intervention, i.e., U.N. intervention or by in­
directly penetrating the polity with foreign aid, trade, etc.^
The Soviet Union and The Peoples’ Republic of China in 
the 1950’s, and the United States until the late 1960’s, 
viewed the international power structure in terms of a bipolar 
system. As will be illustrated in the Laotian case study, 
the Sino-Soviet dispute, which was exacerbated by the Indo­
chinese situation, caused both the Soviet Union and Red China 
to become aware in I960 of the new international power con­
figuration. The United States did not totally perceive of 
the new power configuration until the early 1970’s, i.e., 
Sino-American detente. Thus, until each of these actors 
perceived of the new power configuration, their policies were 
based on the bipolar concept of the international system.
The bipolar system with its emphasis on the importance 
of a single dominant axis of conflict, its tendency to view 
regional and national actors and to conceptualize issues 
(i.e., civil wars, coup d ’etats) in relationship to the under­
lying bipolar axis of the system tends to explain why super­
powers would intervene in local conflicts, i.e., Indochina.
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This conceptualization is reflected in the U.S. containment 
policy and the domino theory. With this conceptualization, 
America’s leaders defined the problem of Indochina in its 
global context; the domino theory justified intervention in 
Southeast Asia. This theory, whether more or less articulated, 
appeared in the relevant National Security Council papers 
dealing with the Indochina situation and underlay all major
7decisions taken relevant to the area.
Although no major emphasis was given to Indochina in 
19^9, National Security Council papers did link the future of 
Southeast Asia, particularly Indochina, with the rest of the 
world :
In any event...it is now clear (with the "loss" of 
Nationalist China) that Southeast Asia is the target 
of a coordinated offensive directed by the Kremlin.
In seeking to gain control of Southeast Asia, the 
Kremlin is motivated in part by a desire to acquire 
Southeast Asia’s resources and communication lines, 
and deny them to us. But the political gains which 
would accrue to the USSR from communist capture of 
Southeast Asia are equally significant. The extension 
of communist authority in China represents a grievous 
political defeat for us: if Southeast Asia also is
swept by communism we shall have suffered a major 
political rout the repercussions of which will be felt 
throughout the rest of the world, especially in the g
Middle East and a then critically exposed Australia.
In 1950, the question was raised where the containment line
was to be drawn. The domino theory as applied to Southeast
Asia reinforced the decision of where to draw the line of
containment. Both ideas— containment line and the domino
theory— were embodied by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in a 1950
memorandum to the Secretary of Defense evaluating "the strategic
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importance, from the military point of view, of Southeast 
Asia:
0 . Southeast Asia is a vital segment in the line of 
containment of Communism stretching from Japan southward 
and around to the Indian Peninsula....The security of 
the three major non-Communist base areas in their quar­
ter of the world - Japan, India, and Australia - depends 
in a large measure on the denial of Southeast Asia to 
the Communists. If Southeast Asia is lost, these three 
base areas will tend to be isolated from one another;
d. The fall of Indochina would undoubtedly lead to the
fall of other mainland states of Southeast Asia;
e. The fall of Southeast Asia would result in the 
virtually complete denial to the United States of the 
Pacific Littoral of Asia.... f. ...Soviet control 
of all major components of Asia's war potential might 
become a decisive factor affecting the balance of power 
between the United States and the USSR....10
This concept was the basis of our decisions not only in
the 1950's, but also in the 1960's. In March 1964, a
McNamara-Taylor report stated that the U.S. objective in
South Vietnam "is an independent non-communist South Vietnam.
The importance of this objective was underscored in a classic
statement of the domino theory:
Unless we can achieve this objective in South Viet­
nam almost all of Southeast Asia will probably fall under 
Communist dominance (all of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia), 
accommodate to Communism so as to remove effective 
U.S. and anti-Communist influence (Burma), or fall under 
the domination of forces not now explicitly Communist 
but likely then to become so (Indonesia taking over 
Malaysia). Thailand might hold for a period with our 
help, but would be under grave pressure. Even the 
Philippines would become shaky, and the threat to India 
to the west, Australia and New Zealand to the south, and 
Taiwan, Korea, and Japan to the north and east would 
be greatly increased....12
The articulation of the domino theory to Southeast Asia 
and the perception of a powerful threat to American world 
interest, as well as the fall of China, the withdrawal of the
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British (from Burma, Pakistan, etc.) and the defeat of the 
French in Indochina, combined to induce Washington to take 
action. However, since all Southeast Asian states were un­
stable (i.e., Burma, Laos), the United States had to select 
the key "domino" or country in which to take a stand against 
communism. The Pentagon Papers indicate that from the early 
1950's, Indochina was considered the key area, and within 
that area, as viewed by President Eisenhower in 1959, Laos 
was of prime strategic importance:
It is important to United States security interests 
that all practicable measures be taken to prevent 
further Communist expansion in Southeast Asia. Indo­
china is a key area of Southeast Asia and is under imme­
diate threat.
The neighboring countries of Thailand and Burma 
could be expected to fall under Communist domination if 
Indochina were controlled by a Communist-dominated 
government. The balance of Southeast Asia would then 
be in grave hazard.^3
...President Eisenhower said with considerable emotion 
that Laos was the key to the entire area of Southeast 
Asia. He said that if we permitted Laos to fall, then 
we would have to write off all the area. He stated that 
we must not permit a Communist take-over.
The Pentagon Papers indicate that Burma lacked the stra­
tegic importance of Laos; if Burma "went communist," Thailand 
would still be defensible; additionally, it would also create 
a "stiffer" Indian attitude toward communism; and, lastly, 
Burma was considered a British responsibility (however, Indo­
china was not considered a French responsibility):
With respect to Burma, Thailand, and Malaya, internal 
subversive moves will probably remain the chief threats 
to the established governments. Chinese Communists would 
probably move against these countries only if first
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successful in Indo-China...
...In the event of Chinese Communist moves against 
Indo-China or Burma....It is unlikely that U.S. forces 
would be employed in Burma. This is considered to be 
an area of British responsibility.^5
...The extension of communist power via Burma would 
augment the communist threat to India and Pakistan and 
strengthen the groups within those countries which 
favor accommodation. However, such an event would 
probably result in a stiffer attitude toward communism 
on the part of the Indian government.
11. Thailand has no common border with China and no 
strong internal communist element. It adjoins areas
of Indochina...the border areas are remote and difficult. 
Hence, communist seizure of Thailand is improbable 
except as a result of the prior loss of either Burma or 
Indochina.
12. Communist control of either Indochina or Burma 
would expose Thailand to infiltration and severe 
political pressures as well as to the threat of direct 
attack....However substantial aid, together with assurance 
of support by the United States and the UN might be 
sufficient to preserve a non-communist government in 
Thailand in spite of any form of pressure short of an 
overt attack.
13- Thailand would be difficult to defend against an 
overt attack from the east by way of the traditional 
invasion route through Cambodia. Thailand is more 
defensible against attack from Burma owing to the 
mountainous terrain and poor communications of the 
Thai-Burmese border...
l4. If the collapse of Thailand followed the loss of 
Indochina, the psychological and political consequences 
would be less immediate, owing to the difficult terrain 
of the Thai-Burmese border country.
Thus, Burma was not involved in the cold war for two major
reasons: it was not perceived as a "key domino;" additionally,
its nationalistic elite agreed to develop a foreign policy of
nonalignment.
In contrast to the Laotian elite, the Burmese elite have 
practiced a foreign policy which has helped to keep Burma 
outside the politics of the cold war. Burma has been able
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to do this only by isolating itself from the cold war contest 
between the United States, the Soviet Union, and the Peoples' 
Republic of China. Two factors are significant in the Bur­
mese government's calculations on relations with foreign 
actors: first, Burma has one of the longest frontiers with
Red China; second, some of the non-Burman ethnic groups are 
eager to obtain foreign aid in support of their anti-govern­
ment activities. Burmese foreign policy has been devised to 
minimize the non-Burman capacity to obtain foreign support 
particularly with respect to China, and to alleviate any
apprehension in Peking that Burmese territory might be used
T Aagainst China.
Burma has adopted nonalignment as the fundamental prin­
ciple of its foreign policy. Burma interprets nonalignment
on the Swiss Model and seeks to isolate the country from
19either global or regional disputes as far as possible.
One high Burmese official once aptly summarized Burmese
foreign policy to a foreign visitor: "We wish Burma could
20be towed, like an island, into the sea and left alone."
On achieving independence, Burma opted against membership in 
the Commonwealth, thus losing a degree of security provided 
at that time by British military support and assistance. 
Moreover, in line with its nonalignment policy, Burma re­
nounced military assistance from either the Western or 
21Eastern bloc.
In contrast to Laotian "neutralism," Burmese policy has 
been the exact reverse. The Burmese elite have isolated
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Burma to the fullest extent possible from foreign economic 
and political forces. In order to protect its neutrality 
and sovereignty, many restrictive stipulations have been 
placed on the acceptance of foreign aid. As one observer 
noted :
Disillusioned with foreign aid that Burma felt 
was being exploited by the donor as an instrument of 
persuasion, the government in Rangoon continued in the 
1970*s to decline any assistance unless it could pay 
for it or unless there was the firm assurance that 
political strings were not attached.22
(Burma, as a result of this policy, has not advanced econ­
omically as quickly as Thailand, South Korea, and Malaysia, 
which have alliances with industrially-advanced powers.^3)
In 1953, the United States’ economic aid program was 
discontinued at the request of the Burmese government. Econ­
omic cooperation was resumed in 1956; however, aid from the 
U.S. and other Western nations remain at insignificant levels. 
The first Burmese-Soviet trade agreement, which set the 
pattern for all subsequent accords, was signed in 1955.
Again, in order to avoid creating unwanted obligations or 
to invite outside interference, all Soviet assistance is
oilpaid for. A 196? dispute with the Peoples' Republic of 
China terminated Burma’s profitable "aid-trade" arrangement 
with China; this agreement had provided for the sale of 
Burmese rice to Communist China and for Chinese goods and 
services to be sent to Burma on an interest-free credit basis
pc"without any conditions and privileges attached." In 
1970, after restoration of cordial relations, the "trade-aid"
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arrangement between China and Burma was reestablished.
Thus, Burmese neutrality is a choice that has resulted in
slower economic development and has required considerable
expenditures for a self-sufficient defense.
Since independence, Burma has faced severe security
problems, primarily but not exclusively internal. Since
its inception, Burma has had to deal with insurgencies.*
In order to cope with its endemic internal rebellions, the
embattled Burmese government placed heavy emphasis on building
up its army. However, as Leo Rose notes:
This virtually exclusive preoccupation with internal 
rebellions has influenced the character of the Burmese 
military, which has long been primarily involved in 
"counterinsurgency" operations. As a result, the army 
has developed only limited capacity to meet direct 
external aggression.2°**
*See Chapter III for a detailed explanation.
**0n several occasions since Burma's independence, the 
Chinese have sent patrols across the border into defenseless 
areas; however, under diplomatic pressure from Rangoon, they 
were removed. This was an acute problem in the 1950's when 
Nationalist Chinese irregulars were mounting guerrilla attacks 
from Burma into the Peoples' Republic of China. The irregulars 
posed a serious problem to Burma's effort to maintain internal 
and external peace. The Burmese became apprehensive that 
these activities would provide a pretext for Communist Chinese 
invasion, thus threatening Burmese sovereignty and, perhaps, 
involving the nation in the "cold war." Burmese concern was 
increased by occasional reports of Communist Chinese incursions 
into the Shan state. Consequently, the Burmese military 
security forces intensified their operations against the 
irregulars but with limited results. Peking offered to aid 
in ejecting the irregulars, however, Burma refused and turned 
to the United Nations for assistance. Under U.N. auspices, 
approximately 10,000 irregulars were evacuated and repatriated 
to Taiwan in 1954 and 1961. In 1961, Burma and Peking signed a 
mutual nonaggression pact and jointly stated that "the two 
countries where necessary act in coordination and cooperation 
to solve" the problem of "remnant Kuomintang troops in Burma.
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The nonalignment and isolation policies which the Burmese 
elite have adopted, are intended to alleviate Chinese appre­
hensions concerning Burma; to avoid direct involvement in 
the cold war; and, thus, to minimize any direct external 
threats.
The Burmese government has been challenged not only by 
tribal insurgencies, but also by the White Flag and Red Flag 
Communist parties. Unlike the Pathet Lao, the Burmese 
Communist cadres have never been able to bridge the gap 
between Marxist-Leninism and the native culture of any con­
siderable segment of the population. Thus, as John Badgley 
notes, "The Party was damned because it did not make the 
linkage" between theory and the native culture and, there­
fore, has had to rely "instead on an external 'fountain' of 
28legitimacy." The Communists have also failed in Burma
because they have suffered from disciplinary problems and
ideological confusion. Compared to the broad-based communist
movements in Laos and South Vietnam, the Burmese Communist
movement is weak and insignificant. The Chinese Communist
investment in Burma's Communist party has been "a low-risk,
low cost a f f a i r . H o w e v e r ,  as Badgley notes.
Fortunately for Burma, it has kept itself out of the 
politics of The Cold War. Yet one cannot study the 
Communist movement and feel secure about the future. 
China has demonstrated a long and unusual interest in 
Burma, and manipulated the major Communist Party there 
to a greater degree than in any other country. Because 
Burmese politics do not inspire confidence in the 
ability of any Rangoon regime to control dissident 
groups, the potential for substantial warfare persists.
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Although the Cold War has become less intense, it has 
been replaced by a Sino-Soviet hostility that inspires 
another type of intervention as in B a n gladesh.30
Unlike the Laotian elite and ethnic Lao population,
the Burmese elite and ethnic Burman population are deeply
nationalistic and, therefore, suspicious and distrustful of
any politician or group which is influenced by a foreign
actor. As Badgley observes.
Deeply felt ethnic Burman nationalism remains the 
dominant political mood of Burma today. Any variety 
of international communism or unusual loyalty to a 
foreign political system is sufficient cause to create 
suspicion, official distrust, and even confinement.31
Thus', by not being viewed as a key "domino" and by developing 
a policy of "hermit diplomacy, Burma did not become 
drawn into the great powers' cold war contest.
In contrast to Burma, Laos was perceived to be a key 
"domino;" additionally, unlike the Burmese elite, the Lao 
elites' factionalism based on regional rivalries and ideologies, 
their tepid nationalism, and their historical "clientship" 
relations with foreign actors, set the stage for their 
acceptance of anti-communist promises and foreign interven­
tion. According to Nina Adams, the necessary personal and 
political compromises had been accomplished and rationalized 
by 1949:
A lack of ideology and social concern allowed the easy 
transformation of a moderate political nationalism 
keyed to the achievement of Laotian independence into 
an increasingly conservative political, economic, 
military, and psychological dependence. The Laotians 
came to see clientship as necessary to the preservation 
of their elite model of government from increasingly 
effective attack and counterorganization by the PathetLao.33
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As will be illustrated in the Laotian case study, the
imperatives of the bipolar international system, the non-
ideological factionalism among the Lao elite, and the lack
of political, national, and territorial integration which
helped to provide the Pathet Lao with a strong power base,
converged, thus, creating a war in Laos, which, as Guy
Morechand notes, was
at the same time a civil war, an ideological war, a 
war in which different minorities have aligned them­
selves with one side or another for local advantage, 
and above all a war in which foreign powers have, for 
their own ends, exploited ethnic differences, setting 
ethnic groups, or factions of ethnic groups, at each 
others' throats. Foreign intervention does not "help" 
unify a Laotian nation, but sides with particular ethnic 
groups, classes, factions, and individuals in a complex 
and unpredictable country.3^
CASE STUDY: LAOS— 195^-197^
United States diplomatic policy toward Laos can be 
viewed as having four phases: 195^-1960, 196O-1962, 1963-
1973, and 1973-74. During the first phase, 1954 until approx­
imately i960, the chief characteristic marking all of United 
States policy was an overt anticommunism; this policy pre­
cluded acceptance of a neutral Laotian government. The 
second phase, 196O-1962, was a transitional period; during 
this period the United States policy changed from opposition 
to nominal support of a neutral government. This shift in 
policy was not the result of any real commitment to a truly 
neutral Laos, but the recognition that only a neutral govern­
ment, supported at least nominally by both Communist and non-
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Communist nations, could maintain a stable government. The
third phase of U.S. policy, 1963-1973, has been dominated
by U.S. interests and concerns in Vietnam. These phases
are valid and useful in comprehending American diplomacy
toward Laos, but there are certain elements of American
involvement which were common to these three phases: "namely
35the covert and deceptive nature of U.S. involvement" and 
the recurring American subversion of the Geneva Agreements 
of 1954 and 1962. This covert U.S. policy had been motivated 
by an underlying anticommunist attitude and a desire to pre- 
vent Communist hegemony in the Laotian territory. The 
fourth phase, 1973 to the present, has been the United States 
disengagement from Laos, and its apparent acceptance of a 
neutral coalition government.
1954-1960
After the Geneva Conference in 1954, Laos achieved 
true independence (outside the umbrella of the French Union). 
The Geneva settlement marked the end of the Prench*-Indo- 
chinese fighting phase and the end of the "old imperialism." 
However, it by no means established an adequate basis for 
permanent peace. The distinctive feature of this settlement 
was a vagueness and a general lack of precise provisions for 
the political settlement of the conflict. The only detailed
*U.S. military aid to the French in Laos during the 
period of French control, 1950-1954, has been estimated at 
$30 million.
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document was the document concerning the cessation of hos­
tilities. The Geneva agreements stipulated a general cease­
fire, the withdrawal of French Union forces (except for 1,500 
French officers and men to train the Laotian army) and Viet 
Minh, and the regroupment of Pathet Lao forces in Sam Neua 
and Phong Saly provinces pending a political settlement.
The Geneva agreements prohibited introduction of foreign 
military personnel and military advisors; Laos was to be 
a neutral area. Laos emerged in a good position from Geneva; 
it was to be a neutral, independent and undivided state. 
However, the realization of a neutral, nonaligned, and 
united Laos was made impossible by a series of events both in 
and outside Laos.
The major task of the newly established neutral govern­
ment of Souvanna Phouma was to reach a political settlement 
with the Pathet Lao (which would create a coalition govern­
ment and would integrate the two armies). However, barely 
three months after Geneva, October 20, 195%, Prince Souvanna 
Phouma resigned. Souvanna Phouma's resignation has been 
attributed to the political upheaval which followed the 
assassination of Kou Voravong, Minister of Defense and a 
leading advocate of the Geneva Accords. The imputed political 
purpose of the assassination was to remove the cabinet mem­
ber most heavily in favor of reconciliation with the Pathet 
Lao. The Sananikone family is considered the culprits and 
is blamed for the killing.^9 However, years later in 1961,
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Souvanna Phouma ascribed his fall in 195% to foreign inter­
ference. He said:
Immediately after the conclusion of the Geneva 
Agreements the Government over which I presided entered 
into negotiations with the Pathet Lao in order to re­
integrate the combatants of this patriotic movement into 
the national community, but foreign interference into 
our internal problems compelled me to resign.
Stevenson notes that "whether foreigners intrigued to
engineer Souvanna's ouster and the naming of Katay, who opposed
a coalition government or integration of the army remains to
be p r o v e d . S t e v e n s o n  believes that the United States
played no major role in these events since the C.I.A. was
just beginning to set up shop and operate in Laos at this
time. He contends that "the French or Thais seem more likely
iipsources of trouble."
After the resignation of Souvanna Phouma, a new govern­
ment was formed under Katay Don Sasorith,* who favored closer 
relations with Thailand and who opposed a coalition govern­
ment with the Pathet Lao. Katay, prime minister from November 
195% to February 1956, was a strong supporter of the South­
east Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) which came into 
existence on September 6, 195%, seven weeks after the con­
clusions of the Geneva Accords, placed Laos within its 
"protective o r b i t . W i t h  the permission of Katay Don 
Sasorith, the small United States Operation Mission (USOM) in 
charge of administering the aid program was established in
*A member of the Southern Laos family which has traditionally 
preferred close links with Thailand.
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Vientiane on January 1, 1955. The size of the mission rapidly 
increased from a dozen men to over one hundred by December,
1957.̂ ^
The objective of the aid program to Laos was to bolster 
the army and government rather than to promote economic develop­
ment or self-sufficiency in defense. Laos was "the only 
country in the world where the United States supports the 
military budget 1 0 0 % . The aid program was designed "to 
keep Laos this side of the Bamboo Curtain." From 1955 to
1958, the United States’ aid to Laos totaled approximately
$167 m i l l i o n . H o w e v e r ,  despite the magnitude of the U.S.
aid program very little of it reached the average Laotian
peasant because of the corrupt administration of the pro- 
47gram. '
During 1955, the USOM civilian economist had to evaluate 
requests for military equipment. Not having the technical 
expertise in this area, the Pentagon won approval to estab­
lish a Program Evaluation Office (PEO) in January 1956. In 
order to avoid contravention of the Geneva Agreement, these 
military men wore civilian clothes; however, despite the 
subterfuge, the PEO was in actuality a Military Assistance 
Advisory Group (MAAG). As Stevenson notes, "the PEO official 
functions grew from disbursing and budget evaluation to end-
use inspection, to weapons training, and finally, in July
481959; to tactical training and field operations." Thus, 
the obstacle, the Geneva Agreement’s prohibition of the
201
establishment of a military mission in Laos, was overcome
when the United States established a military mission but gave
it a different label— PEO— and attached it to the USOM, The
PEO violated the Geneva Agreement since it clearly served as
the functional equivalent of a military advisory group. The
PEO contrivance was so obvious that the State Department in
1957 included Laos on a list of "countries where MAAG personnel 
49are stationed."
Katay did little to resolve the internal conflicts in 
Laos. Negotiations with the Pathet Lao concerning the 
administration of the two provinces under their control, 
foundered and were broken off in April 1955. Talks with the 
Pathet Lao resumed once in the summer and once in the fall 
only to be broken off. General elections were held in 
December 1955, without the participation of the Pathet Lao. 
After the December elections, Katay could not obtain the 
two-thirds Assembly majority support then needed to form a 
new government; Souvanna Phouma, however, obtained this 
support and formed a new government in March 1956 (which 
lasted until July 1958), on a pledge of reconciliation with 
the Pathet Lao.^O He pledged: "No effort shall be spared
so that negotiation with the adverse party be crowned by the 
loyal reconciliation longed for by all."^^ The Royal Laotian 
Government and the Pathet Lao resumed negotiations; they 
reached a final agreement in November 1957. The Vientiane 
Agreements provided for the integration of 1,500 men from the
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Pathet Lao units into the Royal Laotian Army and the discharge 
of the forces remaining. It also provided for the integration 
of the administration of the two Pathet Lao-controlled pro­
vinces after the creation of the Government of National Union, 
which would include two Pathet Lao representatives as Ministers 
in a new coalition cabinet. Also supplementary elections would 
be held in 1958.^^
During this period, the United States government was 
developing economic and military aid programs, and was in­
creasing its involvement in Laotian affairs. The aid programs 
were viewed in 1955 as necessary for victories by anti­
communist elements in Laos; this aid was primarily for military 
purposes without concern for political support in the villages. 
There was no program whose objective was to create electoral 
support among the peasantry for the anti-communist factions. 
Thus, while Souvanna Phouma and the Pathet Lao slowly moved 
toward reconciliation, there is little evidence that American 
influence altered the direction or pace of this movement be­
fore 1957.^3
The major characteristic marking all American policy in 
Laos throughout the 1950’s was anti-communism. In a Con­
gressional hearing the Assistant Secretary of State for Far 
Eastern Affairs, Walter S. Robertson, bluntly stated U.S. 
objectives :
Our policy objectives in relation to Laos have been and
are to assist the Lao:
1. In keeping the Communist from taking over Laos;
2. In strengthening their association with the Free 
World; and
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3. In developing and maintaining a stable and inde­
pendent government willing and able to resist 
Communist aggression or subversion.54
Robertson also indicated the strategic importance of Laos:
...when you look at the map you will see that Laos 
is a finger thrust right down into the heart of South­
east Asia. And Southeast Asia is one of the prime 
objectives of the international Communists in Asia 
because it is rich in raw materials and has excess 
food. We are not in Laos to be a fairy godfather to 
Laos, we are in there for one sole reason, and that is 
to try to keep this little country from being taken 
over by the Communists....It is part of the effort we 
are making for the collective security of the free 
world. Every time you lose a country, every time 
you give up to them, they become correspondingly 
stronger and the free world becomes weaker.
This isn't happening only in this little country 
of Laos, it is happening all over the world, every­
where. We are engaged in a struggle for the survival 
of what we call a free civilization.55
A basic feature of American policy during the Eisenhower
administration was opposition to a coalition government in
Laos. Memories of the 1948 coup d'etat in Czechoslovakia
left American officials with a fear of coalitions with the
Communists and a belief that coalitions were dangerous and
unworkable. Walter Robertson expressed this belief in 1959:
We very much feared when they took the Communists 
into the Government that the same thing would happen to 
Laos as happened to Czechoslovakia. We very much 
feared the Communist coalition would bring the Communists 
dangerously into the country.55
The United States believed that the Pathet Lao should not
and need not participate in the government of Laos in any
way.
Souvanna's visit during the negotiations to Peking and 
Hanoi which was an effort to prove his neutrality and desire
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to achieve reconciliation, and the negotiated agreement itself 
was perceived by the United States as evidence of a Laotian 
veering away from "pro-Western n e u t r a l i t y . T h e  setbacks 
for the United States in its battle against a "communist 
take-over" were recounted in the following Operations Coor­
dinating Board (GOB) Report on Southeast Asia;
The formation in Nov., 1957 of a coalition cabinet 
with Communist Pathet Lao participation, additional 
communist gains of places in the army and civil service, 
and permission for the Pathet to operate as a legal 
political party throughout the country, were generally 
considered setbacks for United States objectives.
Moreover, with elections scheduled for May 1958, American
officials' concern and worry prompted action. A congressional
report set forth the situation:
In the fall of 1957, with an awareness of the forth­
coming elections. Ambassador Parsons contemplated the 
cumulative results of U.S. aid program to date. He 
was concerned with the possibility that its short­
comings might become an election issue for the Communists.
He was apparently impressed by the aid program's 
obvious neglect of the needs of the typical Lao, the 
villager or farmer. In an effort to remedy this short­
coming, the Ambassador conceived Operation Booster Shot.59
In 1957, the United States realized that its corrupt and
abused aid program had not had a significant impact on Laotian
politics or economy. Not having the needed leverage with its
present aid program, the United States designed "Operation
Booster Shot," which was an emergency attempt to extend the
impact of the U.S. aid program into rural Laos before the
upcoming elections. As Walter Robertson explained to a
congressional committee:
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This was a crash program. Such a program, we felt, 
would do much to counter the anticipated vigorous 
Communist campaign in the villages and the growing 
criticism that American aid benefits the few in the 
cities and fails to reach the rural population."0
The operation, which cost over $3 million, involved more 
than ninety work projects. Included in this were repair of 
schools, temples, and roads, irrigation projects, and air­
dropping 1,300 tons of food, medical and other supplies. 
American overzealousness weakened the effect of Operation 
Booster Shot. Americans took over and dominated the program. 
As Stevenson notes:
Instead of letting the Laotian politician take credit 
for the village aid projects and special air lifts of 
commodities, many U.S. officials flaunted the American 
role in the effort and, consequently, added to the 
credibility of Pathet Lao charges that the established 
politicians were U.S. lackeys.ol
Operation Booster Shot failed; the aid did not produce 
an electoral victory for the anti-communist. In the 1958 
elections, nine out of thirteen Pathet Lao candidates won 
seats in the National Assembly. Moreover, when the National 
Assembly convened Souphanouvong was elected Chairman. A 
Laotian official offered one explanation for the Pathet Lao 
victory: "Black market deals in American aid dollars reached
such proportions that the Pathet Lao needed no propaganda to 
turn the rural people against the townspeople."^^
The impact of Operation Booster Shot was to weaken the 
anti-communist groups. American enthusiasm for concrete 
results in this program and later aid programs, as well as 
American contempt for Laotian reluctance and lethargy.
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caused many U.S. aid officials to bypass the bureaucratic 
red tape and the legitimizing procedures which delayed their 
projects. For example, in Operation Booster Shot the initial 
plans stated that civil action programs were to be implemented 
through the Royal Laotian Army, but American officials 
found the RLG too incompetent and slow moving. An ironic 
but important result of this overzealousness in the imple­
mentation of aid programs "has been to weaken local govern­
ments at a time when the major reason for extending development 
projects to the village level was to strengthen those political 
structures as an alternative to the Pathet Lao."^^ U.S. pene­
tration of Laos weakened political integration and the Laotian 
Administration; it strengthened the Laotian Government's de­
pendency on the United States (officials for implementation 
of programs). A U.S. intelligence estimate in December 1958 
concluded that the Neo Lao Hak Sat, the political arm of the 
Pathet Lao, was making "strong gains in almost every sector 
of Laotian society.
In 1957, the United States decided to increase its 
direct, but covert, intervention in Laotian domestic political 
affairs. By 1957 the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) staff 
in Laos "had been expanded and its intelligence network fairly 
well established."^^ The CIA shared the anti-communism of 
other U.S. officials, i.e.. State Department and Pentagon 
officials, and perceived its task as that of creating a 
viable non-French anti-communist political system. In order
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to accomplish its objective, the CIA operations attempted to
manipulate various Laotian political factions in order to
keep pro-Americans on top. CIA, and later Pentagon and State
Department, manipulation and penetration of various Laotian
political groups were made possible by the nonideological
6 7factionalism among the ruling elites. As this chapter will 
illustrate, factionalism also existed among U.S. policy makers: 
the CIA, the State Department, and the Pentagon; each group 
cultivated a Laotian clientele, each group perceived develop­
ment in Laos according to its own major objectives, tasks, 
and concerns; each group used policies which preserved its 
own primary interests. Moreover, once the CIA, the Pentagon, 
and State Department officials promoted and backed their 
respective Laotian faction or client, "to support another
faction would be to discredit their own judgement and activi-
fi Rties." Thus, a major consequence was the bitter-end support 
of their respective Laotian clients. As U.S. officials pene­
trated different Laotian political groups, the close working 
relationships with their clients led Americans to accept and 
adopt some of their clients’ perspectives and to defend their 
clients’ interests in U.S. policy debates. Thus, different 
competing American officials might have penetrated, supported, 
and promoted their own Laotian clients, but a "consequence 
of these close relations was the increased susceptibility of
69the Americans to manipulation by the Lao."
In 1957, the major CIA rivalry was not with other American
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officials but with the French "Deuxième" bureau and the network 
of Frenchmen who were high officials in the Royal Government 
bureaucracy. The CIA vigorously opposed any Lao official 
whom it considered under French influence or control; it also
70rallied against any Lao who was not a staunch anti-communist.
The CIA considered Souvanna Phouma hopelessly pro-French as 
well as dangerously naive about the Pathet Lao which Souvanna 
denied were under foreign Communist control. This evaluation 
was reinforced when Souvanna Phouma took two Pathet Lao assembly­
men into his Cabinet in 1957. This coalition government and 
the 1958 elections confirmed the CIA belief that new political 
groups had to be created and established to replace the old, 
insufficiently anti-communist ones. The State Department 
became alarmed over these events, perceiving its whole anti­
communist policy to be in jeopardy. State Department officials 
looked for a way to reverse this "creeping communism" either 
by defeating the Pathet Lao in the upcoming elections through 
Operation Booster Shot or by withholding U.S. aid to weaken 
the government. The Pentagon played a minor role in the 1957 
policy debate because its Laotian operations were still small 
and of low priority. The Pentagon also viewed this policy
debate as one which would not affect the Laotian Army, its
71primary concern.
United States officials quickly registered their dis­
pleasure with the May 1958 election results, which gave the 
Pathet Lao added authority in the coalition government, in two
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ways. First, the CIA helped to organize a group of young right
wing conservatives, the Committee for the Defense of National
Interests (CDNI), in opposition to Prime Minister Souvanna
Phouma. The CIA saw this group as a new elite force and was
impressed by their anti-communism. Some saw the CDNI as "no
72more than a U.S. front organization." At the very least,
the CDNI were heavily influenced and controlled by the CIA.
Secondly, on June 30, the United States suspended aid to Laos.
As Roger Hilsman later wrote: "...by merely withholding the
monthly payments to the troops, the United States could create
the conditions for toppling any Lao government whose policies 
73it opposed." The aid suspension and CIA opposition through
the CDNI were too much to overcome; on July 23, Souvanna Phouma
lost a vote of confidence in the National Assembly and resigned.
One observer charged that the United States paid $100,000 for
74each National Assembly vote against Souvanna. A U.S. source
admits that CIA agents were "counting their votes and stage-
75managing the whole affair." The United States intervened 
in the domestic politics of Laos in 1957-1958; it was clearly 
and deeply implicated in the fall of Souvanna Phouma, as it 
would be again in i960.
With CDNI support, Phoui Sananikone succeeded in forming 
a government by a narrow margin on August I8 , 1958. He 
excluded the two Pathet Lao ministers who had held cabinet 
positions in the Government of National Union; the coalition 
government was broken. He created his own brand of neutrality.
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one which "does not imply a neutrality on the ideological
plane: we are a n t i - c o m m u n i s t s . H e  stated that his major
objective was "the struggle without fail against the implan-
77tation of the Communist ideology in Laos." Phoui created 
closer relations with Thailand, upgraded the diplomatic 
mission in Saigon to embassy level, and established official 
relations with Nationalist China. In October the U.S. resumed 
aid to Laos; in January 1959, the United States Increased its 
aid by nearly 40 percent. The American role in Laos increased 
with its foreign aid. The new and accelerated aid program 
differed from earlier programs in its increased reliance on 
the Royal Army for administration and implementation of the 
programs. The new programs were for village and agricultural 
improvement, health information, improvement of the supply 
system for the army, and the training of the Laotian Army.
In February, Phoui with State Department support, renounced 
the section of the Geneva Accords which placed limits on the 
amount of foreign military aid Laos could receive. The Pentagon 
for the first time began to take an active interest in Laos. 
Through an agreement with the French who were reducing their 
training forces, the Pentagon was moving toward complete con­
trol in the training of the Laotian Army. The new head of 
the PEO, who was assigned in February, was an active general, 
who was officially put on civilian status. These actions 
caused Soviet protests that the U.S. was inciting the Laotian 
government to violate the Geneva A c c o r d s . Souvanna Phouma
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subsequently claimed that Phoui's diplomatic actions, and the
permission he gave to the American government to send military
instructors and advisors for the army, were a "fundamental
error" by which Laos, under U.S. pressure, turned from a
7Qpolicy of neutrality.
Although the Phoui Cabinet was united in its anti­
communism, it was divided by factional distrust and suspicion. 
Moreover the United States did not try to bolster Phoui within 
his Cabinet, because the CIA and the Pentagon supported other 
politicians, mainly the CDNI and a young vigorous anti­
communist Colonel Phoumi Nosavan, who, with CIA and military 
support, became Secretary of State for Defense. The increased 
military aid program brought the Laotian Army under close 
American supervision and control. As the Laotian Army grew 
stronger under its expanded role in the U.S. aid program,
Phoui Sananikone grew weaker, and the CDNI, which included
many young army officers and which made up half of his cabinet, 
80grew restless. Fearing an army coup, perhaps backed by the 
CIA which preferred Phoumi Nosavan to Phoui Sananikone, Phoui, 
with possible backing from the State Department’s American 
Mission, seized upon the occurrence of a Laotian-Democratic 
Republic of Vietnam (DRV) border incident in a remote northern 
area to charge North Vietnam with starting a campaign against 
Laos "by acts of intimidation of all sorts, including the
Q
violation and occupation of its territory." The validity 
of these charges are questionable; the incident served merely
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as a pretext for political maneuvering. Phoui used the 
incident to request emergency powers for one year; his 
request was granted. Hugh Toye suggests that Phoui, in 
maneuvering for emergency powers, may have been emulating 
Marshall Sarit of Thailand, who had used the Communist
8 2threat to assume full power less than three months earlier.
As the government became more conservative, and, as the 
power of the army and its anti-communism increased, purges 
were initiated and continued for months against Pathet Lao 
officials and sympathizers. Two Pathet Lao battalions were 
encamped at Xieng-Ngeum and the Plaine des Jarres, and were 
preparing to be integrated into the Royal Laotian Army, as 
previously agreed upon by Souvanna Phouma and the Pathet Lao.
The Pathet Lao battalions, fearing deception by the increasingly 
anti-communist Phoui government, refused at the last minute 
to comply with the integration agreement. The following day. 
Prince Souphanouvong and other Pathet Lao leaders were arrested 
in Vientiane, and the Pathet Lao battalions were encircled by 
the Royal Army. Phoui issued an ultimatum to the two battalions: 
either be integrated in the Royal Army or be disbanded. The 
battalion at Xieng-Ngeum capitulated; however, the battalion 
on the Plaine des Jarres, with their families, chickens, pigs, 
and other household possessions, melted through the Royal Army's 
cordon and headed toward the North Vietnam b o r d e r . A n  
OCB Report on Southeast Asia stated: "The Lao Army displayed
a disappointing lack of capacity to control a small scale
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Internal security problem when it permitted the battalion to 
84escape." The Pathet Lao subsequently suggested a recon­
ciliation, however, the Phoui government rejected the idea; 
the Phoui government declared that the Pathet Lao were 
deserters and had committed an act of open rebellion, leaving 
only a military solution available. The American government 
voiced support of the Royal Government’s position and actions. 
As Stevenson notes:
The stage was set for the first serious military crisis 
in Laos since France’s Indochina war, a crisis made 
possible by the American policy of building a strong 
army which imposed an intransigent anti-communist 
policy on a weak and divided political system. John 
Foster Dulles’ "dike" against Communism had been built 
and was waiting for the flood.
In the summer of 1959, the Pathet Lao began attacks on 
the Royal Government’s positions in the North. Although the 
United States publically claimed that the 1959 fighting was 
an attempt by "Communist-led forces...to impose their will 
over the Kingdom (of Laos) and its small army," the only 
political demands the Pathet Lao made were for a "restoration 
of the coalition government of 1957-1958."®^ Thus, the onus 
of the blame for the resumption of guerrilla attacks and 
hostilities rests with the Phoui Sananikone government and 
indirectly with the U.S.^?
On September l8, 1959, a Special National Intelligence 
Estimate (SNIE) attributed the renewed guerrilla war to "a 
reaction to a stronger anti-Communist posture by the Laotian 
government and to recent U.S. initiatives in support of Laos." 88
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SNIE analyzed the situation as follows :
7 . We believe that the initiation of Communist guerrilla 
warfare in Laos in mid-July was primarily a reaction to 
a series of actions by the Royal Lao Government which 
threatened drastically to weaken the Communist position 
in Laos. For a period of about one year after the November 
1957 political agreements between the Laotian Government 
ant the Pathet Lao, the Communist controlled party in 
Laos - the Neo Lao Hak Sat - attempted to move by legal 
political competition toward its objective of gaining 
control of Laos. The Laotian Government had taken 
counteraction which checked this effort. Moreover, 
the U.S. had stepped up its activities to strengthen 
the Laotian Government, notably through the decision 
to send military training teams, and clearly was in­
creasing its presence in Laos. The Communist advance in 
Laos was losing impetus. To the Communist world, the 
future probably appeared to be one of increasing political 
repression, declining assets, and a strengthened anti- 
Communist position in the country.
During the summer of 1959, the Pathet Lao attacks against 
Royal Army posts in Northeastern Laos were not serious in a 
military sense; however, these attacks did create a feeling of 
insecurity and instability within Vientiane, and they did 
reveal the basic inability of the Lao Army to stand, fight and 
win. In spite of $200 million in American aid, mere rumors 
of advancing North Vietnamese troops were enough to cause the 
Royal Laotian troops to flee in terror. These rumors, which 
initially were the result of its own propaganda, had the same 
affect on the Royal Laotian government officials who asked 
Washington for assistance to meet the threat. The tension 
and particularly the rhetoric of crisis heightened. Dis­
tortions by the Lao government and irresponsible American
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journalism*— U.S. newspapers treated the attacks as a major
90crisis— stimulated a high level policy review in Washington.
In July, the United States signed a new agreement which expanded 
the PEO group and called for U.S. military advisors to begin 
training Lao combat troops. In August, the CIA did increase 
its logistical support to the Lao Army by chartering transport 
planes belonging to Air America. However, direct overt military 
intervention was avoided. Neither President Eisenhower nor 
the new, less assertive and less influential Secretary of 
State Herter, who was not particularly interested in Asia, 
wanted intervention.^^ Dissatisfaction with the United States 
response to its request for assistance prompted the Royal 
Laotian Government to again charge North Vietnam with aggression; 
however, this time they appealed to the United Nations for 
assistance. Neither the U.N. team of observers nor the secret 
U.S. government SNIE of September l8, 1959, found any con­
clusive evidence of participation or aggression by the North 
92Vietnamese.^
After failing to obtain international support in his 
battle against the Communists, Phoui considered reorganizing
*Not an atypical example is given by Bernard Fall who 
was in Laos at the time. The New York Times on August 24, 
1959, titled a story— "Laos Insurgents Take Army Post Close 
to Capitol." As Fall notes the headlines should have said 
"Rain Cuts Laos Vegetable Supply," because there had been 
no attack. The whole story resulted from a washed-out bridge 
which had stopped traffic to Vientiane and thus prevented the 
daily vegetable supply from coming through. The report of 
a Pathet Lao attack was speculation which resulted from the 
cut-off traffic.
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Q - 3his cabinet. The CDNI members who were advised by the 
resisted this reorganization which would have shifted CDNI 
Foreign Minister Khamphon Panya to another cabinet post.
The CDNI contended that Phoui intended to weaken the govern­
ment’s anti-communist orientation. In December, the army 
General Phoumi Nosavan and other CDNI members demanded Phoui's 
resignation and sent troops to surround his house. The Army 
coup was successful; on December 30, Phoui resigned.
Phoumi Nosavan was sponsored by and the protege of the 
CIA. For several months the CIA had been building up and 
strengthening Phoumi Nosavan; by supporting Phoumi, the CIA 
believed they could preclude another coalition and build an 
effective anti-communist government. Moreover, Phoumi was 
not only strongly pro-American and staunchly anti-communist, 
he also had a close relationship with his cousin, Marshall 
Sarit of Thailand. For these reasons, both the Pentagon and 
the CIA backed him against the Phoui Sananikone government 
and wanted him to become the head of the Laotian government.
By 1959, the CIA had a strong hand in formulating and imple­
menting American policy in Laos, however, at times the State
oilDepartment opposed it.^
The State Department, which reportedly was unaware of 
the Pentagon and CIA support of the coup,^^ unenthusiastically 
supported the Phoui Sananikone government; the State Depart­
ment did not want to choose between anti-communists. It 
opposed Phoumi Nosavan because he lacked political skill; he
217
had a militarist image, and he antagonized both America's
allies— Phoumi was an anathema to the British, French, and
Australians— and Laotians, who disliked him for his inability
to keep his word and for being un-Laotian which is not following
the traditional Lao policy of compromise. A compromise was
reached, and the King appointed a caretaker government headed
q 6by Kou Abhay until the elections scheduled for April.^ In 
the meantime, however, Phoumi holding the cabinet positions 
of Minister of Defense and Veteran Affairs, dominated the 
government. During this period, the U.S. had trouble con­
trolling its "strong man." As the Pentagon Papers note:
Our problem in the last few months has not been "to 
strengthen the determination of the RLG to resist 
subversion" or "to prevent Lao neutrality from veering 
toward pro-communism." Without minimizing the impor­
tance of these objectives, our immediate operational 
problem has been to persuade the Lao leadership from 
taking too drastic actions which might provoke a 
reaction on the part of the North Vietnamese and 
which might alienate free-world sympathy for Laos - 
as for instance, outlawing and eliminating by force 
the NLHX or taking a hard anti-communist position in 
international affairs.97
The election in i960 was rigged; the election rules* 
were rigged against the Pathet Lao, and Prince Souphanouvong, 
the Pathet Lao's top vote-getter in the 1958 elections, was 
under arrest and not permitted to run. No attempt was made 
to hide the fraudulent nature of the election. Frank Robert­
son of the Christian Science Monitor noted:
*See Chapter III for complete details of the i960 
election law.
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Last April’s elections, rigged so blatantly that the 
most backward villager could perceive the deception, 
played right into the hands of the Pathet Lao....The 
Pathet Lao in recent months have increased public support 
enormously.98
Another American reported: ”If free elections were held
today, every qualified observer including the American 
Embassy concedes this hermit Kingdom would go Communist in 
a l a n d s l i d e . H o w e v e r ,  with the election carefully managed, 
pro-American conservative candidates won, and the Pathet Lao 
were soundly defeated. The King appointed Tiao Somsanith 
as the new Prime Minister; he was a front-man for Phoumi 
Nosavan, the "incipient strong man" of the country. Laos 
was relatively peaceful after the elections and an NSC 
memorandum in July cited among United States objectives in 
Laos that of "helping maintain the confidence of the Royal 
Lao Government in its anti-communist, pro-Free World 
’neutralism.
From 1954 to i960, the United States spent $300 million, 
which went primarily to support an army. However, the PEO 
director in Laos admitted, "we have yet to give this country 
a fighting Army."^^^ In I96O, the army was evaluated as 
being poorly trained and its dependence on motorized trans­
port made it ill-adapted for guerrilla warfare (Laos has few 
roads). Buddhist sensibilities against taking a human life 
are more meaningful to the average Laotian soldier than fighting 
for political objectives. Other Laotian values such as care­
ful good manners, respect for others, concealment of any
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displeasing emotion, and serenity do not contribute to the
creation of an efficient army. Keyes Beech noted: "By
Western standards discipline Is appalling....Officers are
careful not to hurt enlisted men’s feelings.... Laotian army
102troops are very much averse to fighting."
A French advisor reported that four of the twelve 
battalion commanders he was training were overtly sympathetic 
to the Pathet Lao. In 1959-1960, the army proved to be In­
effective In battle being unable to defeat the Pathet Lao, 
and Inept at simple security measures— letting the Pathet Lao 
leaders who had been In jail for a year escape from prison on 
May 24, I960. As Stevenson notes:
The survival of the army depended on the continuation 
of American aid, which has assisted the rise to power 
of strongly anti-Communist and pro-American officers. 
This chain of dependency guaranteed that the Laotian 
government would avoid a coalition with the Pathet Lao, 
would align Itself closely to the United States, 
Thailand, and South Vietnam, and would oppose pro- 
Communist elements both politically and m i l i t a r i l y . 103
In i960, the International Cooperation Association summarized 
to the House Foreign Affairs Committee the results of Its 
aid program to Laos : "That Laos has remained free is attri­
butable largely to U.S. aid."^^^ This statement reflects the 
continued prevalence of a cold war perspective on Laos. The 
importance of Laos continued to be its context in the cold 
war as an area threatened by international communism.
To what extent is the Pathet Lao a mere pawn of the 
policy objectives of other Communist powers— if the Pathet 
Lao is indeed a pawn. To what degree, if any, has the Pathet
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Lao lost control over its operations? As Bernard Fall notes, 
to supervise and direct anything in Laos by remote control 
is, as the U.S. can testify, extremely difficult. In sheer 
physical terms alone, it is easier, logistically, for the 
United States to supply the Laotian pro-American right wing 
forces from nearby Thai airstrips and railroads than it is 
for "the Communist to supply even the ’Plaine des Jarres' across 
the whole North Vietnamese upland jungle with its washed-out 
roads (when they exist at all) and the monsoon climate which 
is notoriously inhospitable to airlifts. Thus, out of 
sheer necessity a great deal must often be left to local 
initiative.
Until i960 the Soviet Union had no diplomatic relations
or influence in Laos.^^^ The Chinese also stayed aloof from
Laotian affairs, in accord with Chou En-lai's Bandung Conference
pledge of noninterference. At the Geneva (195^) and Bandung
107(1955) conferences, China had supported Laotian neutralism.
China consistently backed the neutral forces from 1953 to 
1962 and took relatively little direct action in Laos. In 
January i960, Peking seemed reluctant to involve itself in 
the Laotian crisis. In January 196O, however, in reaction 
to Phoumi's seizure of control, Peking charged the United 
States with having installed a facist government. After the 
i960 rigged elections in Laos, Peking criticized the Pathet 
Lao and North Vietnamese for putting any faith on elections 
under rightist a u s p i c e s . N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  when the new
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Laotian government of Tiao Somsanith pledged to respect the 
Geneva Accords, Peking declared its intention to keep good
IQOrelations with the new government.
North Vietnam was the only Communist government with
more than nominal interest or involvement in Laos at this
time. The North Vietnamese role during this period was low-
keyed. Although the United States publicly stated and acted
as if it believed that only the American threat of nuclear
retaliation and the Royal Army kept the Chinese and North
Vietnamese from marching to the MeKong,^^^ American policy
makers had little evidence of foreign Communist troops in
Laos before the border clashes in disputed territory at the
end of 1958, and even then it is q u e s t i o n a b l e . T h e
Pentagon Papers reveal little direct involvement in Laos by
outside Communist actors during this period. In July 1955,
a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) came to the conclusion
that North Vietnam would infiltrate Vietnamese soldiers
into Laos only if the Royal Laotian Government took military
action which seriously threatened the Pathet Lao position in
112the two Northern provinces. The paper stated that some
North Vietnamese cadres remained in Laos after 1954, both as 
advisors and administrators. Some of these Vietnamese were 
withdrawn in early 1957, and during 1958 and early 1959,
North Vietnamese activities were "evidently attenuated."
The study contends that the Vietnamese did increase their aid 
and military involvement only when the Royal Government
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attempted to "disestablish" the two remaining Pathet Lao 
battalions In May 1959. Reports, such as the OCB report, 
during the 1959 crisis confirm the lack of hard evidence on 
which to blame outside Communists for aggression. The 
August 12 OCB report stated that It was reasonable to assume 
North Vietnamese Involvement, but "there Is no conclusive 
evidence as to the exact composition and objectives of the
nilattacking forces." Both Bernard Fall and Denis Warner,
journalists and frequent visitors to the Laotian front In 
1959, refuted the American official public claim that the 
1959 (and I96I-I962) Pathet Lao offensives were carried out 
largely by North Vietnamese combat t r o o p s . ( W a r n e r  later 
commented a "Laotian army commander accepted as fact what the 
most junior Western staff officer would have rejected as
fiction."llG)
During the period 195^-1960, the most valuable and 
Important service provided by the North Vietnamese "was 
sanctuary In case of trouble, although they also at times
117provided training and leadership for some operations."
Many of the Pathet Lao cadres, which were situated throughout 
the country to win the support of the people, were trained 
In North Vietnam, and to a lesser extent China and the 
Soviet Union. Bernard Fall estimated the number of Pathet 
Lao cadres Involved at only two hundred; however, even such 
a small number could have extensive Influence and Impact 
among the Isolated ethnocentric Laotian communities where
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leadership material Is scarce and poorly trained. Because of
this, neither was direct outside assistance and aid very
great In absolute terms, nor was It necessary during this
period; the North Vietnamese limited their activities to
encouragement, training, and providing some military supplies.
However, as Stevenson notes, "a soldier could not carry much
through the mountains and jungle. Any political organizer
would ultimately need to win the support of the people with
120whom he was working." By i960, the Pathet Lao had extended 
their control throughout the provinces of Sam Neua and Phong 
Saly and beyond. Bernard Pall quoted a "friendly Aslan 
military observer" who had an opportunity to visit these 
remote areas In the Spring of I96O: "The Pathet Lao In
hundreds of villages has almost reached the stage of political 
organization that enabled the Viet Mlnh to defeat the French 
In Vietnam."
U.S. Involvement In Indochina during this period was 
rooted In an Ideological misconception of post-war Aslan 
realities. The Chinese revolution was perceived as a creation 
of the Soviet Union, and the national liberation movements 
In Vietnam and Laos, as projects of Moscow and Peking. As 
Marek Thee noted, "John Poster Dulles approached the conflict 
as an exercise In brinkmanship, playing with the Idea of
'rolling back’ the Chinese revolution through the Indochinese
122gates." U.S. policy makers throughout the entire period 
of Involvement never gave credence to the fact that Laotians
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as well as Vietnamese acting independently and on purely 
nationalistic grounds, made the decision to resist U.S. 
interference. Neither China nor the Soviet Union was fully 
consulted.
1960-1962
The reality of a Communist threat changed greatly after 
196O; the Communist threat became much more real. According 
to Bernard Pall, the Laotian crisis began to resemble the 
Spanish Civil War; Western (mainly U.S.) and Communist powers, 
respectively, continued or began to use various Laotian factions
123as proxies for their own confrontation on Laotian soil.
Moreover, in all of the almost two decades of the second
Indochina war, the I96O-I962 period was "the only time
during which Laos was for the United States much more than
124a mere side show to the conflict in Vietnam."
Captain Kong-Le, a nationalist and neutralist army
commander of the best unit in the Royal Lao Army, the Second
Lao Paratroop Battalion, precipitated the i960 crisis, by
executing a coup d'etat on August 9, and occupying all of
Vientiane. Kong-Le explained the aims of his coup: to bring
an end to the Laotian civil war; to rid Laos of foreign troops;
and to stop and suppress those who "were making their harvest
off the backs of the people." He explained his motives for
overthrowing the government :
What leads us to carry out this revolution is our 
desire to stop the bloody civil war; eliminate grasping 
public servants (and) military commanders...whose property
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amounts to much more than their monthly salaries can 
afford; and chase away foreign armed forces as soon as 
possible.... It is the Americans who have bought govern­
ment officials and army commanders and caused war and 
dissension in our country....We must help each other, 
drive these sellers of the fatherland out of the country 
as soon as possible. Only than can our country live in 
peace.125
Kong-Le called on Souvanna Phouma to head and organize a 
new, truly neutral government. Souvanna Phouma organized a 
new cabinet and headed the new legitimate recognized govern­
ment .
The following events illustrate American intervention/ 
penetration of Laos and the crosscurrents in American policy 
toward Laos. The United States, which continued to have 
doubts about Souvanna’s orientation to the Pathet Lao, 
pressured Souvanna to form a coalition government which 
included Phoumi but excluded the Pathet Lao. Convinced of 
Souvanna’s neutrality, Winthrop Brown, the new U.S. Ambassador 
to Laos, supported Souvanna’s newly-created neutralist govern­
ment; J. Graham Parsons, new Assistant Secretary of State for Far 
Eastern Affairs, temporarily tended to support Brown’s actions 
and recommendations. However, Secretary of State Herter was 
indecisive; he was suspicious of Souvanna, but he suspected 
that Phoumi’s army might bungle a coup d ’etat overthrowing 
Souvanna's government. The CIA, the Pentagon, and its 
military advisors of PEG, favored Phoumi Nosavan. The 
Pentagon and CIA officials in Laos wanted to provide Phoumi
T p ̂
with full American support and give him free rein.
Washington instructed Brown to find a pro-Western substitute
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for Souvanna. While Brown delayed implementing his instruc­
tions and argued for Souvanna, the Pentagon and CIA "turned
127once again to their protege— Phoumi Nosavan." Throughout
September, the CIA and the Pentagon advisors continued to
aid Phoumi forces. CIA officials used their own private air
corps— Air America— to give Phoumi's troops a military supply 
128system.
Despite his agreement with Souvanna Phouma, Phoumi flew 
to his Savarnakhet headquarters (in Southern Laos) in September 
i960 and formed a countercoup committee against Souvanna's 
government in which he was a nominal member. He announced 
the establishment of a new revolutionary group nominally 
headed by Prince Boun Oum, head of one of the three major 
political dynasties in Laos and a venerated prince from the 
South. This Southern faction has always had close relations 
with Thailand. A week later, with America's tacit support, 
Thailand closed supply routes to Vientiane and instituted a 
blockade. The CIA and the Pentagon channeled all supplies, 
including those intended for Vientiane, through Savannakhet. 
Moreover, two hundred Laotian paratroops, who had been train­
ing in Thailand under America's sponsorship, were turned over 
to Phoumi, even though Washington had made a promise to 
Souvanna to the contrary. This military assistance to Phoumi 
strengthened him against the established government rather 
than the Pathet Lao.^^^
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Souvanna Phouma pleaded with American officials for
supplies and for assistance in overcoming the Thai blockade,
however, no help was forthcoming. Thus, Souvanna looked to
the left— both domestically and internationally. Domestically,
he began talks with Pathet Lao representatives aimed at
bringing them back into the national community. Internationally,
he turned to the Soviet Union for aid. He announced the
establishment of a Soviet embassy and diplomatic relations
with the Soviet Union. Souvanna sought help from the Soviet
Union, thus "proving," according to Washington officials, his
pro-Communist tendencies. In reaction to Souvanna’s actions,
the United States suspended the Royal Government’s monthly
p a y m e n t s . H o w e v e r ,  Ambassador Brown interceded and
offered Souvanna a compromise. Aid would be resumed if
Souvanna would officially permit the United States to continue
providing General Phoumi with military assistance. In return,
Phoumi pledged to send his forces against the Pathet Lao.
Souvanna Phouma agreed, only to be overthrown by Phoumi two
months later. It became obvious that ’’the United States
131was backing two horses in a race only one could win."
The State Department was backing the recognized legitimate 
government of Souvanna Phouma; both Brown and Parsons wished 
to resume aid to Souvanna to prevent his dependence on the 
Soviet Union. Anti-communism was all that mattered to the 
Pentagon and CIA. The Pentagon viewed Souvanna as an 
"accommodator" who had no moral principles, and objected to
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State Department officials support for a "collaborationist 
government" including the Pathet Lao. They had great con­
fidence in Boun Oum and Phoumi and in their determination 
to resist communism. In late October, a U.S. delegation, 
including Parsons, was sent to Laos to confer with Souvanna; 
Parsons demanded that Souvanna abandon his policy of neutrality. 
Since Souvanna had already been denied most of the help which 
the United States could have given, he refused to succomb 
(to U.S. demands). Shortly thereafter, the United States
decided that the legally-constituted government of Souvanna
188Phouma "must go." Souvanna was fighting for political 
survival and had no where to turn but to the Pathet Lao with 
which he concluded an agreement on a coalition government.
On November l6 , I960, Souvanna announced his government's 
decision to establish "good neighbor relations" with China 
and to send good will missions to Peking and Hanoi. He also 
began negotiations with the USSR for aid. According to 
Stevenson, Souvanna’s "willingness to establish a neutralist 
rather than communist government is shown by both his political 
dealings in November and by the fact that he delayed requesting 
Soviet assistance until American opposition to his government 
was unmistakably clear." In a sense, the CIA and Pentagon 
assessment of Souvanna's pro-communist tendencies proved to be 
a self-fulfilling prophecy. Calling him pro-communist, the 
Pentagon denied him aid. "In desperation, he turned to the
18̂ 4Soviet Union for aid, thus 'proving' the original assessment."
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Ambassador Brown attempted to avoid an open civil war.
He protested when Phoumi began his abortively-started march 
against Vientiane on November 23. Brown contended that 
Phoumi had broken his pledge not to use his equipment against 
the neutralist government. The United States suspended mili­
tary aid to Phoumi, because it feared that the Soviet Union 
was going to take the issue to the United Nations. Since 
American aid to Phoumi provided proof of U.S. complicity in 
the attack on Souvanna's government, the State Department 
wished to have a defense against this charge. The Pentagon 
was deeply angered by this decision, and encouraged Phoumi to 
continue his attacks on Kong-Le's forces and to ignore 
Washington's pressures to work with Souvanna or cease his 
offensive. Moreover, the CIA provided Phoumi with the funds 
he r e q u e s t e d . T h u s ,  in December "with plans drawn by 
his American advisors," Phoumi and his Pentagon-CIA backed 
forces marched on Vientiane.
With Phoumi moving North, on December 3 the Soviet Union 
began airlifting supplies to Kong-Le's forces, however, it 
was too little too late. After a bloody battle, Kong-Le's 
forces which were greatly outnumbered withdrew to the North 
and formed a tenuous political alliance with the Pathet Lao; 
Souvanna fled to Cambodia; this left Phoumi's forces in control 
of Vientiane and Luang Prabang. On December 13, the King 
nominated Boun Oum to form a new government. Thus, the 
Phoumi forces became the Royal Government troops and Kong-
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Le’s troops became the pro-Communist rebels. The United States 
quickly recognized the Boun Oum government and stated that "the 
responsibility for the present fratricidal war in Laos...rests 
squarely and solely upon the Soviet Government and its 
partners."^37 Exiled in Cambodia, Souvanna Phouma stated:
"What I shall never forgive the United States for is the fact 
that it betrayed me, that it double-crossed me and my govern­
ment . "^38
The Soviet Union, which had tended to ignore Southeast 
Asia before the growing Sino-Soviet rift, now felt compelled 
to try to preserve good relations with Communist parties in 
the area— especially North V i e t n a m . T h e  Soviet government 
could not stand idly by, in view of direct American support 
of one group of counter-revolutionaries. Thus, the Soviet 
Union airlifted supplies to the Pathet Lao and the Kong-Le 
forces. Between December 15 and January 2, 1961, aircraft of 
the Soviet Union and North Vietnamese flew l84 sorties to the 
Pathet Lao and Kong-Le. Kong-Le's capture of the Plaine des 
Jarres from Phoumi's forces on December 31 permitted regular 
supplies to be flown into the Plaine via the Soviet airlift.
In Washington, the Soviet airlift made all Laos questions more 
psychologically important. The United States viewed increased 
activity in Laos as a threat to the newly-established govern­
ment .
In an attempt to explain away a series of defeats and 
the rout of their troops on December 31j the Boun Oum/Phoumi
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government claimed an alleged invasion of Laos by seven North
l40Vietnamese battalions. As Haney notes, "the charge later
1^1proved to be a complete fabrication." The Kong-Le/Pathet
Lao forces were numerically inferior, but proved more than a
match for the Phoumi forces. Referring to this situation, the
Pentagon Papers note, "it turned out that the neutralist/
communist forces were far more effective than those favored by
the U.S., and so it became clear that only by putting an American
l4 2army into Laos could the pro-Western faction be kept in power."
President Eisenhower was disturbed at Phoumi's deteriorating 
military position, however, and he refused to take overt 
counteraction until he had indisputable evidence of foreign 
Communist intervention. Because of Phoumi's defeats, the 
Soviet airlifts, and the suspicions of large-scale inter­
vention by North Vietnam, U.S. policy makers viewed the situa­
tion as urgent. Since the use of American troops was a live 
option, this crisis was much greater than earlier ones invol-
1 Qving Laos.
On January 19, 1961, the President conferred with President­
elect Kennedy and briefed him on the Laotian situation:
President Eisenhower said...Laos was the key to the entire 
area of Southeast Asia. He said that if we permitted 
Laos to fall, then we would have to write off all the 
area. He stated that we must not permit a Communist take­
over . . .
As he concluded these remarks. President Eisenhower 
stated it was imperative that Laos be defended. He said 
that the United States should accept this task with our 
allies, if we could persuade them, and alone if we could 
not. He added that "our unilateral intervention would 
be our last desperate hope" in the event we were unable
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to prevail upon the other (SEATO) signatories to join 
u s .
At one time it was hoped that perhaps some type 
of arrangement could be made with Kong-Le. This had 
proved fruitless, however, and President Eisenhower said 
"he was a lost soul and wholly irretrievable."
...This phase of the discussion was concluded by 
President Eisenhower in commenting philosophically upon 
the fact that the morale existing in the democratic forces 
in Laos appeared to be disappointing. He wondered aloud 
why, in interventions of this kind, we always seem to find 
that the morale of the Communist forces was better than 
that of the democratic forces. His explanation was that 
the Communist philosophy appeared to produce a sense of dedi­
cation on the part of its adherents, while there was not 
the same sense of dedication on the part of those supporting 
the free forces.
Soon after Kennedy assumed power, the President in 
January, 1961 provided Phoumi with six AT-6 airplanes; it 
also sent 400 special forces personnel to form White Star 
Mobile Training Teams, which lived in the jungles and organized 
guerrilla activities. The Meo tribes along the Laotian- 
North Vietnamese border were the first to be organized into 
an effective anti-communist force. As the Pentagon Papers 
reveal, "the 'White Star Teams' used in Laos...had the purpose 
and effect of establishing U.S. control over foreign forces.
Also, the CIA and Pentagon continued to supply the Royal 
Laotian Army. Kennedy's decision to send Special Forces 
personnel (White Star Mobile Training Teams) escalated the 
conflict. This decision was "an early application of the 
counterinsurgency theories propounded by Roger Hilsman and 
others who hold that by using Mao Tse Tung's techniques either 
side in a civil war should be able to win. As in Vietnam in 
1961, the impending embarrassment of a weak ally's defeat pro-
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voked in Washington a drive to enlarge the struggle and
lM6foresake the possibility of a political solution." Never­
theless the Phoumi forces continued to fight and perform 
abysmally. The Pathet Lao/Kong-Le forces consolidated their 
military position on the Plaine des Jarres. In early March 
when the Kong-Le/Pathet Lao forces attacked the Sala Phou 
Khoun junction on the road from Vientiane to Luang Prabang, 
the Phoumi forces, despite American advisors, panicked and 
fled. To American policy makers, the crisis appeared to be 
reaching explosive proportions.
Having created a task force in January to review American 
policy in Laos, Kennedy delayed action on Laos and temporized. 
Various proposals for intervention were discussed, considered, 
and rejected. Agreement among the policy makers could only 
be found for increased military aid (discussed above) and a 
show of force. Without ordering any troops to Laos, Kennedy 
put the Task Force ll6 (U.S. Marines) on Okinawa on alert 
for possible intervention and ordered helicopters and supplies 
to Thai bases near Laos. Two aircraft carriers and their 
auxiliary ships were dispatched to the Indochinese coastal 
waters. Kennedy's decision to send Special Forces personnel 
(White Star Mobile Training Teams) escalated the conflict.
By March, however, Kennedy appears to have decided to 
pursue a diplomatic rather than a military solution. On 
television that day, Kennedy declared:
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I want to make it clear to the American people and to 
all of the world that all we want in Laos is peace and 
not war, a truly neutral government and not a cold war 
pawn, a settlement concluded at the conference table and 
not on the battlefield.148
However, the Pentagon Papers reveal that a May 1 meeting on 
Laos seems to have been the final time (at least for this 
crisis) at which overt intervention was considered. Kennedy 
'deferred any decision on putting troops in Laos,"^^^ however, 
instead approved "a cable alerting CINCPAC to be ready to move 
a 5,000-men task force to Udorn, Thailand and to Touraine, South 
Vietnam....The alert was intended as a threat to intervene in 
Laos, if the Communists failed to go through with the cease­
fire which was to precede the Geneva C o n fe re n c e ."^^0
The United States' decision to retreat from overt mili­
tary involvement in Laos and to seek a political settlement 
was based on the following factors :
1. The Phoumi forces, the only alternative to negotiated 
settlement or U.S. military intervention had repeat­
edly demonstrated their abysmal fighting capabilities;
2. The Pentagon opposed limited scale intervention in 
an Asian land-war and particularly after the Bay of 
Pigs fiasco were reluctant to approve intervention 
which was restricted "in terms of either territory 
or the weapons to be used;
3. The United States at the time simply did not have 
the strategic reserves necessary to mount a massive 
intervention (and U.S. intervention in Laos would 
present some difficult logistic problems);
4. U.S. Congressional leaders "had no stomach for 
further military adventures;"
5. Major allies of the United States resisted inter­
vention; and
6 . There was no conclusive evidence of North Vietnamese 
troop involvement, which could have served as a 
pretext for a major U.S. intervention.151
As Dommen notes, "the 'decision* to accept a coalition in Laos
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was virtually thrust upon the Kennedy Administration.
Dommen*s evaluation is supported by American intelligence 
estimates at the time of the Geneva Agreement. According to 
Stevenson, American intelligence officers perceived and con­
sidered the risk of Communist compliance fairly small:
They concluded that the North Vietnamese were determined 
to preserve their corridor into South Vietnam— Ho Chi 
Minh Trails— but would not overtly expand or improve 
their infiltration routes. Within Laos, U.S. experts 
thought that the Pathet Lao would try to maintain their 
de facto control, otherwise restricting their actions 
to political maneuvering.153
Nevertheless, Washington policy makers opted for the Geneva 
Conference and signed the subsequent agreement.
Roving Ambassador Averell Harriman, who perceived the need 
for a negotiated settlement earlier than most Americans, re­
ported to the President on March 29, 196I that the best option 
would be to give at least conditional support to Souvanna 
Phouma, and the best negotiated settlement for Laos was 
neutralization by international agreement, guaranteed by both 
the West and the Soviet U n i o n . T h e  American diplomatic plan 
included a cease-fire and a termination of the airlift before 
a conference could take place. The United Kingdom called for 
a new Geneva Conference on Laos, and on April 24, 1961, the 
Soviet Union joined Britain in calling for a Laotian cease­
fire and a reconvention of the Geneva Conference.
Kennedy had "rejected" overt military intervention, 
however, he demonstrated surprising willingness to permit 
extensive covert operations in Indochina. The Pentagon Papers
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showed that at a National Security Council meeting on 
April 29, 1961, Kennedy approved plans for covert operations 
to infiltrate intelligence and even assault or commando teams 
into Laos regardless of the cease-fire. A July report by 
Brigadier General E.G. Landale, a counterinsurgency expert, 
revealed other covert operations in Laos :
About 9,000 Meo tribesmen have been equipped for 
guerrilla operations which they are now conducting with 
considerable effectiveness in Communist-dominated 
territory in Laos.... Command control of the Meo operation 
is exercised by the Chief CIA Vientiane with the advice 
of Chief MAAG Laos. The same CIA paramilitary and U.S. 
military teamwork is in existence for advisory activities 
(9 CIA operations officers, 9 LIAG/Army Special Forces 
personnel in addition to the 99 Thai PARY (Police Aerial 
Resupply Unit))....There is also a local veteran’s 
organization and a grass-roots political organization 
in Laos, both of which are subject to CIA direction and 
control and are capable of carrying out propaganda, 
sabotage, and harrassment o p e r a t i o n s . ^ 5 6
Despite the concurrent negotiations at the Geneva Convention,
which began May 16 and were to last more than a year, during
which time parallel negotiations among the three Laotian
factions proceeded sporadically, the United States continued
to increase covert operations in Laos. On August 29, 1961,
according to the Pentagon Papers, President Kennedy approved;
An immediate increase in mobile training teams in Laos
to include advisers down to the level of the company,
to a total U.S. strength in this area of 500; together
with an attempt to get Thai agreement to supply an equal
number of Thais for the same p u r p o s e . ^^7
The President also approved on April 29j 1961: "An immediate
increase of 2,000 in number of Meos being supported to bring
the total to a level of 11,000."^^8 This continuing covert
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military support and the intransigence of the Laotian rightist
faction led by Prince Boun Oum/Phoumi Nosavan encouraged by the
Pentagon and CIA, and Thailand were the major stumbling blocks
159in the path of a negotiated settlement.
Phoumi Nosavan was the biggest obstacle to a negotiated
settlement. As one Washington official stated, "Our major
problem was to get Phoumi and his people to accept the facts
of life that a military solution was impossible and that a
negotiated settlement was the only possible solution.
Nevertheless, in June 196I, Pentagon officers encouraged by his
anticommunism, agreed to support an increase of his army to
60,000. This increased aid reinforced his resistance to a
coalition government. In December, Phoumi launched a series
of "probing actions" deep into Pathet Lao territory. According
to Hugh Toye, British military attache to Laos, these probes in
central and northern Laos, were in "areas where his opponents
could be expected to be sensitive and where probes would provoke
military reactions which could then be used as excuses for
delay on the political f r o n t . B y  January 1962, Phoumi's
drive collapsed. His tactics were designed, however, not to
gain territory but to tear apart the fragile cease-fire and
disrupt the Geneva discussions. In these maneuvers, he was
162supported by the CIA. In the meantime, Boun Oum rejected
the division of portfolios in a proposed coalition government 
and refused to confer with Souvanna Phouma and Souphanouvong 
in order to work out a compromise. Thus, with the rightists'
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intransigence becoming more apparent, Harriman, the U.S. 
negotiator at Geneva, convinced his superiors that more effec­
tive pressure or drastic action was necessary to bring the Phoumi/ 
Boun Oum faction into line. Fearing that the suspension of 
military aid would benefit the Kong-Le/Pathet Lao forces, in 
January 1962, the U.S. withheld economic aid. Laotian economic 
dependence on U.S. aid forced Boun Oum back to Geneva to 
resume negotiations.
Phoumi Nosavan was more intransigent. In reaction to 
Phoumi's probing actions and air attacks from Nam Tha, the 
Pathet Lao in January 1962 clearly broke the cease-fire and 
moved close enough to Nam Tha to mortar the airfield. Dis­
regarding American advice, Phoumi responded by increasing 
his troops at Nam Tha to 5,000 by the end of January. Fighting 
between the Phoumi/Pathet Lao forces continued through spring.
Once again, Averell Harriman suggested the use of sanctions 
against Phoumi; the February U.S. aid payment was not made. 
Moreover, Harriman obtained the removal of the CIA Station 
Chief, Jack Hazey, of whom Harriman had suspected (and was 
later proven correct) of counteracting the aid suspension by 
supplying CIA funds to Phoumi's forces. Besides backing Phoumi 
in his venture, the CIA had counselled Phoumi against agreeing 
to a coalition government. In March, Harriman met with
Phoumi and bluntly told him that "the Phoumist forces were
l64finished in Laos if they did not agree to a coalition."
But the Nam Tha crisis had already reached the threshold stage.
239
In February, fearing that the fall of Nam Tha would pro­
vide the Chinese an easy land corridor into his country,
Marshall Sarit of Thailand moved Thai troops to the northern
Lao-Thai border. Thailand, thus, became a stumbling block 
to an agreement. However, Harriman who met with Sarit explained 
American policy to Laos in blunt and unambiguous terms. Sarit 
agreed not to give Phoumi his military support, and later 
urged Phoumi to accept the coalition.
Pathet Lao attacks on Nam Tha intensified and in early 
May Phoumi charged that the Pathet Lao were backed by North 
Vietnamese and Chinese troops. Believing their own propaganda, 
Phoumist forces abandoned Nam Tha. Haney describes the Nam 
Tha crisis and denouement:
Accounts differ as to whether there actually was a battle 
of Nam Tha. Apparently there was not, "only the 
possibility of one." Whatever the case, Phoumi’s troops 
fled in panic toward the Mekong River town of Ben Houei
Sal and crossed into Thailand. Once again Phoumi cried
"wolf!" and this time not Just "North Vietnamese!" but 
"Chinese Wolf!" Amid the panic and confusion rumor had 
it that an attack on Ben Houei Sai was imminent. So 
Phoumi troops fled across the Mekong into Thailand.
An American patrol, displaying more courage, probed 
back toward Nam Tha. They encountered only scattered 
Pathet Lao patrols, no Vietnamese or Chinese. One 
American officer displaying a sense of humor, undoubtedly 
necessary for his work as military adviser to Phoumi’s 
troops reported to his superiors : "The morale of my
battalion is substantially better than in our last 
engagement. The last time they dropped their weapons , 
and ran. This time they took their weapons with them."^°2
After the Nam Tha fiasco. President Kennedy deployed 
3,000 U.S. troops to Thailand, however no U.S. overt inter­
vention in Laos was forthcoming. However, the Pentagon Papers 
reveal a continued focus on and support of covert operations.
240
A June 19, 1962 report recommended the increased use of third-
country personnel, paying particular attention to
The whole range of this concept from the current limited 
use of Thai and Filipino technicians in Laos to the 
creation of simply equipped regional forces for use in 
remote Jungle, hill, and desert country. Such forces 
would be composed of foreign volunteers supported and 
controlled by the U.S.loo
Nevertheless, despite continuing covert operations, after the
Nam Tha defeat progress toward a neutral Laos and a coalition
government came quickly. The princes agreed on the composition
of the cabinet, and on July 23 the Geneva Conference approved
the neutralization declaration and gave official sanction to
the new Government of National Union. As David Wise notes.
After a decade of humiliating reverses and the expenditures 
of close to half a billion dollars, the United States 
policy had come full circle: during the 1950’s Souvanna
Phouma and his plans for a neutral Laos had been opposed 
with all the power of the Invisible Government (CIA); 
now the United States was ready to settle for even less 
than it could have had five years earlier at a fraction 
of the cost.lo?
Washington suspected the Communists, especially China and 
North Vietnam, of harboring aggressive designs in Laos, and 
proceeded to use these suspicions to justify much of their own 
intervention in Laos. The Pentagon Papers * dominant concern 
is with "Communist expansion" perceived as part of an inter­
national great power contest. Although at points a distinction 
is made between the interests of Hanoi, Moscow, and Peking,
the final Judgment leans to coordinated communist bloc 
1 fiRstrategy. For example, referring to the increasing insurgency 
in South Vietnam at the end of the fifties, the Pentagon Papers
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state: "Whatever differences in strategy may have existed
among Moscow, Peking, and Hanoi, it appears that at each 
critical Juncture Hanoi obtained concurrence in Moscow with 
an aggressive course of action.
The Kennedy Administration inherited the Indochinese 
commitment at a "critical juncture in Soviet-Chinese rela­
tions: The faltering of the seemingly monolithic structure
170of the socialist camp." Neither the United States nor 
the Laotian and Vietnamese Communist leaders perceived that the 
Indochinese conflict would intensify Sino-Soviet discord; more­
over, the rift would effect both Peking's and Moscow's strategy 
and actions in Indochina. The Kennedy Administration misread 
the nature of the struggle. As Marek Thee, a Polish delegate 
to the ICC, observes in Notes of A Witness, the Sino-Soviet 
rift and the Indochinese Left were totally underrated. The 
contest was viewed mostly as a key battle in the global con­
frontation with expanding Communism.
Thus Washington paid more attention to Moscow and Peking 
than to Hanoi and the Neo Lao Hak Sat (Pathet Lao). In 
1961-62 the Soviet Union, because it maintained the air­
bridge to Laos, was actually seen as the chief adversary, 
and U.S. strategy paid great attention to Moscow moves. 
Signs of Soviet reluctance to continue Laotian involve­
ment thus encouraged the U.S. to aim for victory.^^1
In the 1950's and until the Sino-Soviet split, a Euro-
centered vision of international relations which gave preference
to Europe over Asia, to the preservation of the post-World
War II status quo over revolutionary change dominated Soviet
172attitudes and outlook. Over the years, the Soviet Union
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vacillated in its support of Asian revolutionaries, and 
Khrushchev himself never demonstrated much interest in 
Southeast Asia. As Marek Thee notes, "Contrary to tendencies 
in Peking, Khrushchev strongly opposed a militant line in 
Indochina, and he adhered to this policy until the moment
1 7  15of his removal from office."
The Soviet Union became involved in Laos in 196O for
three major reasons. First, the Soviet "sought to control a
crisis through which its Asian allies might draw it into a
174larger conflict." Thus, its first objective was to keep
the war from growing out of proportion or getting out of hand.
The second reason the Soviet Union became involved was because
of its recent competitive relations with China. In view of
the sharpening political and ideological controversy between
the two nations, and due to the clash at the conference of
the Communist parties in Moscow earlier that year, the Soviet
Union felt obliged to act. Soviet involvement was to provide
evidence of active help to liberation movements. Thirdly,
while checking its own allies, a Soviet political-military
position in Laos could provide the Soviet Union with a good
bargaining card in negotiations with the United States over
Berlin, etc. Involvement in Laos was perceived as enhancing
175the Soviet's international and diplomatic position. Until 
Phoumi Nosavan's countercoup, the Soviet Union made some gains 
at the expense of the United States without much risk to them­
selves. However, once Phoumi/Boun CUm ascended to power, the
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Soviet's newly-achieved position was threatened and the credi­
bility of their professed support to "wars of national liberation" 
was questioned. Thus, the Soviet airlift and arms buildup to
the Pathet Lao/Kong-Le forces in early 1961 were "to preserve
1 7their gains and to prove their credibility." Between December
i960 and early 1962, the Soviet Union airlifted a little more
than 3,000 tons of supplies to the Pathet Lao and Kong-Le
forces. The Pentagon Papers reveal that this aid greatly worried
177American policy makers, however, as Stevenson points out, 
it was "an amount which the 17,800 men of a typical U.S. Army 
infantry division would consume in less than four days."^^^
The Soviet Union did not wish to confront the United 
States in Laos and "was quite willing to put Laos on the shelf 
and get on with more important issues like Berlin and disarma­
ment."^^9 The Soviet Union wanted a negotiated political 
settlement for Laos. The Soviet Union responded encouragingly 
to the British note of March 23 which suggested a reconvening 
of the Geneva Conference; it expressed a willingness to appeal 
with the British for a cease-fire. Khrushchev told Ambassador
Thompson, "If we keep our heads and do nothing provocative, we
T R ncan find a way out of our problem in Laos."
The expansion of U.S. involvement in Indochina in I96O
exacerbated and deepened the rift between Moscow and Peking.
As Thee notes :
While China’s attitudes toughened, the Soviet Union 
showed a tendency toward appeasement. Peking saw danger 
moving nearer to its borders and was not ready to surrender; 
Moscow took the resolution and tenacity of the U.S. mili­
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tary very seriously, and offered concessions. Although 
China was careful to steer clear of an open military 
clash with the United States, It thought that the greatest 
support must be given to Vietnamese and Laotians holding 
foreground positions on Its borders. Peking's reaction 
to military pressures was not resignation but preparedness 
for protracted struggle. The Soviet Union, however, 
considered the risks too great. Moscow wanted to avoid 
confrontation with the United States, especially In 
faraway Indochina. Its main policy was "peaceful co­
existence" and the objective seemed worth any price 
paid by the Indochinese...
Although the International set up following U.S. 
escalation In Laos compelled the Soviet Union to extend 
aid to Hanoi, this did not allow Moscow to dominate 
decisions In North Vietnam.
The Soviet Union faced the problem of bringing their 
Communist allies Into line. The Pathet Lao, with their 
continual and mounting victories over the Phoumlst forces, 
were not willing to cease, and might have launched their 
offensive attacks In March and April without Moscow's know­
ledge.^®^ The North Vietnamese were also against a cease­
fire at this time. The North Vietnamese thought In terms of 
maintaining the status quo; they did not want either a coalition 
government or larger military operations. This approach 
supported Hanoi's prime concern, to maintain communication 
lines with South Vietnam. Hanoi's approach suited the Pathet 
Lao for a different reason— the postponement of a coalition 
government could well serve to strengthen and expand their 
political and military gains achieved during the past year.
From i960, the Chinese, who believed that the Russians wanted 
"peace at any price" denounced all Soviet (and American) pro­
posals for accommodation with the capitalist. "The Chinese 
were resolved not to make concessions, and to follow an Inde-
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pendent line in Indochina without heeding Soviet policy demands." 
Nevertheless, the chances for convening the Geneva Conference 
were good, since Communist China, too, "seemed interested in 
a political solution that would eliminate any possibility that 
U.S. ground forces would one day enter Laos and appear on China's
1 Q 2lsouthern borders." The Soviet leaders' only leverage was
their logistical support, however, the Russians were no more
willing to cease helping their clients, the Pathet Lao/Kong-
Le forces than were the Americans. With Soviet support and
influence, Souvanna Phouma, who proceeded to visit Hanoi,
Peking, and the Pathet Lao/Kong-Le forces, must be credited
1with bringing the Communists to Geneva. The Soviet Union's,
the Pathet Lao's, and Hanoi's approaches were reflected in a
1962 conversation Soviet Ambassador A.N. Abramov had with
Marek Thee. Thee notes:
Abramov dwelled in some detail on Khrushchev's conversation 
with Souphanouvong after the Zurich meeting, and he 
recalled that Khrushchev's main concern had been to 
tighten the alliance between the Pathet Lao and Souvanna 
Phouma, with the aim of forming a coalition government.
...he (Khrushchev) insisted on the overriding need for 
a peaceful solution to the Laotian problem.
...Moscow had a clear awareness of its differences 
with the Pathet Lao and Hanoi, and Abramov was disturbed 
that this divergent trend persisted. From his conversa­
tion with Khrushchev, Abramov said, Souphanouvong seemed 
to have chosen those points which suited a hard line, 
while reflecting the guiding principles of the line 
suggested; this was a reflection of essentially different 
approaches to the Laotian problem. While the Soviet Union 
was convinced that, of the burning international problems, 
the question of Laos was best suited to an exemplary 
peaceful solution, the local perspective inside Indo­
china seemed different. Hanoi, Abramov concluded, was 
particularly worried about developments in South Vietnam „ 
and rather inclined to ignore the international context.^"'
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Since China shares over 200 miles of border with Laos,
Laos and America's penetration of it (South Vietnam and 
Thailand) presented a vital national security rather than 
ideological issue. Due to these considerations, China followed 
a cautious foreign policy and did not become actively involved 
in the conflict. Marek Thee gives a concrete example of the 
Chinese orientation and their concern not to become involved 
and not to escalate the Laotian conflict.
In one of his angry reactions to Nosavan's war moves, 
Souvanna Phouma, without even consulting the Neo Lao Hak 
Sat, had requested Chinese jet pilots to defend Laotian 
airspace; he hoped to receive the planes from the Soviet 
Union and asked China for pilots. Liu Chun explained 
to me in great detail that the Chinese Peoples' Republic 
had refused because it did not want to be accused of 
intervention, and did not want to create a pretext for 
an escalation of the conflict. Transactions involving 
military personnel must be considered with great prudence, 
Liu Chun emphasized.loo
Peking established diplomatic and economic relations with
Laos. On October 7> 1961, a Chinese Consul was established
in Phong Saly, and on November 5, a Chinese economic-cultural
delegation went to Laos.
In a note to the British and Russians, Peking stated
"its 'sacred duty' was to uphold the Geneva Accords, as well
l8gas to 'take measures to safeguard its own security.'"
On December 28, I960, the Chinese called for the ICC to re­
convene and to deal with Souvanna Phouma not Boun Oum. Since 
an imposed Laotian Communist government would increase the 
chances of U.S. intervention, Peking favored a neutral buffer 
s t a t e . ^90 In March 1961, in the Peking Review, the Chinese
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government observed that "though the military situation in
Laos (was) becoming increasingly unfavorable to the Laotian
191(Rightist) rebel group" the Laotian war was "in danger of
being extended," and "the patriotic troops and civilians of
Laos still face a difficult and complex struggle in defeating
192the enemy’s military intervention and political intrigues."
Thus, Peking, being aware of no Soviet backing or "hard line" 
approach, agreed to negotiation on Laos. Peking favored 
negotiations and did not wish to upset the negotiations which 
would create a neutral coalition government; this was reflected 
in the Chinese Red Army "Military Papers" (prepared for top- 
level internal use only), which stated that "The Laotian 
revolutionary strength is greater now (196I) than before and 
there is strong desire to have a government that wants peace­
ful neutrality. If we support this government we are actually
ig-3supporting the revolutionary strength."
During the I96O-I962 period, China was content to see
the Soviet Union confront the United States. China (especially
with no Soviet support) did not want a bigger war on her borders
(another Korean War); however, Peking deeply mistrusted the
United States’ peace pronouncement because of U.S. military
presence in Indochina. Moreover, the Sino-Soviet rift and the
American-Soviet dialogue made Peking suspicious of the Soviet
leaders’ intentions. As Thee notes :
Khrushchev’s statements and behavior led the Chinese to 
wonder if Moscow did not feel that as a superpower it 
had more in common with the United States than with 
China. It seemed that Moscow had opted for the status
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quo and had concluded that more interests united the 
Soviet Union and the United States than divided them.
"We need nothing from the United States, and you require 
nothing that we have," was Khrushchev’s toast at the 
White House dinner. Was this an allusion to China's 
territorial claims on the Soviet U n i o n ? . . . ^94
With the fear of Soviet-American "collusion," a hostile or
at least untrustworthy (the Sino-Soviet rift had not yet
fully crystallized) Soviet Union on one border, and the
perceived aggressive America on another border, Peking pro-
195ceeded prudently during this period.
Neither Moscow nor Peking were capable of controlling 
to their liking the pace of events In Indochina; neither were 
able to dictate strategy to the Left (Kong-Le/Pathet Lao) In 
Laos. As Thee notes, "the Indochinese Left always fought 
vigorously to keep its independence. Beneath their state­
ments of revolutionary brotherhood and ideological relation­
ship with Moscow or Peking, there always ran a strong
196consciousness of the real national content of the struggle."
Similar philosophic orientations and common interests in 
the Indochinese struggle have forged strong alliances between 
the North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao. During the 196O-I962 
period (as well as other periods when a rightist pro-American 
government controlled the Laotian government), the Pathet Lao 
and North Vietnamese perceived the Vientiane government as an 
agency of foreign interests. According to their view, the 
civil war in Laos could not be isolated; "it was a protracted 
war on the entire Indochinese peninsula. Hanoi became 
involved because the same foreign interests were aligned
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198against its own national aspirations. In addition, North
Vietnam has a direct interest in Laos since Laos abuts on 700 
miles of highly vulnerable North Vietnamese border area and 
offers the best avenue of approach to South Vietnam. (Both 
factors are vital in the current South Vietnamese civil war.)
Thus, North Vietnam's national interest and security is involved 
in its support for the Pathet Lao. In a divided and at times 
(196O-I962) unfriendly Laos, the Pathet Lao and its territory 
serves as a strong military buffer.
North Vietnam has two fundamental objectives or reasons 
for its involvement in Laos. Its primary concern is to main­
tain communication lines with South Vietnam by operating the 
Ho Chi Minh Trail, the infiltration system to the South. Its 
second concern is to maintain a buffer zone along its borders, 
particularly in Sam Neua and Phong Saly provinces, by supporting 
the Pathet Lao.
In order to have access to the South, according to Langer 
and Zasloff,* the North Vietnamese operate the Ho Chi Minh 
Trail as if it were a strategic rear area of South Vietnam.
Using both Vietnamese and Lao laborers. North Vietnamese engineer
*Langer and Zasloff, who did a Rand study, exhibit a myopic 
focus on North Vietnam intervention and completely ignore that 
of the United States. They also tend to accept as fact ques­
tionable charges of "North Vietnamese invasion;" their work 
lacks objectivity and impartiality and must be read critically.
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units maintain and repair existing roads and bridges and build 
new ones for intermittent motor vehicle, bicycle, animal, and 
human transportation. Until 1964, the activity along the trail 
was light.^99 a U.S. Department of State publication. Aggression 
from The North: The Record of North Vietnam's Campaign to Con­
quer South Vietnam, indicates that regular activity was light; 
infiltration over these routes began in late 1959 but until 
1964 most of the personnel infiltrating through Laos into 
South Vietnam were native Southerners who had gone north after 
the 1954 Geneva A g r e e m e n t . A c c o r d i n g  to the U.S. Government, 
80 percent of all the North Vietnamese soldiers, which the U.S. 
believes to be in Laos, are located or stationed in southern
Laos, which demonstrates the priority given to the Ho Chi Minh
201Trail by the North Vietnamese. The North Vietnamese are
willing to fight to protect their investment in this vital 
artery to South Vietnam, however, during the I96O-I962 period, 
the Phoumist forces offered no challenges. (The Ho Chi Minh 
Trail which is intimately linked to the prosecution of the war 
in South Vietnam, had no military value in the Laotian civil 
war. )
The second principal concern of the North Vietnamese— to 
maintain a buffer zone— involved the supporting and strengthening 
of the Pathet Lao which controlled the provinces adjacent to 
the DRV. Moreover, the North Vietnamese wanted (and have) to 
prevent the regions of Sam Neua and Phong Saly from becoming 
sites for hostile activities. It became concerned when CIA
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covert teams mobilized some of the Meo tribesmen for counter­
insurgency activity on both sides of the frontier in the struggle 
against the DRV. Thus during the period 196O-I962, the North 
Vietnamese provided the Pathet Lao with military supplies and 
support, economic and technical help, and political support.
In Khang Khay, Hanoi maintained a military committee whose 
main function was to channel supplies and aid to the forces of 
the government (before Souvanna’s fall) and the Pathet Lao. 
Vietnamese staff officers aided in military planning. Hanoi 
kept in close contact through the Vietnamese Doan 959 (Group 
959), which was the key instrument through which North Vietnam 
furnished advice to the Lao leadership; Doan 959 is located 
near Hanoi. Strategic planning was a joint enterprise; the 
North Vietnamese provided advisory personnel in some of the 
main battles in the northern provinces. The main purpose of 
the Vietnamese advisory effort is to improve the effectiveness 
of Lao operations. According to Thee, both the battles at 
Tha Thom and Ban Padong, the Meo stronghold,(both in a pro­
vince adjacent to North Vietnam) had been won by Vietnamese
202support; the Vietnamese were mainly in charge of artillery.
This supports Toye who suggests that, on occasion, in addition 
to advisors, the DRV aided the Pathet Lao with mortar detach­
ments. There is no evidence of North Vietnamese troops in other
201major battles (i.e., Nam Tha) during this period, however, 
this does not mean that there was no North Vietnamese involve­
ment at all. As noted above, the DRV supplied advisors and
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material to the Pathet Lao, but not regular troops. Moreover, 
about one thousand Vietnamese drivers were in Laotian service, 
while about twenty thousand were employed in cleaning and 
repairing roads. According to Thee, from February to May 
1961, "with the intensification of the fighting caused by 
increased U.S. intervention, the Vietnamese had lost in Laos 
some seven hundred dead and wounded soldiers and auxiliary 
personnel.
Additionally, the Soviet aid program, which was mounted 
on an emergency basis, was channelled through the DRV, and the 
North Vietnamese had a key role in its distribution. However, 
a September I961 memorandum (Soviet) expressed dissatisfaction 
with Hanoi’s handling of Soviet aid to Laos. The Soviet Union 
charged that Souvanna Phouma and the neutralist forces had 
received inadequate supplies, resulting in a weakening of 
the alliance between Souvanna Phouma and the Neo Lao Hak Sat 
which the Soviet Union emphasized was needed for the future 
coalition government; the Soviet leaders, who perceived this
*As late as 1974, the exact relationship between the 
Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese military high command is not 
yet totally known. As noted, many observers (i.e., Pall) 
perceived it as a joint military command, however. Langer 
and Zasloff in their Rand study tend to assume that the North 
Vietnamese make all basic decisions about military activities 
in Laos. There is as yet little evidence to support this 
point of view. Langer and Zasloff’s contention appears to 
be based almost entirely on the revelations of one North 
Vietnamese officer. Captain Mai Dai Hap, who defected to the 
RLG in December 1966. Neither Hap’s rank nor his advisory 
role to the Pathet Lao suggest that his testimony or know­
ledge affords much solid evidence of the relationship between 
high commands.
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move as another Indication of Hanoi’s opposition to a coalition
government, "urged a reversal of the current trends, pleading
for long-range commitments of cooperation with Souvanna 
20 RPhouma." Additionally, many of the supplies slated for
Laos had not been shipped by Hanoi. One of the examples
mentioned to Thee by Soviet Ambassador Abramov was "that out
of 23j000 tons of gasoline delivered to Hanoi for Laos, only
990 tons so far had reached Laos, even though the gasoline
shortage was s e v e r e . F o l l o w i n g  the Soviet memorandum,
and a consultative Communist conference In Hanoi, the North
Vietnamese agreed to stop delay In delivery and alterations
In assignments. The Soviet Union agreed that all aid would
continue to go through Hanoi, but quotas were established
for the government of Souvanna Phouma and the Neo Lao Hak Sat—
the former would receive three-fifths and the latter two-fifths
of all the official supplies. However, agreement between
Hanoi and Moscow on the flow of aid did not erase mutual 
207mistrust.
During the 196O-I962 period, the Vietnamese and Laotians, 
acting Independently at times and on purely nationalistic 
grounds, resisted U.S. Interference. Neither the Soviet Union 
nor China were fully consulted, since the Soviet Union 
objected to a military entanglement and China appeared re­
luctant to repeat the Korean experience. Being concerned above 
all with their own national problems, the Pathet Lao and North 
Vietnamese were "dismayed both by the abrupt cessation of Soviet
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military aid in 1962 and by the subsequent cleavage between
208Moscow and Peking."
According to Langer and Zasloff’s Rand study, a number of 
factors explain the Pathet Lao reliance and dependency on the 
North Vietnamese:
During the two decades (1950-1970) that they have 
depended on North Vietnam for advice and assistance, the 
Lao Communist...found themselves sharing many of the 
interests of their Vietnamese allies. Both parties 
opposed French colonial rule....They faced a common 
enemy: first France, and then the United States. They
also held a similar view of the world and of the desirable 
solutions to its problems....The great scarcity of human 
and material resources in the Communist zone has encouraged 
the Lao to turn for assistance to the North Vietnamese.
The NLHS zone is handicapped by a small and dispersed 
population, a dearth of trained military and civilian 
personnel, and lack of organizational experience in 
civilian and military affairs. It has poor communi­
cations, and few production facilities that would allow 
the Lao to maintain their political and military struggle 
out of indigenous resources. Since their enemy has been 
able to draw on the support of a rich outside power, 
the United States, it is not unnatural for them to look 
to North Vietnam....From their own perspective, the Lao 
Communist have not compromised their legitimacy as a 
nationalist movement by their dependency on Hanoi.209
The Pathet Lao dependence on the North Vietnamese increased 
during these years of coup and countercoup; however, it was a 
limited dependency since the terrain itself inhibits communi­
cation and transportation and additionally, the North Vietnamese 
lacked the capabilities to fill Pathet Lao deficiencies and 
shortages. (This provided the Pathet Lao unconsciously perhaps 
with time to develop some of their own manpower.) These points 
are acknowledged in a Soviet statement made to Thee by Tchivilev;
255
(The Russians) felt that a political solution was 
necessary to give the Pathet Lao time to digest their 
victories. Events had surpassed Pathet Lao capabilities.
Used to guerrilla war and jungle conditions, to the 
countryside and village activity, they found it difficult 
to cope with new circumstances, they lacked political 
cadres and military experts to deal with administration, 
political, and military problems. Of course, Tchivilev 
added, the Vietnamese were helpful in this situation 
(but it was time to move from military to political 
solution).
The concept of the Pathet Lao as a legitimate and independent 
force is supported by the following statement made by Bernard 
Fall in 1965:
That the Pathet Lao could be considered as such a threat—  
not as a puppet of North Vietnam— is perhaps best evi­
denced by the fact that, since the late 1950's, Thai 
police and intelligence keep picking up evidence of a 
Pathet Lao political subversive network among the Lao­
speaking people of Northwest Thailand....The reported 
creation in Hanoi of a joint operation staff for Laos 
and Vietnam with Chinese, North Vietnamese, and Pathet 
Lao "military and political officers," is, if true, 
another indication that the Pathet Lao is more than a 
mere adjunct of the Vietnamese Communist Party.211
During this period of chaos and crisis (1960-1962 period),
the Laotian Left supported by North Vietnamese and Soviet aid
had made significant territorial gains. Neither the Pathet
Lao nor the North Vietnamese were anxious for a negotiated
settlement at this time. Nevertheless, due to the pressure
exerted by the Soviet Union, Souvanna Phouma's diplomatic trip
to Hanoi and the Pathet Lao territory, and perhaps fear of massive
U.S. intervention, the North Vietnamese and the Pathet Lao
agreed to the Geneva Conference and the subsequent establishment
of a neutral coalition government.
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1963-1973
The 1962 Geneva Agreement, which established a tripartite 
coalition government that gave the Pathet Lao equal represen­
tation with the right-wing Phoumist forces, provided only a 
short and imperfect peace to the small Kingdom of Laos. The 
facade of cooperation, which concealed or obscured profound 
antagonisms and perhaps irreconciable disagreements, lasted 
from July 1962 until April I963. If the Laotians had been left 
completely to themselves, the different factions might have 
been able to learn to live peacefully together— or regionally 
separated. However, foreign actors encouraged by Laotian 
factionalism, continued to interfere in Laos. According to 
Stevenson:
None of the Laotian factions wanted, to give up any weapons, 
territory, or control first. Each side was jealously 
protective of its position. The Americans likewise were 
reluctant to reduce or halt support of their clients until 
their interests had been safeguarded. The same was true 
for the North Vietnamese. As a result, each party per­
ceived the actions of its antagonists as proof of a 
rejection of the understandings reached at Geneva. Cau­
tious adherence to the accords reinforced mutual suspicions. 
In less than a year the agreements had c o l l a p s e d . =12
Although different scholars and observers have blamed
213various participants for the breakdown of the agreements,
214the blame was ample, to be shared by all.
The United States withdrew its military advisors, totaling 
666 men, by the October 7 withdrawal date. The relief and 
resupply missions, particularly to the CIA-organized Meo tribes­
men, were the key contribution to the breakdown of the Geneva 
agreements. The Pathet Lao vehemently objected and protested
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the continual supplying of ammunition and aid to the Meo tribes­
men, many of whom lived in enclaves behind the cease-fire line 
in Pathet Lao controlled territory. The Pathet Lao contended 
that the CIA's "Air America" supply flights to the Meo were a 
violation of the agreements since such flights could be legally 
approved only by consensus of all three factions in the tri­
partite government. Additionally, some U.S. personnel, who 
had begun to organize, train, and advise the Meo, remained 
after the Geneva Accords as civilian coordinators of relief
supplies and covertly as guerrilla organizers. During this
215transitional period, the Meo were by no means quiescent.
As Roger Hilsman noted:
The Meo were undoubtedly troublesome to the Communist 
Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese cadre. And it should 
also be said that there were occasions of tension in 
1962 and 1963 when it was useful to have the Meo blow 
up a bridge or occupy a mountaintop in the deadly game 
of "signaling" that the United States had to play to deter, 
the Communists from adventuring with the Geneva Accords.
Thus, the Pathet Lao protests and chagrin over the continuing
supply of the Meo forces was valid and understandable.
Additionally, the AID program served as a cover for CIA
activities when the Requirements Office was established in
October 1962. The Requirements Office differed from the
former PEO or MAAG only by the fact that its personnel were
technically civilians and were not involved in field operations
advice. Despite the ostensible withdrawal of all "foreign
military personnel" as provided by the Geneva Accords, CIA
and Green Beret operations continued; there was no major pause
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In activity because of G e n e v a . S t e v e n s o n  notes that
"Americans were reportedly put into guerrilla bases with 
warnings to avoid capture, lest the United States be caught 
violating the accords. The code name for this effort was
p 1 QOperation Hardnose." To supplement its covert activities, 
the United States hired third-country nationals,* particularly 
the Thais who could operate less visibly and often without a 
language barrier.
Writing later about this transitional period after Geneva, 
Roger Hilsman, a member of the Kennedy Administration, involved 
in U.S. policy making in Laos, stated that: "Harriman,
especially, felt strongly that the United States could comply 
with both the letter and the spirit of the agreements in every 
detail, that its record should be absolutely c l e a r . A n o t h e r  
Washington official, who was intimately associated with policy
220toward Laos at this time, said "we were Simon pure until 1964." 
Evidence indicates that Americans were subverting Laotian neu­
trality and the Geneva agreements.
While the United States clearly can be held accountable 
for the failure of the 1962 Agreements, the North Vietnamese 
were not guiltless. The North Vietnamese violated the agree­
ments by withdrawing only about half of their forces in Laos.
DRV involvement was mainly in Southern Laos, where they were 
opening up the fledgling Ho Chi Minh Trail. North Vietnamese
*This will be examined in more detail with the CIA Clan­
destine Army.
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involvement in the breakdown of the Geneva Accords is obscure 
221and unclear. Stevenson notes that "although about 6,000
troops remained in Laos, these forces apparently did not
engage in significant military operations until 1964."^^2
There is no evidence indicating that North Vietnamese political
advisors encouraged the Pathet Lao to stimulate dissension among
223the neutralists. During this period, the Communist Chinese
provided only verbal support and guidance to the North Vietnamese
and Pathet Lao. In August 1962, G . Porter reports that.
Communist Chinese sources let it be known that they had 
advised the North Vietnamese against withdrawing completely 
from Laos as long as the United States supplied Meo 
maquis in Pathet Lao territory.224
The Soviet Union extricated itself from Laos after the
Geneva Agreement. The Russians continued their airlift, but
gradually dismantled it and turned supply and aid operations
over to the North Vietnamese, who improved their communication
(mainly roads) links with Laos.^^^ By reducing its support
and aid, the Soviet Union lost influence and leverage over
the North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao. In a meeting between
Harriman and Khrushchev, Stevenson reports "the Soviet leader
indicated that he no longer could restrain the pro-Communist
P P fiforces in Laos, and would not try to do so." The reasons 
for the Soviet loss of interest and subsequent disengagement 
in Laos are unclear. One explanation is that the Soviet 
leaders were preoccupied with more important affairs— the 
Cuban Missile Crisis, the Sino-Indian border war, and the
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widening Sino-Soviet rift. Perhaps the continuing struggle 
against the Americans in Laos seemed insignificant by com­
p a r i s o n . S u m m i n g  up the Soviet state of affairs in 
relation to the Asian allies on the eve of his departure,
August 26, 1962, Soviet Ambassador Abramov gave Thee an 
explanation, which totally ignored increasing U.S. activities 
in the area:
The Soviet Union, he told me, had dismantled the air­
bridge to Laos and withdrawn its crews. The ten planes 
which constituted the air-bridge had already been turned 
over to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. The Viet­
namese had enough pilots to handle the planes, and the 
Soviet Union was aiding Hanoi in training additional 
crews. The real aim was to leave responsibility for 
further development to the Asian parties; U.S. activities 
were completely omitted from this r e a s o n i n g . 228
Aid became a crucial problem for the neutralist forces;
after the termination of the Soviet airlift to the Plaine des
Jarres, the neutralist forces of Kong-Le were left with no
independent supply source. With decreasing Soviet aid and
increasing dependence on North Vietnamese aid (as were the
Pathet Lao), Kong-Le's neutralist army, which was Souvanna
Phouma's only power base, was threatened by internal dissension,
By the end of March 1963, fighting broke out between the Pathet
Lao and Kong-Le's troops. The reasons are obscure— perhaps
resulting from disagreements over the allocation of supplies
from North V i e t n a m . N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  the neutralist forces
split— one group of neutralist forces led by Colonel Deuan
Sunnalath sided with the Pathet Lao. In April, the United
States began supplying Kong-Le’s neutralist forces. Renewed
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fighting erupted between the neutralist forces; both military 
and political factors contributed to the renewal of fighting.
Souvanna Phouma/Kong-Le's reliance on the United States 
and the subsequent American supply flights to Kong-Le were 
viewed with alarm by the leftist forces. These fears were 
founded on previous suspicion and hostility which Souvanna 
Phouma incurred by tolerating continued U.S. supply operations 
to the Meo. Moreover, in February 1963, neutralist Ketsana 
Vongsavong was assassinated on the Plaine, and on April 1, 
the left-leaning neutralist Foreign Minister in Souvanna’s 
Cabinet, Quinim Pholsena, was assassinated in Vientiane. Many 
left-leaning neutralist/Pathet Lao members feared for their 
safety.
In mid-April 1964, Souvanna Phouma, Souphanouvong, and 
Phoumi Nosavan met on the Plaine des Jarres for another tripartite 
conference. This terminated in a sharp dispute on plans for 
neutralization and demilitarization of Luang Prabang, and 
subsequently turned out to be the last such meeting. Souvanna 
Phouma returned to Vientiane and on the following day, April 
19, 1964, two rightist generals, Kouprasith Abhay and Siho 
Lamphouthacoul, executed a coup d ’etat and arrested Souvanna 
Phouma. With U.S. aid still dominating the Laotian economy, 
Washington officials threatened to terminate it if Souvanna 
was not released and reinstated as the leader of the coalition 
government; however, they insisted on enlargement and reorgani­
zation of the Cabinet. Although Souvanna emerged as the undis-
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puted leader of the non-communist faction, in actuality, he 
was not so clearly in command; the coup leaders retained 
effective control over important p o l i c y . ^^0 Walt Haney notes, 
"while the form of the new government resembled the old 
coalition, the substance was clearly not the same."^^^ On 
May 2, 1964, Souvanna announced the merger of the rightist 
and neutralist factions. "The partnership was lopsided at 
best. With the rightist in effective control Souvanna 'became 
daily more of a figurehead'in a situation over which he had 
little control."
The Pentagon Papers reveal that by 1964, Souvanna had
tergiversated and cast his lot with the Americans. On May
21, Souvanna Phouma gave the United States permission to conduct
reconnaissance flights over Pathet Lao-controlled territory.
Armed escort planes were soon added to the reconnaissance
missions which we codenamed YANKEE TEAM. On June 6, 1964,
a squadron of U.S. jets attacked Pathet Lao positions on the
Plaine des Jarres in retaliation to a U.S. plane being shot
down by the Pathet Lao. A cable from Dean Rusk, Secretary
of State, on August 9, 1964, reported "Meeting today approved
in principle early initiation air and limited ground operations
in L a o s . I n  December 1964, Ambassador Sullivan, the new
U.S. Ambassador to Laos, cabled Washington that Souvanna Phouma
"fully supports the U.S. pressures program (attacks on North
Vietnamese and Pathet Lao positions) and is prepared to coop-
214erate in full."  ̂ Also, Souvanna Phouma pressed Washington
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to increase its military aid. All U.S. operations in Laos 
for the next six years would be officially explained and 
described as reconnaissance f l i g h t s , ^^5 both to protect 
Souvanna’s "neutral" government and to keep from destroying 
the facade of American adherence to the Geneva Agreement.
By early May, the Pathet Lao perceived the recent political 
events (the merging of neutralist/rightist forces, and the 
increased American military activity) as evidence of a swing 
to the right and of American penetration. The Government of 
National Union had been reduced to a coalition between Souvanna 
and the right-wing. To this day, according to Stevenson,
"Pathet Lao documents trace the collapse of the government 
to April 1964."^36 With the death of the coalition, fighting 
was renewed by mid-May. The Pathet Lao began their offensive 
which drove Kong-Le*s neutralists from the Plaine des Jarres.
According to Porter, one of the ironies of the Geneva
Agreement and the abortive experiment in Laotian neutrality
was "Moscow’s tacit acquiescence to the subversion of the tri­
ps?partite coalition government by the United States." He 
claims that the fiction of Souvanna’s "neutrality" government 
could be preserved because of the complicity of the Soviet 
Union. After 1964, Moscow continued to recognize Souvanna 
and by extension the right-wing government as legitimate. As 
Souvanna himself frankly explained to the National Assembly 
in September 1965, "If we destroyed the structure of the 
coalition government...we would no longer have the support of
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the Socialist countries, especially the USSR."^^^
The U.S. strategy of subverting Laotian neutrality, by
engineering an alignment between the neutralist and right-wing
factions which would give United States personnel freedom of
action in Laos to accomplish its objectives,* began with the
adoption of the Geneva Agreement. Explaining what prompted
Washington policy makers to accept and support a neutralist
coalition government, Roger Hilsman quotes Harriman as
saying, "If Souvanna*s government of national union breaks up,
we must be sure the break comes between the Communist and the
neutralist, rather than having them teamed up as they were
b e f o r e . "^39 Unlike his predecessors in the Far Eastern
Bureau who believed Souvanna was pro-communist, Harriman
believed that Souvanna actually favored alignment with the
24oWest against the Pathet Lao; and that Souvanna could be 
persuaded to cooperate with the right-wing against the left,
"if he received a guarantee of American support for him as head 
of government— something he had always been denied in the
241past." The disintegration of Souvanna’s neutral power
base and the April coup d'etat by the right-wing provided
American policy makers with the opportunity to persuade
Souvanna to move to the right. Seemingly, with little re- 
242luctance, Souvanna was pressured by circumstances which 
persuaded him to modify his political position and to align
*These objectives will be explained below. U.S. strategy 
might have been less calculating than it appears.
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his withering neutralist faction with the right. Perhaps 
an indicator of American influence is that "nothing much 
changed in Laotian politics after the events surrounding 
the April 1964 coup."^^^ There were coup scares in July,
August and December of 1964, but government troops and 
American support and influence forestalled any attempt to 
seize power.
After the April coup d ’etat, the Americans tied their
policy to Souvanna Phouma for many reasons : he was the only
prominent Laotian leader who had not alienated one of the
major factions; he was supported by and held in high esteem
244by the Russians, French, British and some key Americans; 
he was considered the only alternative to Communism. According 
to State Department officials and the head of AID, who testi­
fied in front of a congressional committee: "If the civil
war broke out again, it is certainly conceivable, perhaps it 
would be likely, that the Communist would just extend their
pjicdomination over the whole country." ^ However, the primary
reason was to retain the symbol of neutralism. Prince Souvanna
Phouma "as a figurehead in a government dominated by military
246clients of the United States." As Stevenson notes.
The Americans supported Souvanna as the best compromise.
So long as the Royal Laotian Government was neutralist 
on paper and anti-Communist in practice— by not inter­
fering with the U.S. war effort against the North Viet­
namese— the Americans were content.247
The third phase of U.S. involvement in Laos was dominated 
by considerations for American interests in Vietnam. As Dean
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Rusk, Secretary of State, noted, "After 1963 Laos was only 
the wart on the hog of V i e t n a m . T h e  United States in­
cessantly carried out covert military operations against the 
Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese in Laos. The United States 
used bases in Northern Laos to aid in the bombing of North 
Vietnam, to gather intelligence and to perform acts of sabotage
in North V i e t n a m . T h u s ,  after 1963 "Laos, itself, was little
250more than a sideshow in the growing conflict in Vietnam."
The other major American goal in Laos, which had changed 
little since 195^, was to retain as much Laotian territory as 
possible within the American sphere of influence. Thus, after 
1963 a general attitude of anticommunism and a desire to pre­
vent Communist hegemony in territory adjacent to Thailand con­
tinued to motivate Washington policy makers.
Although U.S. strategy focused primarily on the inter­
diction of Communist supply lines through Southern Laos into 
Vietnam— Ho Chi Minh Trails— , it also included devastatingly 
heavy U.S. bombing attacks in Northern Laos, particularly in 
1968-1969. This strategic policy also entailed a steady build­
up of CIA-directed irregular forces, first in Northern Laos 
but later gradually expanding throughout the country. According 
to Branfman,
The single most notable development of the Laotian war 
has been the American refusal to supplement its ground 
combat advisers with purely American combat units. No 
nation has ever made such an extensive— and expensive—  
attempt to control foreign territory without sending 
in large numbers of its own foot s o l d i e r s . ^51
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The pattern of warfare developed by the U.S. in Laos was 
Intended to realize the two American objectives. The U.S. 
secret Laotian war was really four wars, administratively 
distinct and only partially c o o r d i n a t e d . ^^2 Two of the wars—  
codenamed Operation BARREL ROLL and Operation STEEL TIGER— ^^3 
were air wars, the other two— PAR (Forces Armee Royale) and 
the CIA Armee Clandestine— mainly ground wars. The wars' major 
operational elements did not derive from prior long-range 
strategic projections but rather were the results of day by 
day tactical decisions. The escalation of the air wars illus­
trates this point. Initially, in 1964, the few sorties flown 
were mainly directed against the Ho Chi Minh Trails and enemy 
troop concentrations. However, as more planes became available, 
bombing strikes increased to include the outskirts of inhabited 
areas, then proceeded to random air strikes, and finally cul­
minated in saturation bombing. Most other elements in the
254American "wars" underwent a similar developmental process.
The two "wars" fought by American war planes were Operation 
BARREL ROLL in Northern Laos and Operation STEEL TIGER in 
Southern Laos. The fundamental justification of the bombing 
program in Northern Laos was to halt infiltration from the 
North into South Vietnam. BARREL ROLL, which involved armed 
reconnaissance missions by U.S. jet fighters against Viet Cong 
infiltration routes and facilities in Laos, went into affect 
on December 14, 1964, and slowly increased in t e m p o . ^^5 According 
to a Pentagon official:
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It seems clear to us that there should be a gradual, 
orchestrated acceleration of tempo measured in terms of 
frequency, size, number...of activities such as BARREL ROLL. 
An upward trend...will convey signals which, in combination, 
should present to the DRV leaders a vision of inevitable 
destruction if they do not change their ways. The exact 
rate of acceleration is a matter of judgment but we con­
sider, roughly speaking, that each successive week should 
include some new act on our part to increase pressure on
H a n o i . 2 5 6
The program of twice weekly missions by four aircraft gradually
escalated. At a meeting of the National Security Council on
December 12, U.S. policy makers agreed that there would be no
public statements about armed reconnaissance operations in
2S7Laos "unless a plane were lost." If a plane were to be
downed the U.S. government would "continue to insist that we
were merely escorting reconnaissance flights as requested by
258the Laotian government."
Some of the air operations over the North were closely 
coordinated with the Clandestine Army’s ground war in the 
North. The CIA personnel, which advised the Clandestine Army, 
helped to decide on targeting for the air war in the North. 
Ambassador Sullivan was nominally in charge of all military 
operations in Laos; thus the new ambassador became known as 
"General Sullivan," or "the Field M a r s h a l l . H o w e v e r ,  within 
Laos, there were mainly supply, rescue, and reconnaissance 
aircraft under the immediate command of Americans; thus, air 
support consequently had to come from the Air Force based at 
Udorn, Thailand, and this in turn involved another bureaucracy 
which caused additional coordination problems. Working with 
the Lao, the CIA, the U.S. Air Force, and particularly, the
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U.S. Embassy personnel developed the targets for the northern
air war. According to Stevenson,
At first, air operations were few in number and often 
at the initial request of Laotian officials. The United 
States says that in 1964 there were only twenty strikes 
in Northern Laos. In 1965 the figure was 4,568, which 
would average to only about fifteen a day. The following 
year the strikes totaled 7,316. Figures since then are 
classified, but the trend line is k n o w n . 260
Bombing was the main component of the second war in Laos,
the air war in Southern Laos. In January 1965, the U.S. Army
Chief of Staff, Harold Johnson, recommended that Operation
HARRELL ROLL be "reoriented to allow air strikes on infiltration
routes in the Lao Panhandle to be conducted as a separate
program from those directed against the Pathet Lao and North
P 1Vietnamese units" in Northern Laos. This recommendation
resulted in the creation and implementation of the program
STEEL TIGER, which involved U.S. airstrikes against the infil-
P Ptration routes in Southern Laos. Since much of this region
was written off as enemy territory, the embassy imposed few
restrictions and pilots were permitted to bomb anything east
of a certain line determined by the a m b a s s a d o r F o l l o w i n g
the 1968 bombing halt over North Vietnam, activity shifted
from North Vietnam to Laos which subsequently led to increased
bombings over Laos. As Senator Symington noted.
We made a big thing in the Johnson Administration about 
stopping the North Vietnamese air strikes. But at the 
same time we were increasing in secret the air strikes 
against Laos. In fact, as the general just said, which 
I knew, orders were that if you do not need the planes 
against Vietnam, use said planes against Laos.2°^
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As a U.S. official put it, "we Just couldn’t let the planes
p ̂
rust." By 1972, approximately 70 percent of all U.S.
air strikes in Indochina were being flown against Laotian
targets; and 80 percent of these sorties "were said to be
in the region of trails including the bulk of B-52 flights.
Thus, as Stevenson notes, the war in Southern Laos escalated:
"The number of (B-52) sorties grew overtime, from a daily
average of fifty-five in 1965 to one hundred in 1967 and one
hundred fifty in 1968. After the suspension of regular bombing
of North Vietnam in November 1968, the strikes in Laos d o u b l e d .
Despite these increases, "the embassy retained and exercised
? Rtargeting approval authority." However, with the vastly 
increased air strikes and with the departure of Ambassador 
Sullivan in 1969, the limitations on U.S. air strikes designed 
to avoid the bombing of civilian targets were substantially
r e l a x e d .
The two air wars were the single most expensive item 
in the American war budget for Laos. The estimated annual 
cost of U.S. bombing over Laos in 1971 was between $1.4 and 
$2 billion. (In addition to the daily operational costs of 
the actual air raids, the air "wars" in Laos have required a 
sizeable investment of overhead capital for personnel (50,000 
at least), bases and planes.^^®)
The third and "less secret" war was fought by the Laotian 
"Forces Armee Royale" (PAR); U.S. military attaches worked 
with PAR. Although American advisors supplied full logistic.
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training and combat advisory support, PAR has been without a 
doubt, the least efficient aspect of the Laotian conflict, 
at least, from the American perspective. FAR increased 
modestly from 48,000 in 1964 to about 60,000 in 1972. The 
PAR units are equally distributed among the five Laotian 
military regions. The conflicts in which PAR was engaged 
were generally limited to the areas surrounding the principal 
towns. Although the U.S. military advisors attached to PAR 
would have liked to stimulate the Lao soldiers to undertake 
more frequent operations, they were hampered by PAR'S incom­
p e t e n c e . T h e  United States which trained the Lao soldier 
in Thailand, the Philipines, or the United States, found that
"once trained, the soldiers were subject to their Lao comman-
272ders' lethargy." The Americans attempted to encourage greater
activity by withholding rice if operations were not initiated
against communists; when the Lao complied, one observer reports,
273"it was recognition of the truth: 'no boom-boom, no rice.'"
Haney notes that "the five regional military commanders of
PAR have often been likened to warlords and seemed always
more intent on making money than on making war against the 
274Communist."
Prom 1954 to 1962, a primary U.S. objective was to im­
prove and build-up an ethnic Lao army. After 1962 (and aware 
of its abysmal record) and recognizing the legendary weakness 
of the Lao army, the United States made two basic changes 
in its ground policy. It supported the introduction
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of regular Thai units, and it created a separate army called 
the Armee Clandestine (AC) (also called the CIA Army, the 
Special Guerrilla Units— SGUS). The fourth war was conducted 
by the Armee Clandestine, under Vang Pao's command. The bulk 
of the ground fighting in recent years has been by the secret 
army of irregulars, not the FAR. Having been given the major 
responsibility for offensive ground operations in Laos, the AC, 
which is an outgrowth of the CIA-directed Meo Army of the early 
i960'5, sustained heavy losses of the Meo. Thus, by the late 
1960's, the ethnic composition of the AC had changed; it is 
now a polyglot mixture unrivaled anywhere in Asia. The indig­
enous troops are mostly Meo from the Northwest and other 
montagnard tribes from the rest of Laos. Ethnic Thai and Lao 
from Thailand are reported to make up at least 25 percent of 
the total AC. In addition, there are sizeable numbers of 
Burmese, Cambodians, Nationalist Chinese, and other mercenaries- 
all paid by the CIA. There are today approximately 35,000 
to 40,000 AC troops throughout Laos, but the bulk are concen­
trated in the Northeast.
The Armee Clandestine is part of a larger American-con- 
trolled supranational army extending throughout Southeast Asia. 
Tammy Arbuckle, a knowledgeable observer on this phenomenon, 
has written of the "American-directed Secret Army" which 
operates all through Southeast Asia. Making up its units 
are Cambodians, Vietnamese, Chinese, and Laotians, as well as 
Thais and various hill tribes, such as the Meo who have been
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active on the Plain of Jars. Its operations extend into North­
east Burma, China's Yunnam Province, North Vietnam, South 
Vietnam, Cambodia and Thailand. Laos, bordering on all the 
Southeast Asian nations, is ideal for these U.S. operations.
And the Secret Army concept fits neatly into the Guam Doctrine. 
Americans take care of the leadership, training, planning, and 
logistics. The Asians do the bulk of the fighting.^76 This 
army is oblivious to and respects no frontiers; it recognizes 
no government, and is responsible only to its American employers, 
particularly the CIA.
In many countries, the CIA is largely confined to and 
responsible for intelligence gathering, however, in Laos, it 
not only gathered the information but then recommended and 
implemented policy based on it. The AC is completely con­
trolled by the CIA; the CIA and U.S. army advisors design and 
develop strategy and operations, determine and direct air 
support, and often lead AC troops into battle. Thus, although 
the United States has not introduced ground troops into Laos; 
it has introduced another type of a r m y . ^77
The AC employs guerrilla tactic and its troops do a 
creditable job in commando offensive operations. However, 
as one American official noted, "they are better at attacking 
than d e f e n d i n g . "278 in the mid-sixties, the United States 
supported the introduction of regular units of the Thai Army* 
into Laos. The hope was that perhaps the Thai units could
*The regular Thai Army units should not be confused with 
the individual Thais who are part of the AC.
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contribute something to the ground fighting. However, Branfman 
reports that the Thai are generally regarded by the Lao military 
as rather fainthearted soldiers, "who fight well only when 
generously supplied in set-piece situations. Laotian generals 
state quite openly that they consider Thai troops absolutely 
useless in fighting guerrilla war."^^^ Thus, due to the nature 
of the AC, and the incompetence of the regular Thai Army and 
the Laotian Army (FAR), none of these ground forces offer (or 
are expected to) serious resistance to a determined communist 
ground offensive. This was illustrated in March 1970, when 
despite saturation bombing by B-52s, the Communist forces 
regained control of the Plaine des Jarres, which was being 
defended by AC/Thai/PAR troops. By 1972, two-thirds of Laos 
was under Pathet Lao control.
There is considerable ambiguity concerning the cost of 
the ground war in Laos. However, according to Senator 
Fulbright in 1969, U.S. military support costs of the Armee
280Clandestine has averaged approximately $150 million a year.
In addition, the cost of support of FAR and the Thai Army 
units operating in Laos has averaged approximately $300 million. 
According to the Moose-Lowenstein report in 1971 and Walt 
Haney, military assistance to Laos (not including Thai regu­
lars and facilities based in Thailand but used in Laos) was
valued at $162.2 million and the CIA budget at roughly (since 
it is estimated from other figures) $70 m i l l i o n . T h e  esti­
mated annual cost of U.S. bombing in Laos in 1971 was $1.4
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billion to $2 billion. U.S. economic aid to Laos totaled
$52 million; the United States "spent roughly twenty-eight
P ft Ptimes more to bomb Laos than on economic aid."
By the end of 1968, Americans were in charge of most of 
the activities that went on in Laos. American officials had 
supplanted not only the military but also the Laotian civil 
authorities in many functions and were responsive only to 
U.S. government's needs and wishes. Because of the failings 
of the Royal Lao government in every field— economic, political, 
and military— America, to achieve its objectives in Laos, found 
it necessary to intervene directly and assume control over the 
functions normally carried out by a sovereign government—  
welfare, economic management, domestic development (as well 
as the military).
Counterinsurgency warfare is political as well as mili­
tary in nature; thus, the development of an administrative 
structure which provides for the needs of the people is as much 
a military organ as it is a political one. One of the most 
critical weaknesses of the Royal Laotian Government has been 
its political and structural Inability to meet rural needs.* 
Since 85-90 percent of the population lived in the country­
side and the war was being fought there, an effective and 
honest civil administration, which could gain the loyalty of 
the peasant and which could influence the outcome of the war.
*See Chapter III.
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needed to be created. This was vital since the Vientiane 
bureaucracy was not only inefficient and corrupt, it was also 
fundamentally out of touch with developments in the rest of 
L a o s . In 1962, an American administrative structure was 
developed which paralleled that of the RLG in every important 
aspect. On paper, the Americans were to advise and work with 
the Laotians, however, in practice "the Americans ran the
p O h
show." The American effort was headed by the U.S. ambassador; 
several U.S. officials and observers agreed with one official’s 
conclusion that "the U.S. Embassy was the strongest part of the 
RLG's administrative structure in Laos."^^^ American pene­
tration of Laos is illustrated by an example given in Senate 
hearings on Laos in 1969* In October 1969, a RLG official 
queried USAID Director Mann:
You know, sir, it is customary among us to refer to the 
USAID Director as the second prime minister of Laos.
He has his own budget, his own cabinet, his own technical 
departments, his own bureaucracy. Do you really think 
that this is helping our government to d e v e l o p . 286
From 1962 to 1971, the USAID budget totaled $452 million 
or about $50 million a n n u a l l y . This money established 
such departments as agriculture, irrigation, education, rural 
development; it built schools, roads and dams; provided ferti­
lizer and a dry season rice program. Americans designed and 
financed radio programs to win over the Lao population; it 
provided and maintained minimal government services. However, 
in actuality, the American aid programs did little to strengthen 
the Royal Government and probably failed to change village atti-
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tudes of resentment toward the RLG. In fact, the programs
may have Increased village discontentment since the direct
channeling of aid to the villages emphasized American presence
and highlighted the incompetence of the RLG. The Laotians
learned that to get things done, they had to go to the Americans
Moreover, as one USAID official testified, the aid programs
raised villagers' expectations (and frustrations) so that
villagers' reaction to the ineptness of their officials 
is one of unrest. There is increasing awareness on the 
part of the villager that he has the right to determine 
his own future and certain benefits are entitled him 
under a central government system. This awareness, the 
freedom to express his views, and an increasingly better 
financial position have created social and political 
■problems which the traditional central government author­
ities find difficult to solve without upsetting the 
balance of large-family power, army strength, and the 
favored few.^°°
Since the objectives of U.S. foreign policy in Laos have been 
"to support and maintain the present Lao g o v e r n m e n t , which 
gave the U.S. freedom of action in Laos, wealth and power has 
remained concentrated in the hands of the tiny and corrupt 
elite; thus, the U.S. aid program had "to work through and 
around the elitism and corruption, but could not change it." 
Under these conditions the USAID effort "was hardly conducive 
to winning the political support which was the RLG's only 
guarantee of a political future."^90 The USAID could neither 
rally the Lao people to the RLG nor mobilize them against the 
Pathet Lao. Insurgency thrives on the structural and political 
weaknesses of an existing government. Since the RLG continued 
to be weak, divided, disorganized, urban-centered and corrupt.
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and since the Pathet Lao continued to win territory, greater 
emphasis was put on military counterinsurgency operations and 
escalation of the air "wars."
The concept behind the escalating U.S. air war has been 
as obscure and contradictory as its results. The aim of dis­
rupting the socio-economic fabric of life in the Pathet Lao 
territory and demoralizing the civilians has been accomplished; 
the air "wars" have been, on the whole, counterproductive.
Having ceded control of the air to the enemy for the past 25
years, and having learned to avoid bombing casualties, few
291Pathet Lao or North Vietnamese soldiers are killed. More­
over, bombing has mobilized the apathetic peasant and provided 
the Pathet Lao with more volunteers. The attitude of the 
peasant was "better to die fighting than die hiding from 
b o m b s . "^92 By 1970, Branfman, as well as other U.S. officials,held 
"The Pathet Lao were the only soldiers in Laos who felt they
knew what they were fighting for. Higher morale resulted in
oqoincreased combat efficiency."
The U.S. air war and increased assistance to AC and FAR 
ground forces since 1962 have strengthened the Pathet Lao most 
by increasing the North Vietnamese stake in the Laotian war. 
American actions, including the providing of air support for 
"monsoon" (rainy season) offensives and the bombing of the Ho 
Chi Minh Trails forced an increase in the number of North Viet­
namese soldiers committed to Laos. T.D. Allman (whose New 
York Times reports helped to persuade the Senate to hold
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hearings on Laos in 1969) wrote of the U.S. decision to in­
tensify the bombings and to support ground advances into Northern 
Laos during the monsoon, that
...observers say the most significant development in 
the recent history of the Laotian war came in November 
1968, when the full might of the U.S. air arsenal—  
previously concentrated on North Vietnam— was turned 
on Laos and the trails...the five-fold escalation of 
the U.S. bombing in Laos, the observers say, convinced 
the North Vietnamese that they had to meet force with 
counter force.29%
The North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao did respond in force. After 
a year and half of escalation and counter-escalation by each 
side, the war was extended farther South and West than ever 
before. By January 1972, most observers agreed that"the Pathet 
Lao with North Vietnamese support could take any or all the 
country at almost any time."^^5
The North Vietnamese have focused on controlling and 
operating the Ho Chi Minh Trail and securing Northeastern 
Laos; U.S. government sources recently acknowledged that "about 
80 percent of all North Vietnamese (in Laos) are in Southern 
L a o s . T h e  North Vietnamese have avoided taking towns con­
trolled by the RLG forces* or making massive forays into the 
Mekong. There are, at the maximum, five to ten thousand North 
Vietnamese troops in Laos^^^ostly in the Northeast and areas
*Despite its many failures, American reliance on air power 
guaranteed the achievement of one major aim: "bombing will,
if nothing else, prevent the Pathet Lao/North Vietnamese sei­
zure of any major Laotian towns."
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contiguous to the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Although in the 1970's
only about 5,000 North Vietnamese were actually engaged in
combat throughout Laos (since 60 percent of DRV troops are
used to maintain the Trail and other "North Vietnamese troops,"
mainly older men, women and girls, engage in porterage), this
still represents a significant increase over the number pre-
P Q ftsent in May 1964, when the U.S. air war began. Their 
number in Laos has increased with the growth of American, Thai, 
and other foreign military elements on the Royal Laotian 
Government side. There is little doubt that the North Viet­
namese have played a significant role in strengthening 
Communist ground power.^99
According to Langer and Zasloff, an important contribution 
of the DRV in the strengthening of the Pathet Lao movement has 
been to provide training to some of the Pathet Lao in North 
Vietnam and to provide advisors in Laos. The North Vietnamese 
also provide some Pathet Lao cadres with six weeks of political 
and military training in Hanoi. Since 1962, the North Viet­
namese have created other programs, such as in the field of 
medicine. Medical training programs are taught by a Lao teaching 
staff in Laos, but the materials and methods are prepared by 
the North Vietnamese. Based on testimony of one North 
Vietnamese defector. Captain Mai Dai Hap (who as an advisor 
to the Pathet Lao would have some first-hand knowledge of 
some training programs). Langer and Zasloff reports.
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There are a great many Vietnamese support activities... 
some derive from the presence of Vietnamese troop units 
and include the maintenance of roads by Vietnamese engi­
neers, transportation assistance by Vietnamese mili­
tary vehicles. A variety of technical assistance, both 
civilian and military is provided by Vietnamese specialists.
It seems plausible that North Vietnam would increase or extend 
its technical assistance and support activities during this 
period of increased U.S. intervention. Also, it conforms 
with an earlier quoted statement made by Soviet Ambassador 
Tchivilev to Marek Thee in 196I (when the Russians were per­
suading the Pathet Lao to agree to a political settlement):
...(the Pathet Lao) they found it difficult to cope with 
the new circumstances. They lacked political cadres and 
military experts to deal with administrative, political, 
and military problems. Of course, Tchivilev added, the 
Vietnamese were helpful in this s i t u a t i o n . . . 302
Thus, a logical outgrowth of the escalation of the war would
be increased Vietnamese training and technical assistance to
the Pathet Lao.
After 1962, there has been a progressive tying-in of the
Pathet Lao-held regions with neighboring areas of China and
North Vietnam. Both North Vietnam and China began significant
road-building programs. North Vietnam has built and maintained
Road 7 going into North Vietnam. The Chinese, who have nearly
completed a road linking the important Yunnan garrison town
of Sze-Mao with the northern Laotian provincial capitol of
Phong Saly, have sent men to build roads through northern Laos.
By 1973, an estimated 30,000 Chinese were in Laos (they were
reported there through early 1975), perhaps one-fourth were
troops to protect the road crews. When completed, these roads
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will give Northern and Eastern Laos better land communication
QQ 3with its two Communist neighbors.
In totality. Red China’s role in Laos has been limited. 
Except for its moral support and its economic and cultural 
mission, China’s involvement in the Pathet Lao zone has been 
minimal, due in part to the predominant role of the North Viet­
namese and its fear of another Korea-type war. In the northern 
corner of Laos, a number of Chinese workers and troops have 
been deployed for road building, but they present no threat, 
however, to Vientiane.^0^
In this period, the Soviet Union continued to maintain 
the diplomatic position that recognized the legitimacy of both 
sides. Besides its indirect assistance to the Pathet Lao, 
which was funneled through the North Vietnamese,* the Soviet 
Union continued to support the government of Souvanna Phouma and 
remain disengaged, despite the escalation. The Soviet Union 
has had the least at stake, directly; its major concern has 
been to avoid a direct confrontation with the United States 
in Indochina and to disengage itself militarily from the area.
North Vietnam, like the United States, has used Laotian 
territory in pursuance of its own ends. Most notably, this 
has been so in Southern Laos where North Vietnam "has even 
subordinated the interests of its allies in Laos, the Pathet 
Lao, to its own ends." Some observers, such as Noam Chomsky
*According to Marek Thee, the Soviet Union refused to 
increase Soviet military aid to Vietnam (for Laos) above the 
normal supplies (see Thee, p. 22).
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in At War With Asia, argue that North Vietnamese involvement 
in Laos has come largely after and in response to U.S. inter­
vention in Laos (and South V i e t n a m ) . T h e  evidence currently 
"available from the Pentagon Papers certainly does nothing to 
detract from such a thesis."3^7 It is also relevant to note, 
again, that American government sources acknowledge that most 
North Vietnamese forces are engaged mainly in activities 
related to the Ho Chi Minh T r a i l . T h u s ,  as Haney notes,
"it would be impossible to judge this aspect of North Vietnamese 
involvement in Laos without also judging the whole history of 
the Vietnam conflict and U.S. intervention in it."^^^ This 
is clearly beyond the scope of this study. Thus, while 
avoiding normative justification and while formulating no moral 
judgment concerning North Vietnamese intervention, the facts 
indicate that North Vietnam, like the United States, has ig­
nored Article 2, withdrawal of troops, and has incessantly 
violated Article 4 of the 1962 Geneva Agreements, which pro­
scribes the introduction into Laos of foreign military and 
paramilitary personnel. (Although the DRV did not play 
the crucial role the United States did in the overthrow of 
Souvanna's government in i960, or in the elections of 1958—  
Operation Booster Shot.) North Vietnam, like the United 
States, does have a record of deception concerning its involve­
ment in Laos. However, as Haney points out, "in terms of sheer 
destruction of Laotian lives and homes and countryside, the U.S. 
involvement in Laos has been far more disastrous than anything
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811the DRV has done." He supports this statement by citing
figures from the Cornell Air War Study,
...from 1965 through 1971, the United States dropped more 
than 1.6 million tons of bombs over Laos. In a country 
of 91,000 square miles, this amounts to more than seven­
teen tons for every square mile of the Kingdom. On a 
per capita basis this amounts to roughly six-tenths of 
a ton of bombs for every man, woman, and child In the coun­
try....The bombing has resulted In the destruction of 
all urban centers under Pathet Lao control and, In at 
least some areas, the destruction of virtually every 
village. Such vast destruction wrought so casually on 
one of the least-developed countries of the world surely 
cannot be justified on the basis of any comparable 
destruction wrought by Communist action In L a o s . 312
The Cambodian Incursion
From 1954 until his downfall In March 1970, Prince Sihanouk 
was a practitioner of a policy of neutrality. He perceived 
his purpose as maintaining the territorial Integrity and 
Independence of his small and weak kingdom of Cambodia. From 
1965-1970, however, because of the pressures of the war In 
Vietnam, Sihanouk acquiesced to logistical operations of the 
armies of North Vietnam and the National Liberation Front of 
South Vietnam on Cambodian territory. In December 1967,
Sihanouk offered to cooperate discretely with the United States 
against the Vietnamese Communist, backing up his offer by 
closing his eyes to secret American bombings of Vietcong and 
North Vietnamese sanctuaries inside his borders. After his 
downfall in 1970, Sihanouk stated that he tried to open dis­
cussions with the United States, but his overtures were twice 
rejected by Henry Kissinger.
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In July 1973s the Pentagon acknowledged that during 1969-
1970, acting under President Nixon’s personal authority, U.S.
military units (Special Forces and CIA operatives) engaged in
almost daily ground incursions, codename "Salem House," as
part of a wide range of top secret intelligence operations
ranging over much of Southeast Asia. They were coordinated
with secret B-52 and tactical U.S. air strikes against targets
in Cambodia. These secret operations went on for fourteen
months before Sihanouk’s downfall. Both the secret bombings
and ground incursions in 1969 were in flagrant contradiction
to President Nixon's statement on April 30, 1970, that prior
to the invasion U.S. policy had been "to respect scrupulously
the neutrality of the Cambodian p e o p l e . I n  addition to
the Cambodian incursions, according to information obtained in
interviews with former CIA agents and military specialists, who
had served with the National Security Agency, which covertly
synchronized all these operations. Tad Szulc, diplomatic
correspondent for the New York Times, reported other secret
U.S. operations in Southeast Asia:
Training of Khmer Serei units at two CIA camps in Greece.. 
William E. Colby, the new CIA director, acknowledged that, 
at one point in 1969, the Khmer Serei were supposed to 
be used by the U.S. in a coup against Prince Norodom 
Sihanouk’s regime, something the administration also 
disclaimed.
Cross-border commando raids into China from Laotian 
territory in 1969, involving Special Forces and CIA 
advisers.
...Covert actions in Burma at the confluence of 
Thai and Chinese borders. The CIA station in Bangkok 
was in charge of these activities.315
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The pressures within Cambodian politics in 1970, which 
arose principally from anti-Communist factions (particularly 
in the army which General Lort Nol commanded) were such that 
Sihanouk tried by both direct demand to the North Vietnamese 
and by appeal to the Soviet Union and Red China, to have the 
scale of the Vietnamese Communist operations reduced, if not 
eliminated. These pressures, which might have been exacerbated 
by the CIA, were a sufficient basis for ousting Sihanouk 
on March 10, 1970.^^^ In Peking, on March 23, 1970, Sihanouk 
announced that he would organize a new National United Front 
and The Peoples’ Armed Forces of National Liberation* against
•317the new Lon Nol regime.
From the beginning, the Khmer Rouge has been an ill- 
defined, tenuous alliance among Cambodian dissidents. For 
years, the Cambodian Communist Party failed to attract more 
than a few hundred members. However, with the ousting of 
Sihanouk, thousands of his supporters joined the Khmer Rouge.
In addition, 7,000 Cambodians who had trained in North Vietnam 
joined the insurgents. Although this composite has coalesced, 
evidence tends to indicate that Sihanouk and his allies neither 
trust nor like each other. It is unclear, what roles Sihanouk 
and Khieu Samphan, alleged leader of the Khmer Rouge, would 
play in a Khmer Rouge coalition government. Would Norodum 
Sihanouk be head of state? Sihanouk plainly states in the
*The provisional rebel government under Sihanouk is 
called GRUNK (Gouvernment Royal de l ’Union National Khmer). The 
Khmer Rouge coalition itself is known as FUNK (Front Uni National 
Khmer).
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closing of his recent book. My War with the CIA, that the 
"progressive" wing of the Khmer Rouge movement, involving 
younger Marxist leaders, has grown greatly in strength. He 
appears to perceive his role as that of a useful and effective 
figurehead and, insofar as that is possible, a mediator
between communist and n o n - c o m m u n i s t .
Although the Khmer Rouge have accepted weapons from both 
China and North Vietnam, the rebels have retained their inde­
pendence. Traditional rivalries have made the Khmer Rouge 
suspicious of Hanoi. Newsweek's Phnom Penh bureau claims 
that,
Reports leaking out of Khmer Rouge territory indicate 
that fighting is common between rebel troops and North 
Vietnamese units stationed in Cambodia to protect 
supply routes to South Vietnam. Hanoi refuses to supply 
the Khmer Rouge with sophisticated modern weapons such 
as anti-aircraft m i s s i l e s . 319
The old traditiona] conflict and rivalry between Khmer and
Vietnamese peoples was apparent in an interview Alain Bouc
had with Sihanouk in August 1970. In that interview, Sihanouk
said that he was assured by Peking and Hanoi that they had
absolutely no interest in "satellizing" Cambodia.
During the week of March l8, 1970, the Vietnamese
Communists held formal meetings with General Lon Nol on the
Cambodian sanctuary issue. When the meetings abruptly terminated
on March 23, the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese announced
their support for Sihanouk's government-in-exile. Subsequently,
the Lon Nol government terminated the trade payment arrangements
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which had enabled the Vietnamese to purchase and transport 
supplies to their forces inside South Vietnam. With that 
supply line broken, their logistical position became much 
more difficult.
In the meantime, the Chinese ambassador who had remained 
in Phnom Penh to negotiate with Lon Nol, proposed that the 
Peoples’ Republic of China would recognize Lon Nol’s new 
government if he would leave the Vietnamese sanctuaries alone.
In May, however, with the American incursion into Cambodia,
China broke diplomatic ties with Lon Nol and granted formal 
recognition to Sihanouk’s regime. Red China then signed an 
agreement with North Vietnam, increased its aid to Hanoi, and 
gave Sihanouk’s government a long-term interest free loan and 
free military aid.^^^ King Chen reports that ’’the United 
States forces in Indochina discovered that 60 percent of 
the captured weapons and 80 percent of the captured ammunition 
in Cambodia were from China.”
Perhaps the most conspicuous indication of Sino-Soviet 
differences with respect to Indochina, which were present 
but less obvious in Laos, is the fact that Peking recognizes, 
supports, and aids the Sihanouk regime, whereas, Moscow 
recognizes the Lon Nol government of Phnom Penh. The USSR, which 
has not only retained its embassy but has also expanded its 
personnel, is in disfavor with the Khmer Rouge. In July 1971, & 
Dispatch News Service International reporter stated that.
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According to Phnom Penh Deputy Finance Minister Mau 
Say, Moscow secretly ships trucks to the Lon Nol regime. 
Eighty-five Soviet professors have quietly returned to 
their teaching posts at the Phnom Penh Institute of 
Technology, and Cambodian students are given scholarships
to study in M o s c o w . 324
Sihanouk attributes Moscow’s nonsupport and nonrecognition 
of his government to the Soviet disapproval of his residence 
in exile which is in Peking and to the Sino-Soviet rift.
Moreover, he views the Russian conflict with Red China as
325being motivated by racism— "a fear of the ’yellow peril.’"
The Soviet rift with China and the Soviet priority for improved
relations with the United States proscribed recognition and
support for Sihanouk’s regime. In 1970, the Soviet Union
suggested a new Geneva Conference to deal with the Cambodian
crisis. As Hsiao notes,
...The Vietcong, Hanoi, Sihanouk, and China rejected 
a Soviet peace balloon for a new Geneva conference.... 
Moscow’s real concern, of course, was not the crisis 
itself but the growing Chinese influence which evolved 
during the crisis....Pravda delivered a sharp attack 
on China, criticizing the Mao Tse Tung policy of seeking 
domination in A s i a . 326
Thus, destablizing situations in Southeast Asia, such as the
Cambodian and Laotian crises, tend to work against Soviet
i n t e r e s t s . T h e  American incursion into Cambodia in 1970
and the later Vietnamese operations in Laos in 1971 served
to point up the restraint of Soviet policy, the exacerbation of
its rift with Peking, and the enhancement of Chinese influence.
American military officers were pleased that anti-communist
generals had come to power. A New York Times reporter was
told by American military officers, ’’I don’t see how we can
miss....This is the sort of thing w e ’ve been waiting for.’’̂ ^®
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Subsequently in April at Lon Nol's request, the United States
airlifted weapons to Cambodia. During this month, the United
•329States air war was expanded to include Cambodia. The New York 
Times reported on December 5, 1971, that according to an official 
study of the U.S. Government Account Office, "more than two 
million Cambodians have been driven from their homes...since 
the spring of 1970....Bombing is a very significant cause of
-3-30refugee and civilian casualties." The same report disclosed 
that 26 percent of Cambodian territory had come under saturation
jbombing.
In the Spring of 1970, the American military recommended
"the decisive action by which widening the war (Vietnam) would
shorten it."^^^ On April 30, President Nixon announced the
joint U.S.-South Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia; he also
stated that the troops would leave Cambodia in eight weeks.
In his article, "Beyond the Pentagon Papers: The Pathology
of Power," Fredric Branfman claims that.
The American invasion of Cambodia which began April 30,
1970 and lasted two months, was a relatively minor inci­
dent. Par more important was the full-scale air war 
initiated by the United States one month before the 
invasion began, and which has continued until this day 
(August 14, 1973).332»
*At this writing, a "civilian contractor" with strong ties 
to the CIA has been, according to Tad Szulc, "set up in business 
by the Pentagon to fly an arms and fuel airlift from U.S. air 
base in Thailand to Cambodia in violation of the spirit, if not 
the letter, of the law banning American military operations in 
Indochina. It is a transparent deception, but it has w o r k e d . "333 
Thus, these "civilian contractors" fly military equipment to 
Cambodia abroad borrowed C-130 air force transports to get 
around the prohibition in the Foreign Assistance Act of "mili­
tary or para-military operations by the U.S. in Vietnam or 
Laos or Cambodia."33%
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As In Laos, the American government has carried out parallel 
escalation on the ground. The Lon Nol Army, comprised of 
many Thai officers, has been expanded from some 40,000 at the 
time of the coup to well over 150,000 today; the polygot secret 
Secret Army, "part of the CIA’s 100,000-man force stretching 
throughout Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam, has 
been pressed into action in Cambodia.
The Cambodian conflict is essentially a civil war in which 
the American-supported Lon Nol government, despite almost 
$2 billion in American aid in five years, has proved too 
ineffectual and corrupt to win.^^^ The Cambodian government, 
which has already spent the $275 million in American military 
aid for the current fiscal year, is requesting an additional 
$222 million in supplemental aid. However, the American aid and 
the ground and aerial escalations of the past five years have 
been no more successful in Cambodia than they were in Laos.
The Lon Nol regime controls little more than Phnom Penh.
The Laotian Incursion
After the Cambodian invasion, the North Vietnamese 
increased their forces to improve their supply line through 
Laos and into Cambodia. Both militarily and politically, the 
situation in Laos had deteriorated further. Politically, in 
the Summer of 1970 as well as in 1971, Souvanna Phouma was 
threatened by a right-wing coup from generals who no longer 
perceived any need to preserve the facade of neutrality.
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However, as Stevenson notes, "one factor, helping to save
him was strong American support for him and firm opposition 
337to any coup."
Militarily, the situation was also disintegrating. The
increased North Vietnamese activity caused U.S. military men
to press for the invasion of the Laotian sanctuaries. The
military logic was clear. Having been cut off from supplies
through Cambodia, the North Vietnamese had expanded their
logistical network in Laos and appeared to be building strength
for an offensive against South Vietnam. A military attack by
ground combat troops at the fifty-mile-wide Ho Chi Minh Trail
network, could forestall the possible offensive and perhaps
permanently damage the North Vietnamese. Thus, eight months
after the Cambodian incursion, which at the time was said "to
have bought eight months for the processes of Vietnamization
and U.S. troop w i t h d r a w a l , a n o t h e r  invasion was launched.
Since the Cooper Amendment prohibits funds for U.S. ground
33Qcombat operations in Laos and Thailand, the decision was 
for 22,000 South Vietnamese to invade Laos; thus, "the legal 
prohibition on the use of American ground combat troops was 
ostensibly h o n o r e d . T h e  invasion was a failure; after 
only six weeks, with some South Vietnamese desperately clinging 
to the skids of U.S. helicopters, the last soldiers were 
brought out of Laos.
The many foreign actors involved in Laos from 1963 to 
1973, as well as in Cambodia, were not concerned with the damage
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and havoc they caused to the indigenous population. The North 
Vietnamese were determined to preserve and protect their access 
to the South by the use of the Ho Chi Minh and Sihanouk Trails. 
When pushed westward by the Cambodian and Laotian invasions, 
they extended and strengthened their holds in new areas. By 
providing troops to Souvanna Phouma's and Lon Nol’s government, 
the Thais continued to avoid conflict on their own ground.
The Americans refused to stop the bombings and the escalation 
of the war; they were willing to expand the war into Laos and 
Cambodia, claiming that it protected the lives of men being 
withdrawn from Vietnam.
In June 1971, after the Laotian invasion. Senator J.W. 
Fulbright called the Senate into secret session in order to 
ihform them of the extent of U.S. involvement in Laos. Sub­
sequently, after a special staff report for the Symington 
Subcommittee revealed for the first time the extent and cost 
of American activities in Laos, Congress voted to limit ex­
penditures except for U.S. bombing to $375 million for 1972- 
1973.^^^ Then, in 1973, a Congressional resolution ordered a 
halt to U.S. bombing in Cambodia and Laos at midnight August 
14, 1973.3^2
1973-1974
From 1954 to 1972, Washington policy makers perceived 
that the United States was confronting China and the Soviet 
Union in an effort "to contain." China and the Soviet Union, 
whose rift had intensified since I96I, were espousing different
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policies and were competing for influence over their Indo­
chinese allies, the Third World, and for leadership among the 
Communist states. As this case study and the Pentagon Papers 
reveal, Washington policy makers were slow in discerning the 
Sino-Soviet rift. As Marek Thee observes,
...the study (Pentagon Papers) reflects a mistaken per­
ception of the roles played by the Soviet Union and China. 
Throughout the study’s dominant concern is with "Communist 
expansion" perceived as part of an international great 
power contest. Even in cases where a distinction is 
made between the interests of Hanoi, Moscow and Peking, 
the final judgment leans to coordinated Communist 
bloc strategy. ...the Pentagon analyst notes: "What­
ever differences in strategy may have existed among 
Moscow, Peking and Hanoi, it appears that at each critical 
Juncture Hanoi obtained concurrence in Moscow with an 
aggressive course of action."343
However, with his move to create a detente with China,
President Nixon ended the 22 year "containment policy" toward
China. In a news conference on February 22, 1973, Dr. Kissinger
made it clear that "the substance of the detente was the two
344parties' movement 'from hostility toward normalization.'" 
Additionally, after years of negotiation and war. President 
Nixon agreed to a negotiated peace; the Vietnam war officially 
ended on January 27, 1973. These two events had a major impact 
on the Laotian situation.
At a news conference on January 25, 1973, Dr. Kissinger 
discussed the complexities of the situations in Laos and 
Cambodia in light of the recent Vietnam cease-fire (Paris 
agreement). He contended that divisions among Cambodians 
(Khmer Rouge coalition) who opposed the Phnom Penh government
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had complicated Cambodian cease-fire efforts,* while the 
situation in Laos was "simplified by the fact that leftist 
opposition to the Vientiane government is vested in the Pathet 
Lao." A cease-fire agreement was expected in fifteen days.
The International Guarantee Conference, provided for
in Article 19 of the Paris agreement, was scheduled to open
on February 26. As the Paris conference approached, Washington
policy makers were reluctant to enter it while continuing to
bomb heavily in Laos, "a strategy that probably would be the
-3l|5subject of accusatory speeches by the Communists." Thus, 
the United States strongly urged the Laotian government and the 
Pathet Lao to reach a cease-fire agreement. Additionally, 
according to an Indochinese correspondent, "The Hanoi govern­
ment may not have wanted to walk into the international con­
ference with the Laotian war hanging around their necks. The 
Americans seem to have felt the same way." Thus, on 
February 21, the Laotian negotiators, Phagna Phoumi Vongvichit 
for the Pathet Lao and Phagna Pheng Phongsavan for the Vien­
tiane government, signed a cease-fire agreement.
Under the 1973 agreement, the Laotian cease-fire "in 
place" began in both zones on February 22, 1973. The agree­
ment stated that "All armed forces of foreign countries must 
completely and permanently cease all military movements in 
Laos"^^® and "The armed forces of all sides must completely
*No Cambodian cease-fire agreement developed from the 
subsequent Paris conference.
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cease all military movement encroaching upon one another
oh qboth on the ground and in the air." Despite occasional 
U.S. bombings and infractions of the cease-fire by all actors, 
the cease-fire held together during the negotiations of a 
peace accord. (Technically, this accord is a protocol 
putting into effect the cease-fire agreement of February 22.)
During this period of protracted negotiations, the United 
States Congress acted to diminish the U.S. role in Laos and 
Cambodia. A Congressional order to halt U.S. bombing in Laos 
and Cambodia on August 15» and to end "all combat activities
^50in Cambodia and Laos at midnight August l4, 1973" was approved.
The United States could continue its military aid to Laos and
Cambodia. Thus, with the disengagement of U.S. forces from
Vietnam, with the recognition (i.e., Sino-American detente)
of the new international power configuration, and with the
Congressional ban on American military activities in Laos, the
possibility of a Laotian peace was greatly improved. Since
foreign actors (with Laotian factions collaborating) have
twice subverted previous coalitions, perhaps, if the Laotians
are left alone, peace may come to Laos. As New York Times
reporter, J.M. Markham, notes,
"Live-and-let-live attitude" of opposing sides in the 
Laotian conflict help to explain why Laos is the first 
of the Indochinese countries to apparently reach 
agreement on a military and political settlement....
Laotians will be content to muddle through in their own 
easy going fashion if left alone by outside pa r t i e s ... 351
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On September l4, 1973, approximately six weeks after 
Congress prohibited U.S. military activities in Laos, repre­
sentatives of the Laotian government and the Pathet Lao agreed 
on the basic structure of a coalition government and signed a 
formal agreement to bring about the third coalition in Laos' 
h i s t o r y . A f t e r  several more months of "hard bargaining and 
some arm twisting by Americans and Russians to achieve the 
present a r r a n g e m e n t ,"353 the Vientiane government and the Pathet 
Lao agreed upon a coalition administration and a list of cabinet 
members was presented to the King. The final protocol was 
signed on April 5, 197^, and the tiny landlocked Kingdom began 
its third attempt in two decades at a coalition government.
As J.M. Markham observed:
The protocol signed by the Laotian government and the 
Pathet Lao representative is the perfect recipe for 
national reconciliation— or for government paralysis....
The success or failure in instituting a coalition 
government depends on the attitudes of those who try,
or fail to try, to make it w o r k . 354
The political side of the agreement included: a coalition
government headed by a premier and aided by two deputy premiers;
the sharing of ministries between the two factions; formation 
of a political consultative council; and new national elections 
for the National Assembly. Souvanna Phouma was designated 
as prime minister. Apparently, his lack of a domestic power 
base was viewed as a crucial element in the coalition, because 
he threatens no one and can appeal to both sides to search for 
the common ground in any d i s p u t e . T h e  national coalition 
cabinet is comprised of five Pathet Lao members and five
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"Vientiane government"* representatives, and "two Intellectuals 
who advocate peace. Independence, neutrality, and democracy,
g C ̂
who will be agreed upon by both sides." The function of 
the government Is "to Implement- all agreements reached and 
the political program agreed upon by both sides."^5? The 
National Political Coalition Council, which Is headed by 
Souphanouvong, reflects the same membership as the coalition 
government. The functions of the Council are to help the 
government organize the elections for the National Assembly 
and to make policy recommendations. According to the agreement, 
the Council Is to be equal In authority to the Cabinet. More­
over, according to reports, Souvanna Phouma considers Souphanouvong
his natural successor.
The military side of the settlement Includes: the neutrali­
zation of the two capltols and the division of the country Into 
two zones; and, the withdrawal of all foreign troops by June 
4, 197%. The two sides agreed (for the first time) to neutralize 
the royal capltol of Luang Prabang and the administrative 
capltol of Vientiane, which were to be secured by the stationing 
of the Pathet Lao military and police units equivalent In 
size to the Royal Army garrison. By permitting Pathet Lao 
troops to be stationed In the two capltols, the agreement 
assuaged the Pathet Lao anxieties concerning their members' 
safety In the capltols. The agreement, which reflected the 
realities of the battlefield, provides for Pathet Lao control
*Term used In the agreement to refer to the merged neutral 
and right-wing faction which previously controlled the RLG.
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of about 80 percent of the territory and about one-third of
the people (many refugees left the area because of the saturation
bombing; also it is the less populated area). Thus, the
agreement was a formalization of the status quo, with the
Vientiane government controlling part of Western Laos and two-
thirds of the population and with the Pathet Lao controlling
most of the territory, including the northern and eastern
areas which border China and North Vietnam. In Kenneth Landon's
view, this is the most significant point in the agreement:
Thus, the two sides made it clear that the more things 
seemed to change, the more they remained the same and 
that Laos would continue to be divided along geographic, 
political, and ethnic lines running roughly from north 
to south in a fashion which gave most of the terrain 
to the Communist and most of the people to the government 
side.359
In the past the Pathet Lao has been better organized than
the opposition, and its policies have been more effective.
When ever the Pathet Lao were permitted to compete freely and
openly, as in the 1958 elections, in which many of their
candidates won seats in the National Assembly, they were
successful. Thus, it is not surprising that this agreement,
which granted the militarily superior Pathet Lao most of its
demands, has been beneficial to them since its implementation.
According to a New York Times correspondent.
The Pathet Lao has taken the lead over the Government’s 
disorganized rightist and neutralist competitors in 
the two months since the formation of a new coalition 
government. It has virtually taken military control of 
the royal capitol of Luang Prabang and, in Vientiane, 
it has its people at ministerial or subministerial levels 
in most of the important Government agencies....The
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Pathet Lao's most resounding forum has been the National 
Political Council, based in Luang Prabang and headed by 
Prince Souphanouvong, titular leader of the Laotian 
revolutionary movement....Premier Souvanna Phouma, 
always a neutralist, now plays role of umpire in the 
Cabinet. His accomplishments are seen as keeping Laos 
under one government, "nationalizing” the Pathet Lao by 
bringing them out of the jungle, and preparing Souphanouvong, 
his half-brother, to become his natural s u c c e s s o r . joO
In the Fall of 1974, J.M. Markham wrote a series of articles
on the current conditions in Laos. He noted that,
...unlike South Vietnam, the Laotian cease-fire has held 
and the regime appears capable of holding together.
Laos has a population of perhaps 3 million, most of whom 
live in the countryside and are little politicized....
Good relations exist between the Pathet Lao members of 
the mixed police forces and the residents of Vientiane 
and Luang Prabang....The rightist hold on the population 
is tenuous although they theoretically control two-thirds 
of the Laotian population...
Despite the continuing Laotian factionalism which was reflected 
in their dependency on different foreign actors and which 
is now reflected in stormy cabinet meetings, and despite the 
charges and countercharges of cease-fire violations by the 
different Laotian factions, the tenuous cease-fire and coalition 
government have remained in tact.^^^
According to the April 5 protocol, all foreign military 
troops had to be withdrawn by June 4, 1974. In addition, the 
agreement called on the American CIA to dissolve its paramili­
tary forces in Laos and to end the "secret war." It stipulated 
that the U.S. would have to dismantle its CIA contingent in 
Laos and the bases at which Laotian forces were being trained 
and equipped. The accord also cuts the number of U.S. personnel 
in Laos from 1,200 to about 600. The 1973 agreement contained
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the intriguing statement: "The parties concerned in Laos,
the United States, Thailand, and other foreign countries must 
strictly respect and implement this agreement. Unaccoun­
tably,^ the agreement made no mention of North Vietnam and did 
not overtly refer to North Vietnamese troops in Laos.
Since the June 4 deadline. Defense Minister Sisouk Na 
Champassak has claimed that North Vietnamese soldiers are 
still in Laos; "They have withdrawn into the Laotian scenery 
but not back to North Vietnam....The number of North Vietnamese 
is unknown because some units have pulled back from visible 
positions. According to U.S. official reports. North 
Vietnam has reduced its troop level in Laos and has shifted 
most of the remaining military men to administrative and logistic 
duties. With the breakdown of the Vietnamese cease-fire and 
with the intensifying Cambodian civil war, the North Vietnamese 
have and, in all probability, will continue to use Laotian 
territory for supply routes and base areas for operations in 
South Vietnam. Although it is a violation of the cease-fire, 
both the non-Communist Laotian faction and the U.S. government 
seem to be tolerating continued North Vietnamese presence in 
Laos. The Laotian government, aware that North Vietnamese 
troops will not leave as long as there is fighting in Laos, is 
therefore, disregarding the presence of the troops in the interest 
of national unity. The official North Vietnamese position is 
that there are no North Vietnamese troops in Laos, however.
*Perhaps it is indicative of the dominating influence of 
the Pathet Lao in drawing up the agreement.
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there are large numbers of engineers, civilian laborers, and 
others helping the Pathet Lao make improvements in its zone, 
particularly along the Ho Chi Minh Trail.
On May 23, 19?4, U.S. officials and Thai spokesmen 
announced that all American advisors and Thai mercenaries were 
withdrawn on May 22. However, Minister Petrasy has charged 
that a number of Thai and U.S. paramilitary personnel "had 
simply been ’camouflaged’ and not withdrawn." Moreover, 
according to several New York Times reports in late 197^ and 
early 1975, U.S. planes were "still flying reconnaissance 
missions over Laos in violation of the pact."^^^ American 
officials refused to comment. Although U.S. officials have 
a record of deception, it appears at this writing, that the 
United States is disengaging itself from Laos or at least, 
has reduced its role significantly. (In 197^-1975, only 
$55 million was given Laos in U.S. military aid.) In view 
of the past record no final judgment can be made concerning 
the role of the CIA and Thai "irregulars." The United States 
has given Laos $100 million (economic and military) in 
foreign aid for the fiscal year 1975. However, according to 
Senator Kennedy, by giving all aid to one faction— all economic 
aid goes to refugees and villages within the areas controlled 
by the non-Communist faction, and all military aid goes exclu­
sively to the Royal Laotian military units— the United States 
might be perpetuating political division in Laos, despite the 
formation of the new coalition government. However, the
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coalition government is also receiving $30 million from France,
Great Britain, Australia, and Japan. They also have obtained
an undisclosed amount from the USSR and North Vietnam. Thus,
American aid policy should not create a "hardship" in the Pathet 
368Lao zone.
Although there have been violations of the 1973 agreement
by foreign actors, it appears that, perhaps, the era has passed,
when there was a certain absurdity in speaking of foreign and
domestic policy of this tiny country, ravaged and divided by
invasion, foreign-supported rebellions, and civil war. This
statement is not pure speculation, it is based upon the realities
of the international system and the policies of Red China and
the Soviet Union in Laos in the 1960's, the Sino-American
detente, and the U.S. policies in Laos and Vietnam in the 1970's.
The new power configuration no longer necessitates a
U.S. reaction "to contain communism." The new international
power structure has become more diffuse and fluid. Many
local conflicts now will appear less threatening to the overall
balance than they did when the balance was perceived to be
both bipolar and fragile. Significantly, this affects the way
the major powers, especially the United States and Red China,
369view many local conflicts on Red China's periphery.^  ̂ This 
was reflected in an interview after the January 1973 Vietnam 
cease-fire agreement with Ambassador William Sullivan (the 
U.S. "field marshall" in Laos during the secret war). When 
asked about China's role in achieving the cease-fire agreement.
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he responded by saying that "China wanted a Balkanized Indo­
china with two Vietnams and independent states of Laos and 
Cambodia. A united Vietnam with Laos and Cambodia under its 
control would form one of the■strongest states in Asia and 
might establish a role in Asian affairs inimical to that of 
C h i n a . "370 According to Ambassador Sullivan, a powerful 
united Indochina would not be to China’s liking or advantage.
On the other hand, the Soviet Union would prefer a more 
united Indochina under North Vietnam’s control; this preference 
is based upon the larger pattern of Soviet design to encompass 
China. The Soviet Union, concerned over Chinese influence in 
Southeast Asia— such as in the Cambodian Civil War— has made 
new efforts to increase its influence in the area by offering 
economic assistance to some countries in the area, such as 
Burma and Indonesia, and by increasing its support to Hanoi 
in 1972.371 Thus (with the sharpening of the Sino-Soviet 
dispute, which has been reflected in their different responses 
to the Cambodian and Laotian crises and which America perceived 
only recently), the Soviet objective in the Southeast Asia 
area is to undermine China’s influence and thwart its ambition.
As illustrated in this case study, Peking’s apprehensions 
about a hostile Soviet Union at its rear impose new limits on 
its policies elsewhere and Moscow’s concern about China and 
their mutual uncertainty about American reaction to any mili­
tary action either might take in Asia, operate to reinforce 
other constraints against military intervention in the area.
305
With the development of the Sino-American detente and 
the Soviet-American detente, ideological lines have become 
blurred. This tends to defuse the automatic hostility char­
acteristic of the cold war, which was reflected in U.S. policy 
to Laos until 1973; it allows for greater flexibility and com­
promise. Thus, the Laotian agreement establishing a coalition 
government, which was an anathema to the U.S. in 1954 as well 
as in 1962 and necessitated its subversion of it, is more 
acceptable to both the United States and China in 1972. As 
Landon notes, the 1973 agreement is satisfactory to both the 
United States and China:
The agreement consolidated Laos into a pattern familiar 
since 1954, a pattern that seems satisfactory to 
China. The agreement should be viewed in light of the 
substantial presence of China in Northern Laos along 
the highway constructed by Chinese engineers and 
patrolled by Chinese troops. The highway ends at the 
River U, a small stream that has a matching highway 
started from its eastern side leading through Dien 
Bien Phu to Hanoi. The Chinese highway is a political 
symbol of China's interest in the nature of the Laos 
settlement. It would seem that a divided Laos suits 
China. It also suits the United States, since Laos 
would return to its traditional role of buffer between 
Thai and Vietnamese, a convenience to both and a
threat to n o n e . 372
The realities of the new power configuration, which 
were perceived by the Soviet Union in the 1960's and which 
resulted in its disengagement from Laos and its non-recognition 
policy of Sihanouk's regime, is presently resulting in an 
American disengagement from Laos and Cambodia. According to 
Landon, who previously perceived the Laotian conflict in the 
cold war context and who now views it in light of the new
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international structure, the question the United States must
now answer is what role it wishes to play in Indochina, if the
cease-fire breaks down:
The question is whether the United States should make 
itself responsible for keeping the peace in a parochial 
situation in which its national interest is not involved, 
since the Paris agreements ended the Indochina war as a
proxy war in which the United States confronted the
Soviet Union and China. The nature of the situation 
has changed.373
In the future, instead of bipolar confrontations as the
United States viewed the Laotian situation in the 1950*s and
1960’s, more and more situationsiwill be characterized by
"complicated and shifting patterns of competition, or cooperation,
•37Üor parallel action." It seems probable that, as a result 
of these factors, the new triangular polyarchic international 
balance may create a complex pattern of mutual constraints 
as it has in Laos, that could operate to inhibit and limit 
big power intervention in local conflicts and to encourage 
the pursuit of goals through political and diplomatic maneuvers, 
and economic competition. The Soviet and Chinese policies 
during the 1960’s and U.S. policy in Laos during the 1970’s 
tend to support this conclusion.
Even though intervention in Laos in the future appears 
less probable than in the past, indications of or the trend 
of any possible interventions might be drawn from an analysis 
of interventions in Laos from 1954-1967. The following con­
clusions were drawn from an analysis of the pattern of inter­
ventions over this period:
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(1) The analysis tends to indicate that superpower inter­
vention has or has had a tendency to be in support of the 
governmentj while non-superpower intervention has or has had 
a tendency to be in support of rebellious groups.
(2) There appears to be an inverse relationship between
time and superpower intervention. This tends to indicate that 
later interventions and possible future interventions would 
tend to be by a non-superpower intervener. Conversely, this 
analysis indicates that superpower intervention would possibly 
continue its decreasing trend.
(3) The tendency of superpower intervention has been a 
nation crossing border type. Due to the smallness of deviation 
in the type of interventions by both superpowers and non­
superpowers in Laos, the non-superpower would also have this 
tendency. Because of the inverse relationship of superpower- 
non-superpower intervention with the type of intervention, non­
superpower interveners might have a tendency to establish troops 
in Laos or might support rebellious groups within the boun­
daries of the non-superpower intervener so that rebel group
or groups could intervene within Laos.*
*See Technical Annex for a more complete statistical analysis
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TECHNICAL ANNEX: Chapter IV
In Laos, if intervention occurs, trends tend to indicate that 
the intervention would probably have a tendency to be by non­
superpower interveners crossing the border. Secondly, al­
though less likely, if superpower intervention possibly occurs, 
it would tend to be by crossing Laos* border and would tend 
to support the government.
Stepwise multiple regression was used to analyze the
data and to test this hypothesis. This analysis was performed
using the Regression subprogram of the Statistical Package for
the Social Sciences^ on the IBM 370 at the University of Texas
at Arlington’s branch of the North Texas Regional Computer 
2Center. The sample comprised 70 "intervention** events in 
Laos from the years 1954-1967. The sample was drawn from the 
World Handbook data collection.^ Intervention in this analysis 
has been defined as "any attempt to engage in military activity 
within the borders of another country with intent of influ- 
encipg the authority structure of that country."
In this analysis the dependent or criterion variable, 
"Intervention by the US and/or USSR," was measured by the 
following scale:
0 = the intervention involved neither the US nor
USSR
1 = the intervention involved the US
2 = the intervention involved the USSR




The Independent or predictor variables with score value
were :
Support decision of the intervener:
0 = non-supportive intervention
1 = supporting the government
2 = support of rebellious group
Year of intervention (scored as a time series):
1 = the intervention occurred in 1954 
14 = the intervention occurred in 1967
Type of intervention:
1 = intervention in which nation crosses a national
border
2 = intervener has troops already established in
the country (i.e., colonial or alliance troops)
3 = rebel forces "supported by and/or residing in
another nation"
4 = mercenary forces
5 = international organization forces
The mean for the criterion variable was .5000 which tends 
to indicate that most likely the interveners in Laos were the 
United States or non-superpowers. The mean of the "Support 
Decision" predictor variable was 1.5571 which tends to indicate 
that a decision was probably made by the intervener to support 
either the government or rebel group. The standard deviation 
was 0.5003 which tends to support this indication. The "Year 
of Intervention" predictor variable had a mean of 10.2857 for 
1963 with a standard deviation of 3.0557. The third inde­
pendent or predictor variable, "Type of Intervention," had a
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mean of 1.1143 with a standard deviation of 0.4676 which 
indicates that the predominate type of intervention has been 
by nation-crossing borders.
Through multiple regression analysis (stepwise regression 
was used) the plane of prediction or the plane of best fit 
was developed. (See Figure I) This plane had a Y (US-USSR 
intervention) intercept of 1.34204. (Because all of the B 
coefficients were negative their total was added to the 
constant. (2.23340 + (-.89136))) The slope was .60010. The 
confidence interval of the slope was found at the .01 level.
In this analysis standardized regression will be used where 
the intercept will be zero and the coefficients will be 
measured in Beta weights or Beta coefficients. Even though 
the correlations of the independent variables were only viable 
in one case ("Support Decision of Intervener"), "Year of 
Intervention" was included in the analysis because the data 
on interventions occur over time. "Type of Intervention" 
was included to determine the nature of the interventions.
(See Table A) This analysis proved to be significant beyond 
the .01 level (P (12.38117) DP (3/66)). Thirty-six percent 
of the variance was explained by the predictor variables.
The standard error of estimate was .49722. The sum of squares 
for the regression line was 9-18293 with a mean square of 
3.06098. The sum of squares for the residuals was 16.31707 
with a mean square of .24723. "Support Decision of Intervener" 
and "Year of Intervention" were significant at the .01 level. 
"Type of Intervention" was not found to be significant but
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Figure I
Standardized Multiple Regression 
of Intervention in Laos (1954-1967)
Y = US/USSR Intervention = Suppt. decision 
of Intervener 
= Yr. of Intervention 
= Type of Intervention
Neither
Y = -0,57520 - .23603 Xg - .11189 X 3 + 2.23340
Multiple R = .60010 R Square = .36OII Standard = .49722
Error
Ana. of Var. DP Sum of Sq. Mean Sq. F
Regression 3. 9.18293 3.06098 12.38117
Residuals 66. 16.31707 0.24723
)2y
Table A
CORRELATION WITH US/USSR INTERVENTION
Support Decision -.54798
Year of Intervention -.09362
Type of Intervention -.20394
was maintained in the regression for theoretical reasons and 
because it did not significantly reduce the P ratio of the 
regression (to an insignificant level). Because the standard 
error of estimate was small in all cases one can assume con-
5fidence that the sign of B and Beta are correct. The analysis 
indicated an inverse relationship between the criterion vari­
able and the predictor variables.
MAJOR FINDINGS OP THIS ANALYSIS
1. The analysis tends to indicate that superpower inter­
vention has and has had a tendency to be in support of the 
government, while nonsuperpower intervention has a tendency 
to be in support of rebellious groups as shown by the Beta 
coefficient of "Support Decision of Intervener" (-.57520).
2. There appears to be an inverse relationship between time 
and superpower intervention as shown by the Beta coefficient 
"Year of Intervention" (-.23603). This tends to indicate 
that later interventions and possibly future interventions 
would tend to be by a non-superpower intervener. Conversely, 
this analysis indicates that superpower intervention would 
possibly continue its decreasing trend of Intervention.
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3. The tendency of superpower Intervention has been of a 
nation-crossing-border type. Due to the smallness of 
deviation in the type of interventions by both superpowers 
and nonsuperpowers in Laos, the nonsuperpower would also have 
this tendency. Because of the inverse relationship of 
superpower-nonsuperpower intervention with the type of 
intervention, nonsuperpower interventions might have had a 
tendency to establish troops in Laos or support rebel groups 
within the boundaries of the nonsuperpower intervener so 
that the rebel group could intervene within Laos. This in­
dependent variable, "Type of Intervention," did not prove 
to be significant due to the lack of difference in behavior 
(score) of both groups (superpower and non-superpowers inter­
veners) as substantiated by the mean (1.1143) and the small 
standard deviation, 0.4676. The first standard deviation is 
primarily concentrated within the range of nation crosses 
border (1.5819). The second standard deviation would include 
troops already established within the country (Laos). The 
third deviation would slightly include rebel forces (at this 
point most of variance is accounted for— about 95 percent+). 
Due to the fact that the Beta coefficient is negative for 
"Type of Intervention" (-.11189), the research developed an 
inverse scale of behavior which included possible behaviors 
of the nonsuperpower intervener.
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NOTES--TECHNICAL ANNEX: Chapter IV
^Norman Nie, Dale H. Bent, C.H. Hull, SPSS, Statistical 
Package for the Social Sciences (New York: McGraw-Hill Co.,
1970)7
^Nancy B. Saunders served as technical assistant, 
programmer.
3 (The Yale World Handbook Data as collected under the 
direction of Taylor and Hudson— John Sullivan, "Interventionary 
Data.") As made available by the Inter-University Consortium 
for Political Research; also citing published version—
Charles Lewis Taylor and Michael C. Hudson, World Handbook 
of Political and Social Indicators (New Haven: Yale Uni-
versity Press, 1972), pp. 124-27, and Table 3.6, "External 
Interventions."
^John D. Sullivan defined intervention as "any attempt 
to engage in military activity within the borders of 
another country with the intent of influencing the authority 
structure of that country." This data refers to the initial 
intervention but not to the continuance of that event. See 
World Handbook Codebook, Part IV, p. 2.
^Ronald J. Wonnacott and Thomas H. Wonnacott, Econometrics 
(New York: Wiley and Son, 1970).
Chapter V 
CONCLUSION
This study has focused, examined, and stressed two 
systemic variables— the basic structure of the international 
system and the stability/instability of the national actors 
that comprise the system— as being especially potent as 
sources of intervention. By the basic structure of the 
international system is meant "the degree to which the capa­
bility for affecting the conduct of international life is 
dispersed or concentrated within the system."^ As elucidated, 
the triangular polyarchic system involves a greater dispersion 
of capabilities than a bipolar structure. The more dispersed 
the structure of the international system, the less the 
possibility that it can be rapidly or radically altered by 
a single development. Hence, as illustrated by Soviet behavior 
and policies to the Cambodian situation in the 1970's and to 
the Laotian situation in the 1960's, decision makers are "less 
likely to succumb to the temptation to engage in convention-
breaking behavior toward an unfolding situation in the inter-
2national system." Moreover, decision makers must remain 
aware of common interests even while they prosecute a variety 
of conflicting interests in various regional subsystems; 
essential actors are forced to modify their conflicts in a
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given subsystem by the fact that they have important common 
interests in other various regional subsystems which they 
do not wish to Jeopardize. Contrarily, interventionary behavior 
appears more likely to occur in a more tightly structured 
system such as in the bipolar. As exemplified in the Laotian 
case study, the rationale for whatever actions taken by the 
U.S. in Laos was based on its context in the cold war as an 
area directly threatened by international communism. Thus, 
in a tight system, a potential shift in the allegiances and 
ties of a national actor will appear more threatening to other 
national actors than would be the case in a more loosely
3structured international system.
During the periods of system transformation, i.e., bipolar 
to triangular polyarchic system, decision makers may have 
difficulty adjusting their behavior to the new systemic require­
ments. Thus, contradictory behavior of decision makers may be 
a symptom of difficulty adjusting their behavior to the new
lisystemic requirements. Contradictory behavior may be the 
result of previous historical commitment and experiences 
(i.e., bipolar system) determining the basis of some present 
choices and behavior styles. An illustration of contradictory 
behavior is Secretary of State Kissinger: having perceived
the new international situation, he became the major architect 
of the Sino-American/Soviet American detentes; however, in 
referring to our commitment to Cambodia and South Vietnam, 
he uses the rationale of the domino theory in advocating a
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greater commitment by the U.S.
The choices and activities of decision-makers can be 
guided by the cultural norms and historical precedents of the 
past international system (i.e., bipolar) that governed the 
behavior of their predecessors, or the choices can be guided 
by the changing demands that emanate from the present inter­
national system (triangular polyarchic). During a transfor­
mation period, decision makers’ foreign policy choices might 
be guided by both, or solely by the former. As Laos illus­
trated, U.S. decision makers in the 1960's did not perceive 
the new power configuration and were guided by the "old systemic 
rules." As Thee notes,
U.S. involvement in Indochina was rooted in an ideo­
logical misreading of postwar Asian realities. The 
Chinese revolution was seen as a creation of the Soviet 
Union, and the national liberation movements in Vietnam 
and Laos as projects of Moscow and Peking...
The stubbornness of the Kennedy administration 
in pursuing the Indochina struggle stemmed from mis­
conceptions about the nature of the struggle. The 
Indochinese Left was totally underrated and the contest 
was seen mostly as a key battle in the global confron­
tation with expanding communism...
The Indochina conflict revealed the depth of U.S.- 
Soviet-Chinese rivalries...5
Moreover, this lack of (U.S. decision makers’) perception was
reinforced by the fact that the new policy makers (the Kennedy
administration) at least initially tended to accept the
definition and analysis of the Laotian situation given by the
holdovers from the old administration. As Stevenson observes.
The definition of the situation given by the hold­
overs from the Eisenhower Administration was that of a 
Communist threat to capture all of Laos. They pointed
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to the large Soviet airlift and to the success of Kong-Le's 
troops, in contrast to Phoumi Nosavan's retreats. The 
men new to office did not try to change that definition; 
they accepted the analysis of the people from whom they 
had to learn about their Jobs. If Laos had received 
greater public attention during the autumn of I96O, if 
it had been an issue in the election campaign, the new­
comers might have formed their own opinions about the 
situation. As things were, they were slow to see the 
wisdom and the possibility of a neutral, non-Communist 
Laos. °
Two major features of the triangular polyarchic system, 
the rejection of the zero-sum game and the triangular structure 
which resulted from the Sino-Soviet dispute, should reduce the 
possibilities for essential actors' intervention in Asia. In 
the bipolar system and part of the transformation period, the 
presence of China and the desire to offset her potential in­
fluence were important factors in America's proclivity to
7intervene in unstable situations in Southeast Asia. With 
the continued development and U.S. recognition of the Sino- 
Soviet dispute and the triangular international balance,
American decision makers' compulsive fear of the Chinese pre­
sence has become subsumed to the new detente relationship, 
which is now an increasingly important element in U.S. decision 
making (i.e., U.S. disengagement from Vietnam and Laos).
The dispute and resulting Sino-American detente have 
contradictory effects on Soviet interventionary behavior.
The Soviet incentive to intervene in unstable situations in 
the Third World, especially Asia, to offset the potential 
influence of China is increased. However, as the case studies 
of Laos and Cambodia exemplified, the Soviet Union is restrained
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from taking this type of action by the following factors:
Soviet leaders are uncertain about American and Chinese re­
actions to any overt military intervention; Moscow does not 
wish to become entangled with the United States through the
process of competitive intervention in the affairs of minor 
8actors; and, Moscow is not willing to endanger the detente 
with the United States. Thus, Moscow has responded to the 
conflict with China by competing (i.e., mainly by economic 
and military foreign aid, trade, and diplomatic maneuvers) 
with the Chinese in many and varied situations in the Third 
World.
As elucidated in the case study, the Sino-Soviet dispute 
and the resulting triangular structure impose constraints on 
interventionary behavior of China, which is both apprehensive 
about a hostile Soviet Union at her rear, and the possibility 
of "collusion" between the United States and the Soviet Union. 
Thus, the dispute and the triangular structure have blurred 
ideological lines and have tended to defuse the automatic 
hostility characteristic of the cold war relationships between 
the United States and the Soviet Union and the United States 
and China.9
Thus, it seems probable that the prevalence of superpower 
intervention will be reduced with the establishment and 
recognition of the triangular polyarchic international struc­
ture since it creates a complex pattern of mutual constraints 
that inhibit and limit big power intervention in local conflicts
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This encourages major actors to pursue their interests through 
political, diplomatic, and economic competition and maneuvering, 
and through penetrative behavior.
The second type of systemic variable in this study of 
interventionary/penetrative behavior is the stability/insta­
bility of national actors in the system. The more precarious 
the authority structures of national actors, the greater the 
possibility that "convention breaking attempts to preserve or 
alter them will be l a u n c h e d . A s  Rosenau observes,
...top officials everywhere are likely to be particularly 
sensitive to the stability of foreign governments. The 
less the stability the greater their readiness to break 
with tradition and undertake unconventional efforts to 
avert the dangers of— or seize advantage in— the unstable 
situation.il
Thus, the less viable an actor is (i.e., Cambodia and Laos), 
the more susceptible it will be to intervention by outside 
actors. Oran Young observes that "a determinant of the 
opportunities for intervention in international politics is
the relative internal viability of the actors in an inter-
12national system." He contends that during periods of extended
civil strife, "the ability of an actor to resist external
13incursions tends to decline." Moreover, various local factions 
are apt to "find it expedient, at least in proximate terms, 
to encourage intervention."^^
C.R. Mitchell is skeptical of the idea that some logic 
in internal conflict situations impel domestic parties to 
appeal for aid, since there are many examples where civil 
strife existed but no demands for external aid were made and no
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significant foreign involvement took place. He suggests that
"when enquiring whether outside involvement is likely, questions
should be asked about the nature and intensity of the conflict."
Mitchell posits that key elements in determining whether to
appeal for external involvement appear to be associated with
the "level of social integration and political legitimacy
achieved by the political system, and the relative importance
attached by the parties in conflict to achieving their goals.
Additionally, there appears to be some relationship between
the nature and intensity of the domestic violence, and the
perceived costs involved in calling in an outside actor. As
Mitchell notes, "the more intense the conflict, and the more
likely the costs of an ally’s involvement will be perceived as
17lower, and the advantages higher." These observations tend 
to be supported by the Laotian and Burmese case studies and 
seem to be plausible. As elucidated in this study, both 
Burma and Laos lack integration and have had to deal with 
insurgents. The Burmese elite, which have not had to cope 
with a Pathet Lao organization, apparently have placed a 
higher value on the maintenance of the existing political and 
social system (rather than the gains of defeating the insurgents 
with external aid). Moreover, since the Burmese military has 
been able (barely) to cope with the disunified and anomic 
insurgents, the Burmese elite perceive the cost of an ally’s 
involvement too high and the advantages too low. Additionally, 
the Burmese elite did not obtain or retain their power through
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external actors* support or Intervention. In contrast, the 
Laotian elite which viewed foreign Intervention and penetration 
"as necessary to the preservation of their elite model of
government from Increasingly effective attacks and counter-
18organization by the Pathet Lao," have perceived the costs of
an ally's Involvement to be lower, and the advantages higher.
The Laotian elite has always been racked with factionalism;
thus, the Laotian faction In power has had to deal with political
challenges from the Pathet Lao and with other political elite
faction power moves. Consequently, an elite faction (I.e.,
Phoumi Nosavan, Phoul Sananlkone, or Souvanna Phouma) could
only maintain power with the aid of a foreign actor. Thus,
the faction, which was In power, obtained Its "political
support" or "legitimacy" from neither the populace, other
elite faction, nor the military, rather from a foreign actor,
namely the United States. As Stevenson notes,
Washington officials were sensitive to anti-communism. 
Because of their own concerns, Americans tended to 
view the struggle against Communist Influence as the 
major Issue In Lao politics while In fact the deeper 
reality was and Is the nonldeologlcal factionalism 
among the ruling elites.^9
Thus, as the case studies Illustrate, the degree of Internal
cohesion, and of (elite as well as mass) shared values, as
well as, the degree of territorial, national, and political
Integration within any political system seem to be Important
factors deciding whether domestic conflicts reach levels of
violence. As Mitchell observes.
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Internal unity and lack of violent conflict appear to 
be functions of the level of legitimisation and support 
enjoyed by the political system, of the integration of 
various social and ethnic groups within that system 
and a low level of aggregate or group frustration.
These in turn, depend upon structural factors that 
differ from situation to situation and system tosystem.20
However, since a high level of internal conflict is not enough 
in itself to bring about intervention, attention must also 
be directed to the international system, or as Mitchell 
states, "to those factors outside the situation of domestic 
strife itself which decides whether external involvement takes 
place."21
According to Mitchell, if a situation of high level 
civil strife exists within a political system, "at least one 
necessary condition for external involvement has been fulfilled." 
Intervention can then occur in two circumstances, according 
to Mitchell:
1. When a direct appeal has been made to an external partyj
2. When no such appeal has been made.
In Burma, there were no connecting links between the disunified 
domestic insurgents or the "appealers" and the external party 
or the (potential) "intervener" to whom the appeals were made. 
Contrarily, in Laos, the cold war imperatives and the anti­
communist philosophy of American and Laotian elites provided 
the necessary linkage between the "appealers" and the "inter­
veners." As Stevenson notes.
22
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Whenever the United States did intervene to try to in­
fluence the course of events in Laos, it tended to 
side with those most willing to use the rhetoric of anti­
communism rather than those most likely to strengthen 
and make viable the fragile bonds of the Laotian
political system. 3 
On the other hand, the linkage between the Pathet Lao and 
the North Vietnamese stemmed from an identical enemy, the 
U.S., adjacent territories (Pathet Lao zone abuts North 
Vietnam), and similar philosophies.
In certain societies, in which government has either 
never developed or has completely broken down, "anarchical
p lidecentralization" exists. The Laotian system, politically,
territorially, and nationally unintegrated, could serve as an
example. As the case study exemplified, Laos, lacking a viable
central authority, allowed American operatives and their
clientelle factions tremendous freedom of action. The lack
of a viable centralized Laotian authority and the absence of
clear cut decisions in Washington gave the U.S. officials in
the field "a hunting license to fight for their own preferred
p o l i c i e s a n d  to support their own preferred faction. Policy
was inadequately controlled by the highest officials in
Washington; "control of American operatives and their clients
26was never easy;" the CIA, Pentagon, and State officials in 
Laos consistently fought any restrictions on their freedom 
of action in support of their clients. Additionally, the 
Americans in the field encountered no resistance from the 
factional Lao power structure. Thus, as one American official 
in Vientiane stated in I960, "this is the end of nowhere. We
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can do anything we want here because Washington doesn’t seem 
to know it exists.
Moreover, this anarchical decentralization (resulting 
from a lack of political, territorial, and national integration), 
the nonideological Laotian factionalism, and a general 
shortage of capabilities permitted Laos to be transformed 
from a national political system to a penetrated political 
system.
THE LAOTIAN PENETRATED POLITICAL SYSTEM
By the late 1950's, Laos’ national political system was
extensively penetrated by external actors and therefore it
was no longer the only source of legitimacy or the unequivocal
employer of coercive techniques. This contends that external
actors permeated Laos’ political system until late 1973,
and that its functioning embraced actors (i.e., U.S.), who
were not formally members of the system. Such a system is
referred to as a penetrated political system and its essential
characteristics, according to Rosenau, are defined as follows:
A penetrated political system is one in which non­
members of a national society participate directly 
and authoritatively, through actions taken jointly 
with the society’s members, in either the allocation 
of its values or the mobilization of support on behalf of 
its goals. The political processes of a penetrated 
system are conceived to be structurally different from 
both those of an international and those of a national 
system. In the former, nonmembers indirectly and 
nonauthoritatively influence the allocation of a society’s 
values and the mobilization of support for its goals through 
autonomous rather than joint action. In the latter non­
members of a society do not direct action toward it and 
thus do not contribute in any way to the allocation of 
its values or the attainment of its goals.2°
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Another characteristic of a penetrated system is that national
societies always serve as the site for penetrated systems.
Additionally, penetrated polities are characterized by a
shortage of capabilities; a desire by the penetrated polity
to compensate for, or the external actor to take advantage
of this shortage, explains the participation of the non-member
in its political process. The shortage may stem from lack of social
cohesion (as in Laos); it could involve military weaknesses
(as in Laos or Vietnam); or it may be of an economic kind
(as in the case of a recipient, Laos, receiving foreign aid)
As the Laotian case study indicates, the U.S. role in 
Laos clearly involved thorough participation in the allocation 
of Laotian values and in efforts to mobilize popular support 
for the selected values (i.e., U.S. economic and military 
aid programs— Laos is, "the only country in the world where 
the U.S. supports the military 100%;"^^ the U.S. controlled 
and coordinated the "four wars in Laos;" and U.S. economic 
aid comprised 60 percent of the Laotian budget). The 
United States not only exerted influence upon the Laotian 
political system but actually participated in the processes 
through which the system allocated values, coordinated goal 
directed efforts (i.e.. Operation Booster Shot; the Americans 
directly administered the aid programs to the Laotian popu­
lace; and significantly, the U.S. aid mission was called the 
"parallel government," and the USAID director was referred 
to as the "second prime minister.") and legitimately employed
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coercion (i.e., suspension of aid to recalcitrant factions
to bring them into line— specifically, suspension of aid to the
Phoumi Nosavan faction in order to stop the military fighting
during the Geneva negotiation). Moreover, the United States
engaged in bargaining within the system, "taking positions
32on behalf of one or another of its components." (For example, 
CIA support and backing of Phoumi Nosavan in igGO's; backing 
right-wing coup d'etat and the consequent creation of a figure­
head government. As Roger Hilsman stated, "by merely with­
holding monthly payment to the troops, the U.S. could create 
the conditions for toppling any Lao government whose policies 
it opposed.")33 Most important, according to Rosenau, "the 
participation of non-members of the society in value-allocative
and goal attainment processes is accepted by both its official-
34dom and its citizenry," therefore, the decisions "to which
non-members contribute are no less authoritative and legitimate
35than are those in which they do not participate."
During the 1950's and 1960's in Laos, penetration was
thoroughgoing; the United States was centrally involved in
efforts to mobilize support for certain political factions
and values as well as for military operations. Thus, Laos
was a "multi-issue" penetrated polity. As Rosenau explains,
...so as to differentiate degrees of penetration as 
well as the structural differences to which they give 
rise, it seems appropriate to distinguish between 
multi-issue and single-issue penetrated systems, the 
distinction being based on whether nonmembers participate 
in the allocation of a variety of values or of only a 
selected set of values.3o
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Penetrated systems like national and international systems 
are not static. They come into existence, develop, or dis­
appear "as capabilities, attitudes, or circumstances c h a n g e . "37 
During the 1950's until the Sino-Soviet rift, the Peoples' 
Republic of China was a penetrated system, however, during 
the 1960's it became a national one. Laos was transformed
into a penetrated system during the 1950's and 1960's;
however, with the Sino-American detente, the recognition of 
the triangular polyarchic international structure, resulting 
in American disengagement from Laos (and Vietnam), Laos, 
ruled by a coalition government, emerged as a devasted but
a national political system in 1974.
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